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ABSTRACT 
 
Those who are interested in the public mood, including politicians and economists, 
comment that the public are becoming ever more sceptical about many things, but health 
risk information should not be one of them. If health risk information is perceived by the 
public as ‘just another scary story’, or ‘more of the same we heard last month’, then the 
ability of risk messages to convey urgency and recommend action could be greatly 
diminished; the ‘cry wolf’ scenario becomes more real every time a threat appears in the 
media but fails to materialise. 
 
This thesis explores how avian influenza, (H5N1), as a health risk category, has been 
reported and represented in the New Zealand media. By analysing avian influenza‐related 
items in four New Zealand newspapers over a six‐year period, 2002‐2008, and by 
comparing results with those found in a U.S. study by Dudo, Dahlstrom & Brossard 
(2007), this thesis explores the dominant themes and discourses the media drew upon 
when reporting the health threat of avian influenza. In addition, data from four focus 
groups sessions was analysed for the purpose of exploring public perceptions of health 
risk messages and the influence of the media on those perceptions.  
 
This thesis was situated within a constructionist epistemology, and employed a mixed‐
methods methodology with content, thematic and textual analyses. Risk communication 
theories and models, media conventions of agenda‐setting and framing, and sociological 
concepts informed how the topic of health risk communication was operationalised.  
 
The analysis of the focus group data explored how the participants discussed the threat 
of H5N1; how they constructed concepts of personal and community risk, what role, if 
any, they attributed to the media in their construction and how they positioned 
themselves in regards to illness and contagion. The focus group analysis revealed that 
three dominant themes ‐ risk, media and ‘othering’ – represented how the focus group 
participants talked about the risk of avian influenza. These and several sub‐dominant 
themes shared similarities to those found in the newspaper analysis. Whilst initial 
discussions seemed to indicate a nonchalant attitude towards the risk of avian influenza, 
the many topics and themes that characterised the way the participants discussed the 
risk between them, showed that they had thought about the personal consequences of a 
possible health risk, and had formed strong opinions about many facets of that risk.  
 
Results from the newspaper analysis largely mirrored those of the above U.S. study, and 
showed that the New Zealand media favoured episodic over thematic framing; 
sensationalising the reporting of avian influenza, whilst providing little in the way of 
scientific and contextual information. Moreover, the analysis showed that, when 
reporting health risks, media templates are well established. The analysis of the focus 
group data revealed that the participants wanted media health risk messages to be clear, 
concrete and factual. However, this desire for messages that communicate certainty 
about risk, which is, by definition inherently uncertain, raises questions about the very 
nature of risk communication. 
 
Findings of this thesis suggest that future risk communication research should focus, not 
on how the media are reporting health risks, but how the public conceptualise risk, 
construct it in times of crisis and evaluate their ability to control it. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Media communication about health scares is a responsibility with implications for public 
understanding of personal risk. Observers of media reporting have found that in reporting 
illness and disease there is a propensity to construct the issues by favouring some language 
over others. The media have used scare language and tactics that often afford the risk a 
‘threat-status’ out of all proportion to the estimated actual threat. By repeating stories, 
suppositions can become ‘facts’, and members of the public can react to these ‘facts’ in a 
disproportionate way; for example, changing their behaviour, becoming anxious and 
worrying about a distant threat that, over time, does not eventuate. When this happens, 
the public’s perception of the threat can change, creating a resistance to fearful news. As a 
result, the next time the media reports a health scare, there is more debate about the 
‘truthfulness’ of this threat. Early warning of possible disasters can have positive outcomes 
such as timely preparedness in the form of purchasing flu masks or anti-viral medications; 
however, as Nerlich and Halliday point out: ‘if warnings are issued too early, too frequently 
or in a context of heightened scientific and social uncertainty, they may also have the 
opposite effect, of demoralising individuals and society, neutralising urgency, producing 
cynicism and indifference and stifling sustained investment’ (Brown citied in Nerlich and 
Halliday 2007:48).  
This thesis explores and analyses the communication of health risk messages. It 
examines how the New Zealand media reported the global health threat of avian influenza 
during the period January 2002-January 2008, and compares research findings with the 
results from a U.S. research paper published in 2007, which also investigated media 
reporting of the same health threat (Dudo, Dahlstrom & Brossard, 2007). Using the avian 
influenza as a case study of health risk reporting, this thesis explores episodic and thematic 
framing of news stories (Iyengar 1991), variables of self-efficacy, risk-measurement, the 
use of sensationalism and emotive words and the incidence of non-contextual quantitative 
news stories. It also examines attitudes and perceptions about avian influenza held by 
members of the New Zealand ‘public’ and the relationship between these perceptions and 
media reporting.  
Central questions that direct the research and methodologies for this thesis revolve 
around the extent of media’s influence on public perceptions, in relation to the reporting 
of health risk events. Existing literature makes a number of claims about how to devise and 
identify effective risk communication, but much of it does so from one perspective only; 
for example privileging ‘expert’ voices that often consist of scientists, government health 
officials or medical authorities. Other literatures introduce the notion of ‘the public’ as 
stakeholders in the risk communication process, but do not underpin these theories with 
qualitative empirical research into what shapes risk perceptions. Assumptions about what 
constitutes ‘good or effective risk communication’ are challenged in this thesis through 
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examining the lay public’s perceptions of, and opinions about the risk of avian influenza as 
reported by the New Zealand media. Did the media represent this health issue to the New 
Zealand public in an identifiable way, and if so, how much of a role (if any) did this 
representation play in influencing the public’s perception of personal and community risk?  
Risk communication is the link between risk analysis, risk management, and the 
public body. Important elements are the trust and credibility of the message source, the 
quality and clarity of the message design, the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery 
channel, and the involvement and acceptance of the target audience; the lack of any of 
these components ‘undermines the best efforts’ (Covello, McCallum and Pavlova 1989:9). 
One strand of research reported in the literature suggests that in order for any health risk 
information to be received by the target audience and acted upon in a rational and 
measured way, it needs to be regarded as balanced and credible, informing about the risk 
and pointing to how any possible risks could be mitigated [italics added] (Covello et al. 
1989). Trust can be further strained when trusted sources of health information - health 
organisations and government health bodies - are perceived to have a vested interest in 
which action is taken; drug companies promoting anti-viral medications to prevent the 
onset of flu symptoms is one example.  
Since 1997, the avian influenza virus (H5N1) has been closely monitored by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), when H5N1 was first reported to have infected humans 
in Hong Kong. In 2003, four Asian countries reported H5N1 outbreaks with 100 human cases, 
and by December 2005, five further Asian countries as well as Turkey and Romania reported 
184 infections that resulted in 103 deaths. To June 2008, according to the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), there have been 385 cases and 243 deaths from avian influenza world-
wide.1 This represents a 63 percent case-fatality rate,2 and when compared to the 2003 
SARS outbreak which had a rate of 15 percent, or the flu or common cold which kills less 
than 5 percent of those who catch it every year, H5N1 has the potential to be the most 
lethal flu virus yet. However, although there is worldwide scientific consensus that H5N1 
has the potential to mutate from its present form to one that easily transmits from human-
to-human, the virus, in its current form, does not easily cross over to humans and as such, 
there is no guarantee that the present threat will result in the predicted lethal pandemic.  
Despite the fact that avian influenza has been in the world public arena since 1997, 
the New Zealand press did not begin to report it widely until 2005. Media reports about 
avian influenza and its potential for disaster began with just one story in 2002, increasing 
to the highest incidence of reporting in 2005 with 189 articles.3 This pattern of reporting is 
similar (but not identical) to that found in a paper published in the journal Science 
Communication in 2007 by Anthony Dudo, Michael Dahlstrom and Dominique Brossard, 
                                                 
1 Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) as reported to World Health 
Organisation (WHO) , http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/ 
2 Case‐fatality rate is the percentage of people who died after being infected.  
3 From analysis of news stories between 2002‐2008 reporting avian influenza. Sourced from: The Auckland 
Herald, The Wellington Dominion, The Christchurch Press and The Otago Daily Times. 
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which investigated the U.S. media reporting of avian influenza during the period January 
2000 – January 2006. Dudo et al. analysed 360 articles printed in four major US newspapers, 
and using the concept of ‘quality’, assessed the coverage related to risks posed by the 
avian influenza. Measures of self-efficacy, risk magnitude, risk comparisons, sensationalism 
and episodic and thematic framing were examined, with findings revealing a predominance 
of the use of episodic framing with minimal self-efficacy information. In their conclusion, 
the authors suggest further research be carried out to build on their results and to examine 
‘how the identified content might be participating in the shaping of public perceptions of 
the risk related to avian flu’ (Dudo et al. 2007:451). Public perception of risk depends on 
several factors: the level of consensus about the risk, the amount of anxiety created by the 
spectre of the risk, the level of personal control over the risk and the costs that may be 
incurred when preparing for the risk. Therefore, as different types of risk may create 
different stressors, more than one communication technique may be needed (Dudo et al. 
2007).  
This thesis endeavours to understand people’s concept of risk associated with avian 
influenza from their point of view, with an assumption that each is constantly interpreting 
his or her environment. This approach is particularly useful because constructionist theory 
would suggest that the avian influenza pandemic is not just being understood as a medical 
and social fact, but it also has particular meanings attributed to it. For example, blame 
may be attached to those who catch the disease or to those countries that seemingly fail to 
contain the spread of contagion, and through political or economical motivations, 
unwittingly spread the disease. Therefore, the media representation of avian influenza in 
New Zealand newspapers is an important component of its social construction. 
With regard to research for this thesis, knowledge gained is regarded as situated 
and indeterminate. The categories that people employ in helping them to understand the 
natural and social world are considered to be social products, that is, their meaning is 
constructed in and through interaction, but rather than assuming that knowledge in the 
social domain is determinate, this thesis endeavours to look at trends within wider 
contingent processes. Discourses are a way of articulating knowledge, but are more than 
just ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the ‘nature of the body, 
unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern’ 
(Weedon 1987:108) and can both constrain the production of knowledge and enable new 
knowledges and differences. As Michel Foucault (1973) argued, discourse constructs the 
topic; it defines and produces the objects of our knowledge and governs the way that a 
topic can be meaningfully talked or reasoned about. In terms of medical discourses, of 
which health and the body is but one, Foucault also argued that since the 18th century the 
body has been the focal point of disciplinary power, where bodies have been labelled as 
deviant or normal, hygienic or unhygienic, as controlled or ‘in need of control’ (Lupton, 
2006:24). Through an analysis of risk-related discourses in relation to avian influenza, this 
thesis seeks to understand how the New Zealand media, through the way that they 
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represented and reported the health threat of avian influenza, have contributed to 
discourses about health and disease, and have, in turn, influenced how the threat from 
avian influenza has been constructed.  
How ‘the public’ understands scientific information presented by the media 
represents the focus of a large body of human science literature and research and there are 
different ways to approach this understanding: from psychologically cognitive approaches 
to sociological theories of interactionism, constructionism and models of mass 
communication and effects. Because of the focus on media representations rather than 
audience reception, this thesis will not use cognitive interpretations of behaviour such as 
causal attributions, third-person effect and accessibility bias to conceptualize the public 
understanding of risk (Jones and Nisbett 1972; Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Rather, this thesis 
is interested in how the media report and represents risk, the way it conceptualises 
individuals within these representations, and the way the public interpret and respond to 
media risk messages.  
Nelkin (1987) positions the media as an integral part of this understanding and 
states: 
The press should provide the information and the understanding that is 
necessary if people are to think critically about decisions affecting their 
lives. For most people the reality of science is what they read in the press 
[and] they understand science less through direct experience or post 
education than through the filter of journalistic language and imagery 
(p.2).  
 
Critical to the public’s understanding of health crises and to their uptake of risk messages is 
that the messages are easily understood, they are relevant to the audience, are deemed to 
be credible and that they grab their attention. Moreover, it is in the use of concrete 
images, examples and anecdotes about specific actions that people can take, that risk 
messages and information become relevant (Covello et al. 1989:11). Further discussion in 
chapter 3 will clarify the notion of ‘the public’, how it is mobilised in these contexts and 
why it is important to this thesis. 
Risk and fear discourses greatly influence the everyday worldview people have 
about what constitutes danger and hazards. Commonplace events are underestimated in 
terms of risk but exceptional and abnormal incidents can rouse feelings of panic and 
anxiety. Mary Wilson, a public-health researcher at Harvard University said: 
We spend enormous amounts of money on problems that pose a trivial risk, 
[for example] Europe forked out $2.4 billion to defend itself against mad-
cow disease which infected 10 humans. These fears drive public policy, and 
picking the ‘wrong’ ones can distract us from bigger killers (cited in 
Altheide 2002:87).  
 
One way to operationalise the meaning-making processes in the news media is 
through the concept of framing which sociological theory posits is influenced by cultural 
narratives, symbols and stereotypes (London 1993). Information and news needs to be 
embedded within a meaningful context in order to be clearly understood and a media 
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frame organises relevant ideas, whilst also suggesting what is salient and topical. Framing, 
regarded as a ‘second-level’ agenda-setting media construct, is the term that describes 
how news stories are constructed in the media; it can draw attention to particular issues, 
and can refer to what is included as well as what is excluded. It also encompasses a broad 
range of cognitive processes such as moral evaluations, causal reasoning, appeals to 
principles and recommendations for treatment of problems (Weaver 2007). Scholars have 
described framing in several ways ranging from ‘a subtle change in the description of a 
situation’ to a ‘stated or implied argument’ (Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Scheufele 2000) 
and have shown that a change to the wording or presentation of an issue can powerfully 
influence decision outcomes for those who engage in an issue through the media. A further 
consequence of a media framing effect can be that blame (for an issue or risk event) is 
accorded to an organisation or individuals, a phenomenon that Shanto Iyengar (1991) has 
coined as ‘attributions of responsibility’.  
Those interested in the ‘public mood’, including politicians and economists, 
comment that the public are becoming ever more sceptical about many things but this 
thesis argues that health risk information should not be one of them. The notion that health 
risk information is up for debate has ramifications for bio-security and health and the ‘cry 
wolf’ scenario becomes more real every time a threat appears in the media but fails to 
materialise. A key assumption of this thesis is that if health risk information is perceived by 
the public as ‘just another scary story’, or ‘more of the same we heard last month’, then 
the ability of risk-messages to convey urgency and recommend action could be greatly 
diminished, or even negated. 
To date, there has been not been any academic research about how health risk 
messages are presented, reported, and then received and processed by the New Zealand 
public. Just as importantly, as a result of the threat of avian influenza not eventuating in 
the timeframe implied by media reports, there is a need to question whether the public’s 
reaction to potential risk from the avian influenza virus has resulted in ‘warning fatigue’.4 
This thesis used the U.S. paper as a basis for comparison with the New Zealand media 
reporting of the avian influenza, to build upon the U.S. results and to add to knowledge of 
media reporting of health risks in New Zealand. In addition to a comparative study, this 
thesis also analysed public perceptions, understanding and opinions about the avian 
influenza. Qualitative data were collected during the recording of semi-structured 
interviews, within both a focus group setting and one-on-one discussions. These research 
methods enabled data to be used for the purpose of exploring general perceptions, feelings 
and opinions relating to personal risk, health reporting and influence of the media. Of 
interest is how the group operationalised the concept of illness, risk and contagion as they 
discussed the issue between them.  
                                                 
4 People notice when warnings don’t come true, and if warnings don’t come true repeatedly, people sometimes 
stop taking the warnings seriously. It is referred to in the research literature as ‘warning fatigue’ Sandman 
(2008a).  
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THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the history of contagious diseases and epidemics, with particular 
emphasis on those that are have originated from animals. It situates the health risk of avian 
influenza within the discourse of plagues and pandemics, and explains, in historical terms, 
the history and influence of the disease that is influenza. The last section of this chapter 
describes the epidemiology of avian influenza, and explains how the types and strains are 
determined.  
 
 
Chapter 3 provides a substantive review of the literature, which encompasses risk 
communication and perception, media effects, the public understanding of science and 
public health. Concepts, theories and models that inform this thesis are briefly outlined 
and include the Social Amplification of Risk Framework, Sandman’s (1993) ‘Hazard vs 
Outrage’ theory of risk communication, media effects models and concepts of 
governmentality, deviance and ‘othering’.  
 
 
Methodology and methods are detailed in Chapter 4 and include the rationale for the 
thesis’ analytical approach and why the particular analyses and methodologies were 
chosen. It outlines in depth the analytic approaches for both the newspaper and focus 
group analysis. Included in the description of the newspaper methodology are the 
preliminary pilot study, article coding schemas and inter-rater reliability results. The focus 
group methods explain both the preparation and composition, and how the data was 
conceptualised and analysed. 
 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 are analytic chapters. The newspaper analysis presented in Chapter 5 
comprises two sections: content analysis of the newspaper articles and a comparison with 
the US case study, and a thematic analysis of dominant themes used by the media to report 
avian influenza. The focus group analysis Chapter 6 engages a discourse and thematic 
approach to understand the themes and sub-themes which frame how the participants 
talked about avian influenza. Chapter 7 discusses the intersections between the newspaper 
and focus group analysis, and interprets these in terms of the literature, discussing the 
implications for the similarities, differences, juxtapositions and contradictions.  
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2. INFLUENZA AND H5N1 (Avian Influenza) 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The way that people react to the threat of disease or illness largely depends on their 
personal experience or knowledge about it. Therefore, in the absence of a first-hand 
exposure to sickness of any kind, knowledges acquired through folklore, hearsay or reading 
about an issue are called upon when information is needed to be evaluated. This is why 
understanding about what is already known (an issue or event) is important when seeking to 
understand why people have reacted in a certain way to that issue or event. 
Information about the H5N1 influenza virus has been in the ‘public arena’ in New 
Zealand since 1997, and is considered by health experts such as virologists and bio-security 
authorities as a grave and probable risk to both humans and animals. Presented to the New 
Zealand public by public health organisations and governmental agencies as a potential 
pandemic, risk mitigation measures for the avian influenza have included various 
recommendations from the purchase of anti-viral medication (Tamiflu)5 to individual 
household plans for preparation and containment (see Appendix IX & X).  
The following exposition of historical diseases and epidemics situates the health 
risk of avian influenza within the discourse of plagues and pandemics, and specifically, 
explains the distinction between diseases that are infectious but are predictable and 
treatable (however dire they may be), and diseases and viruses that result from adaptations 
or mutations. Additionally, frequently used medical terminologies and recent research are 
explained and expanded upon. In order to contextualise the potential threat of avian 
influenza, detailed accounts of past epidemics will be given, with particular detail of how 
the diseases were transmitted. 
Plagues, Pandemics and Epidemics 
 
The word ‘plague’ comes from the Latin plaga meaning a strike or blow that wounds, and 
had strong religious overtones. The early Church ‘profited from infections’ which 
encouraged its followers to ascribe plague and death as punishments coming from God as a 
result of their sin, and to turn to the Church to save them (McNeill 1976). Although the 
Church could not stop people dying, it claimed they could guarantee redemption in the 
after-life. More recently, the word plague, whilst retaining its pseudo-religious meaning, 
refers to any contagious or epidemic disease that causes a high mortality. The usage of the 
                                                 
5 Tamiflu is the generic name for ‘Oseltamivir’ which is an antiviral drug that is used in the treatment and 
prophylaxis of both Influenza virus A and Influenza virus B. It is an orally active neuraminidase inhibitor that 
blocks the influenza virus from spreading between cells in the body and is commercially developed by US‐based 
Gilead Science and marketed by Hoffmann‐La Roche (Roche). 
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word pandemic is relatively recent6 and refers to a calamitous outbreak of disease that 
covers a wide geographical area. 
There is a consensus amongst medical historians that human progress spreads 
disease; whenever changes are made to improve lifestyle and environment with the 
resultant social and technological advances, plagues and pestilence will follow. This is not 
to imply that humans are responsible for disease as ‘it is a biological process as old as life 
itself’ (Kiple 1999:6), but rather to emphasize that as humans gather together for any 
reason, to fight wars, travel to new lands, settle in towns and cities, or stay anywhere long 
enough to cultivate crops, new opportunities are created for previously unheard of diseases 
to evolve, adapt and emerge.  
Of particular relevance to research for this thesis are those plagues and pandemics 
that have derived from animal hosts. Species known to host and to easily exchange 
pathogens7 are birds and pigs, but many diseases have been attributed to other animals. 
Evgeny Pavlosky (1884-1965) a Russian parasitologist, has estimated that humans share 
about 300 diseases with domesticated species, wild animals and birds, providing a further 
100 diseases (cited in Karlen 1995:35). Below is a description of the animal origin of some 
well-known (and lesser known) zoonoses:8 
ANIMAL DISEASE  
 
                                                
Rats (fleas) Typhus, Bubonic plague, Lassa fever 
Birds Influenza, Salmonellosis 
Horses The common cold, Glanders9
Pigs Influenza 
Dogs Measles, Rabies 
Mosquitoes Malaria, Yellow Fever, Dengue Fever 
Cows Tuberculosis (through unpasteurised milk), scrofula, 
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD) 
Cats Toxoplasmosis 
Bats SARS 
Monkeys Haemorrhagic fever, Herpesvirus simiae, AIDS10
 
The most devastating pandemics have originated from microbes11 and pathogens that have 
been transmitted to humans from animals, as it is in the passing of these microbes back and 
 
6 The noun was first recorded in 1853 and is derived from the Greed ‘pandemos’ meaning ‘pertaining to all 
people’ 
7 Pathogen: any disease‐producing agent, esp. a virus, bacterium, or other microorganism 
8 Zoonosis: any disease of animals communicable to humans 
9 The human infection ‘glanders’ occurs rarely and mostly amongst those in direct and prolonged contact with 
infected, domestic animals. 
10 Diseases from Wildlife, Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 
http://www.cdc.gov/healthypets/animals/wildlife.htm  
11 Microbe: a microorganism, esp. a pathogenic bacterium  
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forwards between different animal species and humans that the most deadly pathogens are 
born.  
Diseases that emerge from conditions resulting from disasters and poverty are, 
pathologically speaking, consistent, predictable and recognisable; cholera and typhoid are 
good examples. Both these diseases depend on stagnant water and poor sanitation to 
proliferate and are both exclusively human diseases (in that they are not derived from 
animal hosts). When water supplies are infected through faecal contamination, the typhoid 
bacillus is contracted through unwashed hands, food and insects such as flies. Not 
everybody who contracts typhoid becomes sick, as up to three percent become carriers. 
‘Typhoid Mary’ is one famous historical example; an Irish immigrant working as a cook in 
New York at the turn of the 20th century, Mary Mallon spread typhoid fever to many 
households in which she worked. She vehemently denied that she was the source, as she 
was never sick herself and was wholly uncooperative with medical authorities. 
Cholera is especially virulent and death comes within hours of the onset of the 
illness, with healthy adults given only a 50 percent chance of survival. Cholera was first 
reported in British India, and during the 19th century, more than 38 million people died 
from ‘Asiatic’ cholera (Kiple 1999:142). Up until the mid 20th century, there were seven 
cholera pandemics which were spread via land and shipping routes. Survivors developed 
immunity, and since the 1960s, when cholera has appeared it has been in a much milder 
form.  
Many diseases arose from nutritional deficiencies which devastated industrialised 
populations, in fact it was often the very progress industrialisation brought that was the 
cause. Rickets,12 pellagra13 and beriberi 14 ravaged thousands, mostly children, during the 
19th and 20th centuries, but education and better living conditions have now all but 
eradicated these diseases. Similarly, scurvy, a medical mystery for a long time, is now 
known to be a deficiency of Vitamin C, and although it is associated with malnutrition, 
cases of scurvy today are rare.  
Seemingly contagious and often arriving in poor rural populations after a 
particularly cold winter, was a disease first named ‘St Anthony’s Fire’. In one form, blisters 
and reddening of the skin were exterior symptoms of an affected cardiovascular system 
that constricted arteries and veins; a second form involved the nervous system, resulting in 
degeneration of the spinal cord, which caused victims to feel as if they were being bitten 
or pricked, often causing hallucinations and fits. Many of these epidemics broke out in 
France; one such epidemic killed over 40,000 people in 922, and then a further 14,000 
between 1128-1129 (Carmichael 1993). It was not until the late 18th century that ingestion 
of the ergo fungus, found on cereal grains such as wheat and rye, was determined to cause 
                                                 
12 The predominant cause of rickets is a vitamin D deficiency, but lack of adequate calcium in the diet can also 
lead to rickets.  
13 Pellagra is a vitamin deficiency disease caused by dietary lack of niacin (B3) and protein, and is an endemic 
disease in Africa, Mexico, Indonesia and China. 
14 Beriberi is a nervous system ailment caused by thiamine (vitamin B1) deficiency 
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fungal poisoning. Incidentally, it has been suggested as the reason for the vivid fantasies of 
the young women who sparked the Salem witch-hunts in Massachusetts, in 1692. 
A plague that originated in close, cramped and squalid conditions was typhus, a 
pathogen facilitated by rats and lice, which then spread from person to person by the 
human body louse. The lice thrived and depended upon warmth, blood and being able to 
lay their eggs in clothing; conditions that were commonly found in jails, on ships and 
especially wherever military campaigns were taking place. Many historians credit typhus 
with changing the course of wars; in 1812 the Russians (and typhus) defeated the French, 
with only 6,000 men returning to France from an original army of 80,000 (Ornelas and Kiple 
1977). In 1917, 25 million Russians were infected with typhus, resulting in three million 
deaths. In the 20th century, DDT15 a synthetic pesticide was used widely to try to eradicate 
the lice, which eventually became resistant. Antibiotics were then found to be the most 
effective treatment. 
Before the discovery of vaccinations and antibiotics, infectious diseases noteworthy 
for their rashes and boils were responsible for overwhelming and devastating pandemics. In 
430BC, according to Thucydides, a Greek historian and author of the History of the 
Peloponnesian War, a great scourge, unlike anything that he had ever seen, ravaged Athens 
and its port Piraeus. It lasted for almost five years and killed one third of the total 
population of Athens (Longrigg 1992). A plague similar to smallpox or measles struck the 
Roman Empire in the 2nd and 3rd centuries killing between 25 and 50 percent of the 
population, and by the 16th century, measles and smallpox were the most common 
infection resulting in death, especially amongst children. Close attention was increasingly 
paid to how the disease of smallpox was caught. Variolation, a primitive inoculation that 
purposely scratched pus or scabs from an active pox into the skin, led to the discovery by 
an English physician Edward Jenner, that a very small amount of the bovine equivalent of 
smallpox (cowpox) given to his human patients, resulted in immunity to smallpox16 (Crosby 
1997:77). Although measles still kills about a million people a year, mostly children in Third 
World countries where vaccination rates are low, vaccination has eradicated smallpox, and 
mitigated the worst symptoms of measles. 
Vaccination has also done much to reduce the incidence of tuberculosis or TB, 
which can be traced back to the ancient Egyptians, and is derived from ‘Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis’, a relative of an aerobic bacterium ‘Tuberculosis bacillus’, which is found in 
the soil. It was a major plague in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries and like 
smallpox and measles (in the pneumonic form), was primarily an airborne pathogen and so 
was easily spread by coughing or sneezing. It is facilitated by a weak immune system and 
not everybody who contracts the infection will develop the disease; however, it is just as 
dangerous as it can be spread by those who are not aware that they are carrying the 
infection. The remedy for TB today is a long treatment of antibiotics, but before this was 
                                                 
15 DDT: Dichloro‐Diphenyl‐Trichloroethane. 
16 Jenner named this process ‘vaccination’ from the Latin ‘vacca’, meaning ‘cow’ 
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discovered, extended periods of rest, good diet and fresh air were the only known ‘cure’. 
Despite these medical advances, Tuberculosis has not been eradicated, and annually, one 
and a half million people still die from the disease.17  
Dengue Fever, Yellow Fever and Malaria are diseases that depend on the mosquito 
to spread their viruses. Each has a different pathology and relies on a different species of 
mosquito, but are wretched diseases whose devastation is not just in high mortality 
numbers but also in the economic cost to societies in terms of treatment and prevention. 
For example, in the past thirty years, dengue fever has led to the hospitalisation of more 
than 700,000 children in Southeast Asia. In order to halt a dengue epidemic in Puerto Rico 
during 1977, more than $10 million was spent on hospital costs and preventative control 
measures (Kiple 1999). Margaret Humphreys (2001), physician and medical historian, claims 
that malaria is one of the greatest plagues of mankind, because even though it does not 
always kill, it robs people ‘of their energy, their capacity to enjoy life and their ability to 
make a living’ (p.7). 
In terms of virulence, morbidity and mortality, two of the most devastating plagues 
are the 14th century bubonic plague and the 1918 Spanish Influenza (H5N1); both were 
caused by bacterium that originated in animals but had managed, through either mutation 
or adaption, to cross the animal-human barrier. Although the microorganism Yersinia pestis 
usually infects rats, which are killed by the disease, the rodents’ fleas then transfer to any 
nearby host, human or otherwise. The disease was characterised by hallucinations, extreme 
swelling (‘buboes’) of the lymph nodes and extensive dark bruising; demise was quick as it 
took just 10 days from flea-bite to death. A deadly variant of the disease was pneumonic, 
which infected the lungs and changed the disease transmission to airborne; this killed 95 
percent of all who contracted it as opposed to a 60 percent mortality rate of the bubonic 
form. People died quickly and in such great numbers that societies were simply 
overwhelmed; in 1349 Marchione di Coppo Stefani of Florence wrote: ‘bodies were thrown 
into newly dug trenches in hastily consecrated ground, and dirt sprinkled between the 
layers of limbs and torsos like cheese between layers of lasagne’ (Carmichael 1997:62). In 
possibly the first recorded use of biological warfare, Tartar soldiers catapulted diseased 
corpses over city walls during a battle in Kaffa in 1350. First called ‘The Great Dying’ but 
later labelled ‘The Black Death’, it was ‘the gold standard of killer epidemics’ (Kiple 
1999:78). Estimates vary greatly but it is thought that between the 13th and 20th centuries 
the bubonic plagues claimed more than 100 million lives; possibly up to half of the 
populations of Europe, North Africa and parts of Asia, before eventually disappearing in the 
late 19th century. 
 
                                                 
17 World Health Organization (WHO). Tuberculosis Fact sheet N°104 ‐ Global and regional incidence. March 2006, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs104/en/index.html 
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Influenza 
I had a little bird, its name was Enza, 
I opened the window, and in-flu-enza 
(American Skipping Rhyme circa 1918) 
 
For centuries, epidemics amongst domesticated animals appeared to coincide with 
outbreaks of human influenza (Karlen 1995:143), and this link between animals and humans 
has since been scientifically proven. Although usually lasting up to a week, with 
uncomfortable but relatively mild symptoms, influenza can sometimes develop into a 
deadly pneumonia, as the initial infection allows a bacterial super-infection to occur. 
Whereas being infected with a disease usually results in immunity, through minor genetic 
drifts18 in its surface proteins, the influenza virus constantly changes and people can be 
afflicted by the influenza virus year after year.  
When there are major genetic mutations, the influenza virus may become 
especially virulent. In the Northern Hemisphere spring of 1918, the usual mild form first 
broke out in the United States; however in the autumn the virus seemed to change, ‘turning 
into the deadliest of its kind of all time’ (Crosby 1997:148). Unusually for influenza, the 
very young and very old were only mildly affected, but the fit and healthy aged between 
twenty and forty years of age suffered the greatest mortality. Ninety percent of excess 
deaths19 occurred in this age group, and scientific research has determined that it was due 
to the strong immune systems of the younger and healthier overreacting to the virus, 
causing a cytokine20 storm. 21 
Although exact statistics are not available, it is estimated that the morbidity22 or 
infection rate was at least 50 percent, and could have been as high as 80 percent; even 
though the vast majority of people who caught the flu survived, up to 5 percent of the 
world’s population died. This equated to more than 40 million deaths in less than one year, 
seven times the number of deaths from World War I; for example, nearly 80 percent of all 
US army war casualties were the result of dying from influenza (Oldstone 1998:173). 
Outbreaks swept through Asia, India, Africa, North America, Europe, Brazil and the South 
Pacific where it was especially lethal.23 The 1918 pandemic is often referred to as the 
Spanish flu, not because it originated in Spain, but because, during World War I, Spain was 
                                                 
18 Genetic drifts is usually used to describe minor changes, whereas ‘shift’ describes an assortment event that 
leads to a novel virus. 
19 Excess mortality rates ‐ the number of deaths beyond what is normally expected [for the given death risk], 
expressed as a figure 
20 Cytokines: Signalling proteins and glycoproteins that are often secreted by immune cells when a pathogen is 
encountered, thereby activating and recruiting further immune cells in order to increase the system's response 
to the pathogen 
21 Cytokine storm: A potentially fatal immune reaction consisting of a positive feedback loop between cytokines 
and immune cells, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cytokine_storm 
22 Morbidity: the percentage of the population who became infected 
23 In the space of two weeks Fiji lost 14 percent of its population whilst in Western Samoa, 22 percent died within 
3 months. 
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a neutral country whose media reporting, including that of the influenza epidemic, was 
uncensored; therefore, the Spanish media were the first to report the pandemic.  
Medical research since 1918 has revealed that the influenza virus can be classified 
as having three types - A, B and C - with the ‘A’ strain responsible for influenza outbreaks 
not only in humans but also in wild birds and pigs. Wild aquatic avian species are largely 
acknowledged as being the natural reservoir for all influenza A viruses. They have crossed 
the species barrier and become established in horses, pigs, humans and even whales. It is 
when two or more viruses combine in such a reservoir that a new virus evolves; a process 
called an antigenic shift, as opposed to antigenic drift, which is natural mutation over time. 
This new virus can be extremely dangerous as the human immune system may not recognise 
it, and will have no immunity or defence to it. Type A influenza viruses are classified based 
on the composition of the hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) antigens24 on their 
surfaces and are named for the geographic location where they were first identified.  
 
YEAR NAME & LOCATION TYPE DEATHS - (worldwide) 
1918 Spanish Flu(worldwide) H1N1 Up to 50 million – (estimate) 
1957 Asian Flu H2N2 Up to 2 million 
1968 Hong Kong Flu H3N2 700,000 
1976 Swine Flu25 (U.S.) H1N1 25 
1977 Russian Flu H1N1 
8,300 (US) 
No excess mortality (worldwide) 
1997 Bird Flu (HongKong) H5N1 6 deaths from 18 cases 
1999 Bird Flu (U.K.) H9N2 2 cases 
2003 Bird Flu (Netherlands) H7N7 1 death from 89 cases 
2004 Bird Flu (Egypt) H10N7 2 cases 
2003-
2008 Bird Flu – 14 countries
26 H5N1 231 deaths from 365 cases 
May 2009 Swine Flu – 69 countries27 H1N1 125 deaths from 21,940 cases28
Figure 1: Influenza subtypes of influenzas 1918‐2009 
 
The Spanish flu was an H1N1 strain and appears to have been completely avian in origin, 
however two subsequent influenza outbreaks (in 1957 and 1968), were a combination of 
genes from both an avian and human influenza virus. Additionally, the global ‘swine flu’ 
                                                 
24 An antigen is a substance in the cell that prompts the generation of antibodies and can cause an immune 
response. 
25 In the US, 24 percent of the population were vaccinated against the swine flu, but after deaths from swine flu 
that were linked to the vaccination, the program was suspended.  
26 Azerbaijan, Cambodia, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam. WHO Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian 
Influenza (H5N1) reported to WHO. www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2008_02_21  
27http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/influenza‐a‐h1n1‐update‐sixtythree‐070609  
28 As of 08 June 2009, http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_10/en/index.html 
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pandemic of May 2009 was an influenza (A) H1N1 strain, and appears to be a combination of 
human, avian and pig viruses. 
H5N1 ‐ Avian Influenza 
 
The highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus was first recognised in 1996, when it was 
found in a flock of geese in the Guangdong Province of China. From 2003, outbreaks have 
been reported in poultry farms and bird markets in Hong Kong, and although it is suspected 
that many went unreported, outbreaks occurred throughout Asia (Korea, Vietnam, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia). In 2004, it seemed that the virus had mutated and had 
become more lethal, killing a wider variety of wild birds. In China in August 2004, the H5N1 
infection was found in pigs, and although previously thought to be resistant to any 
influenza-type virus, domestic cats (in a laboratory setting) were infected with H5N1, 
confirming that the virus was mutating. Later that year, 441 tigers at a Thai zoo were 
unknowingly fed diseased chickens, resulting in 147 deaths, a 30 percent mortality rate.29 
The virus continued to spread throughout the world via migratory birds; Russia, Europe and 
Scandinavia all had incidences of H5N1 infection in bird and wildlife, and in 2006, the 
disease was found in Israel, Afghanistan and the Ivory Coast. Human infection from the 
avian influenza first occurred in Hong Kong in 1997, resulting in six deaths, with 43 
subsequent fatalities (to 2006) occurring within the Asian region.30 Since 2006, 73 cases 
have been reported outside this area31 culminating in 231 deaths,32 with 365 deaths 
worldwide.  
Wild aquatic birds are believed to be the primary reservoir for bird and mammals 
for the influenza type A virus and, until recently, could carry the disease without 
succumbing to it.33 However, when the virus is transmitted to domesticated fowl it causes 
two different reactions; one mild and the other lethal. The H5N1 virus has been shown to 
spread, not only via wild birds, but also from farm to farm through movements of people 
and transportation of cages. In faecal matter it can survive for several days in both low and 
high temperatures, but this transmission still requires direct contact with the virus. 
Research to date shows that the H5N1 influenza virus contracted by humans is attributed to 
very close contact with the birds, either by farming in concentrated poultry farms, or by 
eating dead or diseased birds; there is limited evidence of human-to-human transmission 
and none of sustained transmission. The H5N1 avian influenza is still the greatest threat to 
birds, and culling on a mass scale has been shown to control the outbreaks. It is a virus that 
crosses the bird/human species barrier with difficulty; this is borne out by the statistics 
                                                 
29 Mortality: the percentage of the population who died [from the disease]  
30 Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam 
31 Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan 
32 H5N1 avian influenza: timeline – last updated 23 February, 2009. 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/timeline  
33 These birds are known as ‘animal vectors’ – animals that are not affected by the infection, but nonetheless 
transmit it to other species. 
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that show that whilst tens of millions of birds have been infected over a wide geographical 
area, less than 240 human deaths have been confirmed (WHO, 2008).  
As yet the impact on humans of the H5N1 virus is not well understood, nonetheless, 
there remain some concerning issues. Scientists have discovered that, in terms of antigenic 
drift, the H5N1 virus has gone through five of the ten gene sequence changes necessary for 
it to transmit easily from human-to human, and compared to the case-fatality34 rates of 
major health events since the turn of the 20th century, the avian influenza statistics are 
alarming. Whilst it is difficult to know exactly how many people caught the Spanish flu 
during the 1918 pandemic, it is estimated that the mortality rate was between 2 and 5 
percent. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic that originated in China in 
November 2002 (and by July 2003 had spread to 28 countries) had a case-fatality rate of 
just under 10 percent. Moreover, the common cold, which infects millions of people 
worldwide, has a less than half a percent mortality rate; in comparison H5N1 has killed 62 
percent of all those who have been infected. 
Although commercial antiviral drugs such as Tamiflu and Relenza35 (which are 
neuraminidase inhibitors), were thought to be a preventative solution for seasonal 
influenza, and have been promoted as a preventative for avian influenza, it has since been 
shown to be only 70 percent effective and only when taken within 48 hours of contracting 
the infection. According to a review published in 2006 by the Lancet medical journal, the 
authors Dr Jefferson and colleagues from the Cochrane Vaccines Field, maintain that while 
the drugs might reduce patients' symptoms ‘the use of Tamiflu could actually increase the 
spread of the flu virus, [because] if people take the drug and have fewer symptoms, they 
may end up going to work and spreading the potentially lethal virus’ (Boseley and Watts 
2006). At present, the use of a vaccine does not seem to be a viable preventative option; 
an influenza vaccine takes approximately 6 months to develop from a non-mutating virus 
and a further year to produce commercially. H5N1 vaccines have been developed but as 
they are based on a strain sourced from Vietnam in 2004 they would be ineffective against 
a later emerging strain.  
Current research however supports the stockpiling of vaccines for pandemic 
preparedness. In the event that H5N1 mutates to a form easily transmittable from human-
to-human, ‘global and timely access to vaccines will be of paramount importance’ 
(Jennings, Monto, Chan, Szucs and Nicholson 2008:651), with production methods and 
capacity a major consideration. As the H5N1 virus kills hen eggs (the traditional medium in 
which to develop vaccines), the pursuit to find new technologies36 that can allow for 
different ways of developing a vast quantity of vaccines quickly, continues.  
                                                 
34 Case fatality – the percentage of the population who died after becoming infected 
35 Relenza is the trade name for Zanamivir, the first neuraminidase inhibitor commercially developed and is 
currently marketed by GlaxoSmithKline. 
36 For example, animal cell culture is a common laboratory technique that grows cells under controlled 
conditions. Most commonly these cells are multi‐cellular eukaryotes, especially animal cells. 
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3. LITERATURE, MODELS, THEORIES AND 
PERSPECTIVES  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The over-arching literature for this thesis concerns risk: risk analysis, risk perception and 
risk communication. It also encompasses media effect theories, public health and risk, and 
notions of social control and governmentality. The three divisions within this chapter of 
risk, communication and health should not be regarded as distinct but rather inter-related; 
indeed it is the interest in the intersection between these three that provides the impetus 
for this research. 
 The exposition of theoretical perspectives follows a similar composition to that of 
the literature review, but with a focus on the theories and discourses that shape how I 
think about health risk communication and the role of the media in relation to the 
reporting of avian influenza. It has become increasingly apparent that the different areas of 
focus have a great deal in common; health for example, can be understood as not just a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being,37 but as Foucault (1973) and 
Douglas (1992) describe, as a cultural construction. The concept of health can be 
contextualised using a bio-medical discourse or can also be approached from a public 
health perspective, in the context of an exchange of information between experts and the 
lay public.  
Experts and expertise are central to the notion of governmentality (Johnson 
1993:50), which Lupton (1995) states ‘locates regulatory activities at all levels of social 
institutions from the family, mass media, the legislature and the police force’ (p.9). An 
extension of Foucault’s theory of governmentality is ‘healthism’ which Rose (1999) 
describes as the ‘public objective for the good health and good order of the social body 
with the desire of individuals for health and well-being’ (p.74). In other words, as people 
internalize public health advertisements and messages, the need for state intervention in 
public health matters is diminished. According to Turner (1994), public health and medicine 
have strongly coercive elements ‘in that they set out to shape and normalize human 
behaviours in certain ways’ (p.27). The media are an intrinsic contributor to this 
communication process, where journalists must decide what is newsworthy, whilst being 
constrained by industry competition and printing deadlines. News stories can be framed in 
different ways, which in turn can influence how an issue is perceived and interpreted. By 
consistently reporting a story in a certain way, the media can elevate the salience of 
topics, and some would say, set an agenda for the way the public think about important 
issues.  
                                                 
37Definition of health according to the World Health Organisation: ‘Health is a state of complete physical, mental 
and social well‐being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.  
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In order to situate the central theme of risk communication, it is necessary to 
explore how the concept of risk has been constructed and how that construction has been 
applied. Research for this thesis explores risk from several different points of view: from a 
public perspective, an individualized interpretation of risk, audience reception of risk 
messages and media interpretation and reporting of risk information. Risk information often 
originates from large organisations and governmental bodies, who, in their role as 
perceived experts, have already determined that an event may be risky, and wish to convey 
their particular message to the ‘non-experts’. However, the ‘public’ may have a completely 
different idea of the probability of the risk and the issues surrounding it, which may lead to 
misunderstanding and conflict.  
In this thesis, ‘risk’ as a concept is critically explored through reading of risk and 
risk communication literature, and provides the framework in which health messages and 
media reporting can be evaluated. It also sets the background for inquiry into seemingly 
irrational reactions by ‘the public’ to risk events, and into responses to those reactions by 
governmental or organisational bodies whose frustration about the public’s slow or lack of 
response to risk messages and health threats is an ongoing concern. This chapter 
encompasses literature, models, theories and perspectives around the concepts of risk 
communication, media, disease and public health in order to build a foundation of 
understanding about health risk communication.  
RISK 
Background 
How risk38 is understood in everyday life has been the focus of much interest and research 
since the early 20th century. Definitions of risk, depending on the viewpoint and purpose of 
the person or organisation defining it, have been variously described as ‘the perception of 
the probability of harm’, ‘a systematic way of dealing with hazards’ (Beck 1992:21), or ‘a 
taken-for-granted objective phenomenon’ (Lupton 1999). Attempts to position the notion of 
risk within different disciplines, such as cultural studies, sociology or science and 
technology studies, have resulted in distinct approaches to understanding risk.  
German sociologist Ulrich Beck for example, asserts that although people have 
always lived with (and have understood) certain risks, as a result of modernization and 
globalisation, modern risks are seen as harder to calculate and control, and ‘affect all 
peoples alike, whether rich or poor, regardless of national or geographic borders’ (cited in 
Lupton and Tulloch 2003:2). He coined the term ‘risk society’ and argued that earlier risks 
were much more visible, in that ‘they assaulted the nose or eyes and were thus perceptible 
to the senses’ (Beck 1992:21), but modern everyday risks are the domain of experts, with 
knowledge largely residing with the experts, rendering risks invisible to lay people. 
                                                 
38 The word ‘risk’ was first used introduced into the English vocabulary in 1661, and probably is derived from a 
Spanish nautical term, the meaning of which is ‘to run into danger or go against a rock’.  
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Concerns about power, governmentality and control of knowledge were issues that arose 
out of Beck and Giddens’ work, where ‘lay people were forced to become reliant upon 
expert knowledges to inform and warn them about risk’ (Lupton and Tulloch 2003:3). Beck 
suggested that knowledge about risk was dependent upon interpretation and that all 
interpretation was a matter of perspective, in fact, it was ‘cultural perception and 
definition that constitutes risk’ (Adam, Beck and van Loon 2000:213). This interpretation 
Beck argued, made risks ‘open to social definition and construction’ (p.23) and positioned 
those within society able to influence such construction (the mass media or politicians) as 
key:  
The system of institutionally heightened expectations forms the social 
background in front of which – under the close scrutiny of the mass media 
and the murmurs of the tensely attentive public – the institutions of 
industrial society present the dance of the veiling of hazards. The hazards, 
which are not merely projected onto the world stage, but really threaten, 
are illuminated under the mass media spotlight (Beck 1999:101). 
 
This particular understanding of risk is important for this research, as one of the 
primary aims is to explore how mass media reporting has influenced and constructed a 
discourse around risk in relation to avian influenza. Furthermore, the ‘risk society’, 
according to Anthony Giddens (1992), consists of external risks and manufactured risks, and 
is mainly concerned with the manufactured risks; who created them, who was to blame and 
who could fix them.  
Beck argues that risk is socially constructed, and ‘is mediated through the lens of 
social and cultural processes’ (Lupton and Tulloch 2003:2), ideas that, in terms of 
individualism and risk perception, are similar to those of cultural theorist and 
anthropologist Mary Douglas (1992). She developed the Cultural Theory of Risk and 
proposed that rather than being the result of one person’s knowledge or understanding, 
ideas about risks are the product of a collective mindset and shared social and cultural 
meanings. Central to her theory is the notion that frameworks of understanding (within any 
particular society) help to form attitudes, which in turn support and uphold the social 
structure. Within these structures, risks are identified and interpreted and are often seen 
as either political or moral, helping to identify marginalized or deviant groups that pose 
threats to the larger community. In an attempt to situate deviance in relation to risk, 
German psychologist Peter Wiedemann states that ‘conceptions of taboo and sin deeply 
permeate the discussion of risks… [and the debate about risk] is the eternal struggle of 
good against evil’ (cited in Timmermans 1996:72). This notion of risk in relation to deviance 
will be drawn upon when exploring the positioning of those in society who chose not to 
engage in recommended public heath practices. 
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RISK COMMUNICATION 
Background 
It is widely accepted that a common reason for a disproportionate reaction by the lay 
public to perceived risk is a lack of knowledge; however, a problem for risk communicators 
is that often the more people know, the more they think they have to fear. How then can 
risk information be communicated without engendering fear and panic?  
Risk communication has been defined as ‘the flow of information and risk 
evaluations back and forth between academic experts, regulatory practitioners, interest 
groups and the general public’ (Leiss 1996:86). William Leiss saw risk communication as a 
legitimate discipline and as having three phases: the first emphasized risk, the second 
stressed that risk communication should persuade the audience towards a ‘correct’ point of 
view, and the third incorporated both elements, highlighting that this approach made for 
best business practice. In 1986, the first ever conference on risk communication was held in 
Washington, D.C; many of the noted authorities on the subject today were contributors to 
this conference, and their work has been influential in the development of risk 
communication. Underpinning research about risk communication is the assumption that 
‘those who promote and regulate health and safety need to understand the ways in which 
people think about and respond to risk’ (Slovic 1987:280). Far from being a straightforward 
assumption, risk communication encompasses many challenges, not the least of which is 
how to measure the effectiveness of a risk communication that assumes a two-way process, 
where both parties learn and/or negotiate knowledge. In fact, Cronin (2007) argues that 
risk communication ‘can be seen as a way of closing the gap between [the] expert and lay 
assessments’ (p.37). 
In a paper presented at the congress of The International Emergency Management 
Society, Bernd Rohrmann (2008) similarly described risk communication as a social process 
‘by which people become informed about hazards, are influenced towards behavioural 
change and can participate in decision-making about risk issues in an informed 
manner’(p.1). He asserts that at the core of risk communication is an exchange of risk 
information between interested parties (individuals, groups, institutions) and that its goal 
should be to ‘modify individuals’ risk perceptions and risk attitudes towards protective risk’ 
behaviour (p.6). 
Approaches, Theories and Perspectives 
In an attempt to counteract what Swedish scholar Palmlund (1992) saw as an emphasis on 
the quantitative aspects of risk communication and the use of ‘management tools’ to 
mitigate risk, she developed a risk theory of social drama, that constructed risk as primarily 
a social interaction. Not surprisingly, her drama theory involved actors who perform as 
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agents upon their audience. These risk actors include: Risk Bearers,39 Risk Bearers’ 
Advocates,40 Risk Generators,41 Risk Researchers,42 Risk Arbiters43 and Risk Informers44 who 
are involved in a dramatic process, employing a genre and engaging in a dramatic plot 
(p.205). Palmlund asserts that when evaluating societal risk, her theory provides a critical 
perspective not only on the discourse and symbolic action, but also on the field of risk 
analysis. By concentrating on the social interactions of the ‘risk actors’, she was responding 
to earlier risk communication theories that, according to Vincent Covello had focussed on 
limitations of scientific method interaction, risk communicators and experts, channels of 
communication (through which risk information can be transmitted) and audience reception 
(Davies, Covello and Allen 1986).  
Davis et al. (1986) suggested that the purpose of risk communication was to inform 
and educate, bring about behaviour change and ‘protective action’, warn about disasters 
and give emergency information. Lastly, once these things had been achieved, it was 
hypothesized that problem solving by all parties would result (p.112). This was a simplistic 
‘top-down’ approach that did not address the complex nature of the audience, something 
that Peter Sandman (1993) also recognised when he expounded on his theory of a four-
stage risk communication. According to his interpretation of how risk communication 
evolved historically, the first stage simply ignored the public, and ‘they were content to be 
ignored’ (Covello and Sandman 2001:169). However, this approach ceased to work as the 
environmental activism of the late 1980s began, and although dialogue (the third stage) had 
not yet happened, companies and organizations realised that they needed to explain risk 
data better (the second stage). During the third stage, Sandman asserted that risk was 
viewed differently from how it had been viewed before, and could now be thought of as 
being a combination of two new ideas; hazard and outrage.45 This new concept allowed risk 
communicators to ‘reframe’ the problem, so that instead of just quoting numbers and 
statistics, organisations acknowledged people’s outrage as being related to the hazard, and 
they adjusted the risk messages accordingly. Sandman’s fourth stage is described in hopeful 
terms as a stage that is yet to be fully realised; it involves a full partnership between 
organisations and the public, and includes negotiation and dialogue (Covello and Sandman 
2001:170).  
                                                 
39 Consumers and workers 
40 Consumer and health organisations, Labour unions 
41 Pharmaceutical industry, cattle industry, veterinarian, agricultural extension advisors 
42 Scientists in private sector research, scientists funded from private‐sector sources 
43 Law firms, mediators 
44 Producers and journalists in news media, journals, books and films. 
45 According to Sandman, (1993), ‘Hazard’ is the technical component of risk, the product of probability and 
magnitude, whilst ‘Outrage’ is the nontechnical component, an amalgam of voluntariness, control, 
responsiveness, trust and dread. 
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Hazard vs Outrage 
Covello and Sandman (2001), have described risk communication as ‘a scientifically based 
discipline’ that can be used to address ‘the gap between expert and non-expert 
assessments of risk’ (cited in Cronin 2007:33). Most literature that addresses risk and risk 
communication recognises the ‘disconnect’ between those who know the most about a risk 
(and who have possibly caused the risk), and those who are exposed to the risk and often 
know the least. The debate has to a large extent focussed on the ‘knowledge’ component 
of this disconnect, and has suggested that the way to redress this imbalance is to improve 
the expert’s ability to communicate and the lay public ability to understand. However, by 
acknowledging that risk has an emotional component, and by trying to solve the conundrum 
‘why do the public perceive some risks to be greater than they really are’, Peter Sandman 
(1993) proposed that risk was a combination of hazard versus outrage, or a ‘function of 
hazard and outrage’ (p.7). 
The emotional component of his theory - ‘outrage’ - encompasses not only how the 
public respond but also the response itself, which according to Sandman is as real, as 
measurable and as manageable as ‘hazard’. According to his theory, problems with risk 
communication result when the ‘experts focus on hazard and ignore outrage, [but] the 
public focus on outrage and ignore hazard’ (Sandman 1993:8). Critics of Sandman have 
claimed that his approach continues to privilege the expert’s point of view, which is an 
understandable response if risk is regarded only as a technical issue. However, what 
Sandman does by acknowledging the ‘irrational’ is to take a more comprehensive approach 
to the problems of risk communication, which if anything, privileges the public response 
over the expert opinion. In fact, Sandman (1993) argues that outrage can be reduced if 
experts would only trust the public, and suggests that if they ‘share information, share the 
control, and keep the outrage from getting in the way, people will make pretty good 
decisions about risk’ (p.82). 
According to Sandman there are many components of outrage, and in his book 
Responding to Community Outrage, he identifies twelve, which include: magnitude, 
coercion, ‘memorable-ness’, controllability, trust and dread. Coercion for example, can be 
demonstrated by the difference between a community having a factory imposed upon 
them, or being given information, and engaging in dialogue (with the factory owners) to 
help the community decide whether a factory being built in their community is a good idea. 
The sources of ‘memorability’ of past events usually come from the media, but can also 
come from personal experience, science fiction (movies, comics or books) or in the form of 
symbols, for example a 55 gallon drum; a universal symbol for dangerous waste. The 
consequence of a memorable risk is that, ‘the more memorable a risk is, the more outrage 
it is going to generate’ (Sandman 1993:25). In his role of working with both industries and 
communities, Sandman has identified two ways that people can react to risk or potential 
risk messages.  
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Adjustment‐Reaction and Reactance 
When responding to new and potentially serious risk, Sandman posits that communities 
often seem to go though an ‘adjustment-reaction’:46 initially finding information alarming, 
becoming hyper-vigilant, hyper-emotional and prematurely cautious, obsessing about the 
risk and taking extra precautions, but only for a while. Then they settle down to the ‘new 
normal’, more concerned but better prepared than they were before their adjustment 
reaction started, but less concerned than when they were going though it. According to 
Sandman (2005), there are seven main characteristics of adjustment-reaction: it is 
automatic; it comes early; it is temporary; it is a small over-reaction; it may need 
guidance; it serves as a rehearsal and it reduces the probability of a later over-reaction.47 
Some members of the public convert their initial fear reaction (or premature relief) 
into contempt, something James Brehm (1966) called ‘reactance’. Contrary to what was 
intended, this emotional reaction can result in people deliberately taking an opposing view 
or attitude, believing that their freedom has been threatened (by actions or statements of 
others) and feeling obliged or pressured to adopt a certain point of view. It can also 
strengthen their resolve to not be persuaded further. Elements of Sandman’s theories of 
adjustment reaction and his interpretation of reactance can illuminate public responses to 
health risk messages, in particular the New Zealand public’s reaction to the health threat 
of avian influenza.   
Warning Fatigue 
Monitoring early promises on the one hand and early warnings on the 
other should be part of the social study of science, as early promises 
might eventually give way to disillusionment, as too many early warnings 
might give way to cynicism, disengagement and a decline in trust in 
science and science-based policy (Brown 2003:3).  
 
Over recent years, many government and health organisations have investigated the 
effectiveness of their own pandemic planning and issues surrounding the public’s interest or 
attention to risk messages. One of the main problems that have emerged during this 
evaluation is that the public seem to be demonstrating signs of resistance to, or apathy 
about risk issues. Labelled ‘pandemic fatigue’, or more generically ‘warning fatigue’, this 
phenomenon could have real implications for the creators of risk messages, and explains 
what happens when authorities keep alerting the public to risks that never seem to 
materialise.  
For example, at the opening of a ministerial conference in Egypt in October 2008, 
Paula Dobriansky, the US Under-Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs, 
                                                 
46 From DSM IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). Also known as or related to adjustment 
disorder (disorder), acute situational disturbance, acute situational disturbance (disorder), adjustment disorder, 
adaptation reaction, transient situational disturbance 
47 ‘Adjustment Reactions: The Teachable Moment in Crisis Communication’, by Peter M. Sandman.  
http://www.psandman.com/col/teachable.htm 
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echoed comments from Egyptian ministers and heads of international organizations when 
she warned of ‘flu fatigue’: “There is a growing feeling that the threat of an influenza 
pandemic has somehow diminished, and that scarce resources could be better used 
elsewhere in the field of public health, in other words flu fatigue”.48 Sandman (2003) 
asserts that the effect of warning fatigue is weak, and people intuitively understand that a 
false alarm is a lot smaller problem than a disaster they were not warned about (p.13). 
Still, warning fatigue does happen and often has other costs associated with it; for 
example, panic-buying of antivirals that are then not used and become redundant as the 
use-by date expires. 
Warning fatigue has been observed to be temporary, however there is often some 
loss of credibility, especially if warnings are exaggerated or overconfident. It is just as 
important to consider the alternative: being criticized for ‘unduly’ frightening people or 
being criticized for failing to warn people. Sandman (2005) determines that the authorities 
should not warn us any more often or more urgently than necessary and that exaggerating 
how unsure they (the authorities) are about an impending risk event, undermines trust 
more than exaggerating how bad the risk itself may be. Recognition that there is a problem 
in being over-alarmist was highlighted in a recent presentation at the ‘Global Technical 
Brief on Critical Issues associated with Avian Influenza (AI)’.49 The paper began with a 
background update, including avian influenza statistics as of January 29 2008, as well as 
current public health standards for pandemic prevention. It concluded with six lessons 
learned, including: ‘Warning fatigue' may pose a risk communication challenge; if too many 
messages are disseminated with an alarming tone...[it will] lead to reduced vigilance and 
preparation despite the very real nature of the threat’.50 In the absence of robust research 
and studies to measure how strong or weak this phenomenon actually is, people interested 
in warning fatigue as risk communication effect are reliant on anecdotal comments such as 
those above, or on observations by those who have written about risk communication 
(Nerlich & Halliday 2007; Brown 2003; Sandman 2005). In his online ‘guestbook’ article 
entitled ‘The dangers of excessive warnings…and of ever-reassurance’, Sandman concludes:  
All warnings begin and end in apathy. If the bad thing doesn’t happen, 
people get apathetic again. If it happens and ends, people get apathetic 
again. If it settles in forever, people get apathetic again. Apathy is the 
default position. What varies is how much people learn, and put in the back 
of their minds, during the warning phase and the crisis phase – before they 
become apathetic again.  
RISK PERCEPTION 
 
Gilbert White (1911-2006), a prominent American geographer known for his work on natural 
hazards, demonstrated that for some reasons, such as familiarity about the risk or the 
                                                 
48 “U.S. pledges extra $320 million for bird flu fight”, Saturday October 25, 2008, Reuters Group Limited 
49 2008 Conference held at the Centre for Communication Programs, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health  
50 ‘Avian Influenza: Critical Program Issues’, from the Centre for Communication Programs 
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amount of personal control (over the risk), members of the public perceive some risks 
differently from others (Lofstedt 2003). Also called ‘decision-making under risk’, or ‘human 
response to natural hazards’, the study of risk perception has examined the judgements 
people make when asked to evaluate and describe hazardous technologies or activities 
(Slovic 2000). As many factors affect how risks are perceived, the question of how to 
understand these factors has resulted in many studies and much research into risk 
perception. The study of risk perception has also drawn upon the disciplines of 
anthropology, psychology, sociology, geography and political science.  
Sociological and anthropological studies have shown that people draw upon cultural 
and social resources to understand risk, and that risk responses are influenced by not only 
authoritative agencies such as the government, but also by the responses of friends and 
family (Short 1984). During her anthropological research, Mary Douglas (1992) for example, 
explored how different types of threats were feared by different societies and whether 
these differences correlated with differences in culture. Central to her studies was the 
observation that commonplace events were underestimated in terms of risk, but that 
exceptional and abnormal incidents roused feelings of panic and anxiety.  
Cognitive psychologists Kahneman and Tversky conducted research on heuristics 
and biases in probabilistic thinking, devising many different experiments in order to explain 
people’s reactions to threats posed by natural hazards. One experiment used an example of 
a health threat where participants were given a choice of two different possible solutions 
to the threat. They demonstrated that even though the outcomes of the proposed plans 
were identical, by simply changing the way the potential threat was worded, participants’ 
preferences for the solutions could be reversed (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). Building 
upon this and similar psychological research, Paul Slovic joined with Baruch Fischhoff and 
Sarah Lichtenstein to study cognitive processes and societal risk-taking. They developed a 
theoretical framework called the psychometric paradigm, which assumed that people could 
answer quite difficult risk-related questions in a useful and meaningful way (Slovic, 2000). 
The framework proposed that although risk perception is subjective and influenced by 
cultural, psychological and social restraints, it can nevertheless be measured through the 
proper use of design models. Using multivariate analysis and psychophysical scaling to 
produce quantitative representations of risk attitudes and perception techniques, the 
psychometric studies showed that threats displayed a unique pattern of qualities that 
appeared to be connected to their perceived risk (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Read and Combs 
1978).  
In their publication Risk Communication: A Mental Models Approach, Morgan, 
Fischhoff, Bostrom and Atman (2002) incorporated the psychometric paradigm idea and 
posited that as people assess the size and manageability of a risk, a ‘mental model’ of the 
risk is formed. More a metaphor than a formal model, the mental models approach included 
influence-diagrams and expert-models to generate exemplars and interview techniques; 
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gathering a snapshot of both expert and layperson beliefs in order to enable organisations 
and individuals to develop clear and understandable messages about risks.  
Social Amplification of Risk  
Perceptions of risk are a key element in the process of social amplification; a term that 
Roger Kasperson coined in the 1980s to refer to the reality that people are more likely to 
take a particular risk more seriously if others around them are, or when the media coverage 
‘suggests to them that their neighbours take it seriously’ (Sandman 2005). The metaphor of 
amplification is derived from communications theory and can be understood as ‘the ways 
that various social agents generate, receive, interpret and pass on risk signals’ (Pidgeon, 
Kasperson and Slovic 2003:15).  
Relevant to discussion about social amplification or attenuation, is the difference 
between the voice of the expert and the voice of the ‘lay public’. Risk amplification occurs 
when experts judge events to be ‘low-in-risk’, but the public pay the event’s possibility 
more attention. Risk attenuation occurs when a society decides that a risk is not that 
serious, so they pay less attention to it than experts think they should. The reasons that 
issues become attenuated are less clear than the reasons for amplification; there is a 
suggestion that attenuation may result from risks that ‘occur in distant times, distant 
places, or [to] distant (that is, powerless or marginalised) social groups’ (Kasperson and 
Kasperson 1996:103). 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) 
In order to integrate the technical and social experience of risk, and to explore why 
individuals pay attention to some risks, but ignore others, researchers51 from the Clark 
University and Decision Research created the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) 
in 1988. In this framework, risk was conceptualised as both a social construct and an 
objective property (of a hazard or event), an approach which avoided ‘the problems of 
total relativism on one hand and of technical determinism on the other’ (Renn, Burns, 
Kasperson, Kasperson and Slovic 1992:138). The goal was to ‘examine broadly, and in a 
social and historical context, how risk and risk events interact with psychological, social, 
institutional, and cultural processes in ways that amplify or attenuate risk perceptions and 
concerns, thereby shaping risk behaviour, influencing institutional processes, and affecting 
risk consequences’ (Pidgeon et al. 2003:2). Pidgeon et al. state that within the social 
amplification network exist ‘places’ or ‘stations’ where amplification takes place, namely 
the social (institutions or organisations) and the individuals (who are members of social 
units).  
A central premise of SARF, as a conceptual framework, is that social amplification 
(or attenuation) can create ‘ripple’ effects that result in secondary or tertiary 
                                                 
51 Jeanne X Kasperson, Roger E Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, William J Burns and Paul Slovic 
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consequences; triggered by the occurrence or suggestion of an adverse event (which can be 
relatively minor), the effects generated by a perceived risk can often be more harmful than 
the actual risk itself. These effects could be economic, changes to the tourism industry for 
example, or social or symbolic, such as the stigmatisation of a product or community. 
Pertinent to this thesis, and an example of ripple effect, is the aforementioned warning 
fatigue. Sandman (2008) says this effect, whilst weak, is also ‘real’, and impacts upon the 
credibility of journalists and public officials alike; he also states that exaggeration or 
amplification can be useful ‘in the hands of those who wish to arouse outrage’ (p.13). 
The social amplification of risk framework (SARF) proposes that the media are 
central in the amplification (or attenuation) of risk, and as active mediators of information, 
this premise seems to have merit. SARF begins with the idea of a ‘risk-related event’ 
(Murdock, Horlick-Jones and Petts 2001), and the following classic example from literature 
- the phenomena of moral panic - demonstrates this well. Stanley Cohen was largely 
responsible for advancing the concept of moral panic, which has come to be understood as 
‘a condition, episode or group of persons [that] emerges to become defined as a threat to 
societal values and interests’ (Cohen 1972:ix). Cohen placed the media central to the 
creation of a panic. In his report of a seaside riot between two opposing groups of young 
people, he showed that through exaggeration, distortion, prediction and symbolization, the 
media created a problem where there was none. Through the repeated use of symbolic 
rhetoric the press ‘images were made much sharper than reality’ (Cohen 1972:30), and 
stories were constructed that reinforced the public’s preconceived notions about 
adolescent deviance. Likewise, Cronin (2007) places the responsibility for social 
amplification of technological risks on the expansion of the global media channels, 
observing that ‘modern society is increasingly informed and active, less trusting, more 
demanding of influence and more socially and culturally diverse’ (p.291).  
As previously stated, the framework of risk communication provides a lens through 
which the media reporting of avian influenza and the public’s reaction can be understood. 
The main stakeholders in the risk communication process are those who create the risk (or 
know about it first), those who are impacted by the risk, those who communicate the risk 
and those who react to it. However, these roles are by no means distinct, and for risk 
communication theorists, a challenge has been to understand the effect of one role upon 
another. If, as Davies et al. (1986) argues, risk communication is about education, then a 
way to determine if the audience has been ‘educated’ is paramount. This is why risk 
perception has been a focus of much risk communication literature, with models to 
evaluate reception and perception gaining wide appeal.  
Sandman (1993) however, regards the audience as already ‘educated’ or 
knowledgeable, primed by past risk events and motivated to engage with present or 
possible risk issues. This, he posits, is why they react to risk messages emotionally, with 
‘outrage’, and claims that this component of risk needs to be acknowledged as integral to 
risk communication as to the risk or ‘hazard’ itself. Within the health risk communication 
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framework, the media and the public are the two ‘actors’ with which this thesis is 
engaging, drawing upon the notions of risk as a culturally constructed phenomenon. In 
reference to Douglas’s notion of ‘frameworks of understanding’ this thesis explores how the 
risk of avian influenza was identified and interpreted, and whether this identification was 
associated with individuals or groups being considered to be deviant and operating ‘outside’ 
of the expected norms. A question that this raises is whether the risk of avian influenza has 
been communicated in a way that has reinforced a hegemonic public health didactic. 
MEDIA 
Mass Communication 
The power of the press [in America] is a primordial one. It sets the 
agenda of public discussion; and this sweeping political power is 
unrestrained by any law. It determines what people will think and talk 
about – an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, 
priests, parties and mandarins (White 1973 cited in London, 1993:2).  
 
Mass communication encompasses many types of mass media: radio, television, 
newspapers, magazines and the electronic media, but for the purposes of understanding 
the role of mass communication in relation to this thesis, the emphasis will be on the 
printed media of newspapers. From the invention of the printing press to modern day, the 
relationship between the role of mass communication and the public has been under 
scrutiny. Many studies have analysed the influence and effectiveness of propaganda for 
example, and have concluded that it is a powerful persuasive tool based on the premise 
that ‘if you can capture their minds, then their hearts and souls will follow’.52 Leaflet drops 
(known as ‘grey propaganda’),53 have been used from the World War I (1914) to the Iraq 
War (2003), as it is believed that if people can read then maybe they can be told what to 
think and/or how to act. In exploring the role and effect of mass media, it is important to 
be clear about the level on which effects can occur: the individual, the group, the 
institution, society or the culture (McQuail 1977).  
James Curran (2002) likens the modern-day function of mass media to the Medieval 
Church suggesting that the media makes sense of and interprets the world for the mass 
public, ‘emphasizing collective values that bind people closer together’ (p.77). This 
statement sits between two competing views about the effect of mass communication; 
firstly that mass media mirrors society reflecting back to it ideas, norms and values, thus 
validating and maintaining what is already there. Secondly, that it is a teacher of moral, 
religious, political and social values ‘passing the social heritage from one generation to the 
next’ (Lasswell 1948 cited in Tuchman 1987:195), where the values are understood 
implicitly and can be a catalyst for change within society (Harris 1999).  
                                                 
52 ‘Psychological Warrior’ n.d. http://www.psywarrior.com/links.html  
53 Propaganda that does not identify its source. 
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Media Audience 
The media clearly have a powerful role in constructing people’s knowledge beyond their 
personal experience, but people also construct their own relationship to that knowledge 
and use it as a personal resource. The interaction between media and society is more 
complex than originally thought; once considered to be passive recipients (or forgetters) of 
information, through repeated exposure, the audience is now widely considered to be well 
educated, and to have certain expectations of what they see and read (Seale 2004). In fact, 
they are well able to interact actively with media representations of issues and events by 
filling in the gaps when required. Murdock, Horlick-Jones and Petts (2001), in their UK 
study of the role of the media in the amplification of risk, called the public ‘media-savvy 
and sophisticated’. Their results showed that the media can only attenuate or amplify risk 
‘if they capture or resonate with an existing public mood’ (p.ix), but when the lay public 
had little information or direct experience of an issue, the media played a greater role in 
the process of interpretation and refinement.  
As previously explained, Kasperson et al. state that during the process of risk 
amplification, the event or risk signal passes through various individual or social 
‘amplification stations’ causing ripples or secondary or tertiary effects. Like Kasperson et 
al. the approach for the current research thesis positions the media as a ‘primary definer’; 
this term originates in Hall’s (1980) research that describe ‘the elites’54 as the primary 
definers, and the media, under the guise of objective reporting, as just the amplifiers of 
elite messages. 
Media Reception 
Media reception literature suggests that the reader’s perception of what is written in texts 
is more complex than originally thought; for example, an early media effects theory called 
the Hypodermic Needle Model55 posited that media messages were received passively and 
without question. World War II propaganda methods were predicated upon this premise, 
however this theory is now considered obsolete, and subsequent research has shown that 
audiences respond to articles based on many factors such as the way an article is framed, 
which voice was used to ‘talk about’ an issue, or if they are able to personalise what they 
read.  
Psychological and sociological theories underpin approaches to understanding media 
reception (Staiger 2005). For example, mass communication theorists proposed that the 
stimulus-response behavioural theory could explain how media messages could be used to 
alter people’s opinions and that functionalism could address how to understand the 
                                                 
54 According to Goode and Ben‐Yehuda (1994), elites can be institutional or economic, that is, elites with 
powerful positions and elites with great wealth. 
55 Also known as the ‘Magic Bullet theory, the ‘hypodermic needle theory’ implied that mass media had a direct, 
immediate and powerful effect and that it could influence a very large group of people directly and uniformly by 
‘shooting or injecting’ them with appropriate messages designed to trigger a desired response. 
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individual within the context of the wider society. By focussing on the relationship between 
the individual and the media, media reception research sought to answer questions about 
effect, agency and causality.  
Stuart Hall, a critical cultural theorist, proposed that people react to messages in 
one of three ways: they respond and interpret the text as the creators of the text intended, 
they ‘negotiate’ problems in the text in order to find their own interpretation of the text or 
they reject the intended meaning and choose to put the message into ‘some alternative 
framework of reference’ (cited in Staiger 2005:80). A criticism of the critical cultural 
approach however, is that audiences are positioned as having multiple identities, and 
therefore cannot be regarded as a homogenous group.  
There are many reasons why people do or do not pay attention to messages, and 
cognitive psychology would endeavour to explain these reasons using theories of 
attribution, dissonance, memory and motivation. This thesis does not explore the cognitive 
influences on the audience perception of the risk of avian influenza as presented to them 
by the New Zealand media, but acknowledges that, for some reason, there are some 
members of the public who pay more attention to risk-threat messages than others. A 
rationale frequently offered for this reality is that when people hear a message that they 
think will affect them personally, they pay more attention and in doing so, ‘acquire a 
greater amount of information from the news media’ (Wei, Ven-Hwei and Hung-Yi 
2007:669). 
Media Templates 
The ways in which people ‘make sense of the world’ are many and various, and Kitzinger 
(2000) argues that, when learning about new media events, the use of ‘media templates’ is 
an essential tool. Media templates correspond closely to ‘framing’ as described by Goffman 
(1974), where a schema that includes categories and stereotypes is constructed (about a 
past event) in order to understand a new one. Framing differs to templates in that framing 
assumes ways of thinking in society, whereas templates refers to ways of thinking or 
‘strategies’ within journalistic practices; nonetheless, the two are linked. Templates can 
be understood as a ‘social reference point’ that shape narratives about new events and 
stories, ‘guiding discussion not only about the past but also the present and the future’ 
(Kitzinger 2000:61).  
Research has demonstrated the importance of ‘collective memories and historical 
analogies in audience reception, media representation and effects’ (Kitzinger 2000:74) and 
has shown that, when confronted by news stories, people draw upon large reserves of prior 
knowledge (Seale 2002). Initial descriptions of events, which use references to past similar 
events, can create a ‘script’, which is then used by journalists and audiences alike to make 
meaning of a new event. These templates are automatically drawn upon as ‘powerful pre-
packed associations’ (p.70), so that when the media used phases like ‘another Vietnam’, 
‘another Hitler’ or ‘another plague’, images are quickly formed and can ‘short-cut’ the 
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description process. Furthermore, Kitzinger (2000) defines templates as explaining current 
events, not only as a point of comparison but also as proof of an on-going problem, 
highlighting patterns and minimizing dissenting or forgotten facts (p.76). Like the media 
effect of agenda-setting, templates can define how an event is talked about, thus 
influencing how people think about a new story, predisposing them to ‘come to conclusions 
with the minimum of analysis’ (Nuestadt and May 1988:33). 
MEDIA EFFECTS 
 
Media texts, including representations, do not affect audiences in a simple 
and direct way, but rather that this process is complex, ambiguous and at 
times, even contradictory (Newbold, Boyd-Barrett and van den Bulck 
2002:308) 
 
The history of research on media effects began in the early 20th century, and according to 
McQuail (1977), can be categorized by four stages: the first was primarily interested in the 
effects on attitudes of war propaganda; the second extended the gaze on attitude change 
and was an era of ‘limited effects’, concluding that the media were effective only if similar 
attitudes already existed. In the 1970s, the third stage explored the cognitive aspects of 
mass media and since the mid 1980s, the fourth stage has been defined by social 
constructivism. Scheufele (2000) observed that ‘by framing images of reality in a 
predictable and patterned way, the mass media have a strong impact in constructing social 
reality’ (p.105). One of the ways that the media does this is to create an interpretation of 
an event, limiting other possible understandings, even so, ‘media discourse is part of the 
process by which individuals construct meaning’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1989:2).  
Agenda‐setting 
As early as 1920, the idea that people’s opinions and attitudes could be influenced by what 
they read was being explored. Walter Lippmann (1922) proposed that because the media is 
the means by which most people learn about the wider world, it ‘determines our cognitive 
maps of that world’ (cited in McCombs and Reynolds 2002:3). Moreover, Bernard Cohen 
observed that even though the media may not have the power to tell people what to think, 
they were ‘stunningly successful in telling [them] what to think about’ (Cohen 1963:6).  
In 1968, professors of journalism Maxwell McCombs and Don Shaw conducted 
research to explore whether mass communication had an influence on public opinion, 
initiating what is now known as the famous Chapel Hill study (McCombs and Shaw 1972). 
The results showed that amongst undecided voters during the 1968 U.S. presidential 
campaign who ranked issues according to importance; there was a high correlation (+.97) 
between the ranked issues and frequency of news stories about the same issues (McCombs 
2004). McCombs also described behavioural consequences of intense media reporting when, 
for example, in the absence of factual evidence, newspaper stories about an energy 
 37
shortage in Germany in 1974 provoked a huge increase in demand for oil, especially by the 
public for refined petroleum.  
Through this exploration of issue salience, Shaw and McCombs originated the theory 
of ‘agenda-setting’, which has been the basis for over 400 subsequent studies and bodies of 
research. Their theory, a cumulative effect model, has frequently been used to understand 
how people’s opinions and attitudes are influenced. The central tenet is that the media 
have an agenda-setting role as it decides the degree of emphasis or salience that is placed 
on an issue, and in doing so prioritises the issues for the public. The theory has some 
constraints, and one of them is that for agenda-setting theory to be applied, the media 
system and the political system need to be ‘reasonably open’ – that is to say democratic 
and free from censorship.56 Agenda-setting theory is a direct challenge to previous theories 
of media effects such as the hypodermic theory, and it has been generalised to investigate 
issues in the public agenda from civil rights to drug abuse (Zucker 1978 cited in McCombs 
2004:61) 
Iyengar (1991) approached the agenda-setting model from a cognitive perspective, 
and suggested that the public, when evaluating or deciding upon an issue, will use 
information that they have recently read or seen, as it is easier to retrieve this data from 
their long-term memory. In other words, what they have read most of, and most recently, 
will be most easily remembered. This idea he called the ‘accessibility bias’ model, but 
others (Kim, Scheufele and Shanahan 2002) have named this mechanism the accessibility-
based model, and as an agenda-setting effect, can be thought of ‘as an almost mindless, 
mechanical response’ (Takeshita 1993:276). 
For the purpose of this thesis, agenda-setting theory has a broad application; once 
the threat of avian influenza was first reported, agenda-setting theory could explain why, 
through the stories the New Zealand media used to report the H5N1 threat, the New 
Zealand public’s perception of the threat’s salience was heightened. It is possible for 
example, that when the issue stopped being reported, some of the New Zealand public 
perceived the problem to have gone away, but others, who had been exposed to, or had 
taken more notice of the risk messages, changed their behaviour. There were anecdotal 
reports for example, that in New Zealand, as the avian influenza stories were increasing, 
some people began to stock up on canned goods, water, facemasks and anti-viral 
medications.  
The salience of the avian influenza issue may have been a direct result of the 
media coverage, similarly, the way the H5N1 stories were framed may have influenced the 
audience’s perception of how ‘risky’ the threat was. A core tenet of agenda-setting theory 
is that the way the media frames an issue influences how the issue is perceived by its 
audience. Entman (1993) calls this process ‘sizing’ and concludes that the public’s interest 
                                                 
56 Critics of the media, for example Noam Chomsky, would argue that even in the most seemingly democratic 
countries, media censorship is pervasive and endemic. 
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in an issue directly relates to how much and how prominently the information has been 
displayed by the media. 
Framing 
Originally, a photography and cinematography concept, framing can refer to page design or 
aspects of language in verbal messages. In mass media effects research however, framing 
has differentiated from the stylistic interpretation, and in relation to media effects theory, 
it can be described as ‘the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context 
and suggests what the issue is through selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration 
(McCombs 2004:87). McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) describe framing as an extension of 
agenda-setting, and have labelled it a second-level agenda-setting effect.  
Information and news need to be embedded within a meaningful context in order to 
be clearly understood, and a media frame organises relevant ideas, whilst also suggesting 
what is salient and topical; it can draw attention to particular issues, and can refer to what 
is included as well as what is excluded. As a theoretical construct, the framing of news 
stories is linked to ideas of news production, information control and notions of ‘gate-
keeping’,57 and it ‘situates the analysis of news in the context of discursive formation of 
issues, policies, opinions and engagement’ (Pan 2008:3). When reporting a story, 
journalists, through their interpretation of events can ‘turn an occurrence into a 
newsworthy event, and a newsworthy event into a story’ (Tuchman 1987 cited in Marks, 
Kalaiyzandonkes, Wilkins and Zakhroava 2007:184). Journalists can be limited by their own 
understanding of an issue, nonetheless, by focussing on some aspects and not others, they 
define and interpret the issue for the public.  
Sociological theory posits that framing is influenced by cultural narratives, symbols 
and stereotypes, whereas psychological literature concentrates on causality and treatment 
(London 1993). A ‘schemata of interpretation’ is how Goffman (1974) describes frames in 
Frame Analysis, and suggests that frames have considerable power when the audience is 
engaging, thinking about and forming opinions about an issue. Framing can change the 
wording or presentation of an issue and has been shown to powerfully influence decision 
outcomes for those who engage in an issue through the media, as the earlier example from 
cognitive psychologists Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated. They conducted research on 
heuristics and biases in probabilistic thinking, devising many different experiments in order 
to try and explain people’s reactions to threats posed by natural hazards. Their results 
support the media theory of framing: that the way an article is framed changes peoples 
perceptions of the issue presented. Frames can be identified by looking for certain words 
(or pictures) that consistently appear in a story or text, and as ideas are repeated, 
meanings, concepts or themes are reinforced. McCombs and Ghanem (2001) describe these 
                                                 
57 Occurring at all levels of media structure, ‘gate‐keeping’ is the process through which ideas and information 
are filtered for publication. As a theory used in the disciplines of journalism and mass communication, it was first 
proposed by social psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1947. 
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frames as dominant perspectives used to ‘organize [both] news organisations and personal 
thoughts about objects’ (cited in McCombs 2004:88).  
In his exploration of how television frames political issues, Shanto Iyengar (1991) 
hypothesized that each story could be classified as using either an ‘episodic’ or ‘thematic’ 
news frame, and found that whilst few news reports were exclusively episodic or thematic, 
for most stories, one frame or the other clearly predominated (p.14). An episodic news 
frame is one that focuses on particular cases or specific events whereas a thematic news 
frame situates events and issues within a generalised context. In relation to health risk 
reporting, it has been found that episodic framing can represent an issue in the following 
ways: with sensational reporting (emotive language), non-contextual statements (‘35 died’) 
and little or no self-protection or self-efficacy information (Dudo et al. 2007.; Roche & 
Muskavitch 2003; Friedman et al. 1987). Conversely, thematic reporting is factual, 
contextual and situational, and gives self-protection and/or self-efficacy information. 
Furthermore, this thesis takes the view that thematic framing can also include the provision 
of scientific and medical information.  
The results from the paper, authored by Dudo, Brossard and Dahlstrom (2007) that 
is used in this research as a basis for comparison, showed that the U.S. reporting of the 
avian influenza could be clearly differentiated into episodic and thematic framing. Their 
hypothesis that the health risk story of avian influenza would be framed primarily in an 
episodic way was supported with 50 percent of articles determined to be episodic in 
content, whilst only 19 percent were framed in a thematic way (p.445). 
Attributions of Responsibility 
One way to demonstrate the effect of media framing is to investigate attributions of 
responsibility. As Beck (1999) asserts: ‘Risk and responsibility are intrinsically 
connected…[therefore] …to whom can responsibility (and therefore costs) be attributed?’ 
(p.6). Attributions of responsibility are critical ingredients of all social knowledge and are 
often spontaneous, ‘powerfully influencing self-images, evaluations of others and emotional 
arousal’ (Iyengar 1991:8). Attribute agenda-setting introduces the element of moral 
reasoning, and can be regarded as a function of framing. Framing an event, issue or story in 
a certain way can ‘promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman 1993:52). The fundamental 
assumption of this media effect is that people attribute responsibility differently depending 
on the way a story was framed: being more likely to hold individuals responsible if the story 
was framed episodically but more likely to hold government and society responsible if the 
story was framed in a thematic way. 
Iyengar (1991) hypothesized that threats about which individuals were familiar or 
had personal knowledge, would be less responsive to contextual cues, such as framing, than 
they would be for threats with which the audience were less familiar. Using crime 
(personal) and terrorism (less familiar) as variables and by observing that both issues were 
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framed similarly (episodically) in news stories, his research showed that ‘framing was more 
powerful when terrorism was the target issue’ (p.45). Iyengar concluded that responsibility 
was assigned to individual causality (personal qualities of terrorists) when a familiar issue 
was framed episodically; however, when an unfamiliar issue was framed in the same way, 
the causal responsibility was societal (social or political reform).  
The process of attributions of issue responsibility is far from straightforward, and 
caution must be used in applying this theory to opinion formation. However, if an ‘at-risk’ 
individual can be produced in an avian influenza news discourse, and media framing of an 
event or problem can influence to whom the public attributes responsibility, framing could 
be a powerful media tool. 
Priming 
Down’s (1972) observation that an issue will be paid more attention the next time it is 
reported in the media, is a media effect that has been referred to as ‘priming’ and was 
applied to media use in the 1980s. Often regarded as an extension of agenda-setting, 
(which make some issues more salient than others), and a factor in causal attribution and 
opinion formation, priming occurs when the media produce certain content that ‘influence 
people’s subsequent behaviour or judgments related to that content’ (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 
Roskos-Ewoldsen and Dillman-Carpentier 2002:97). Originating in the discipline of cognition 
and psychology, priming can refer to the activation of a concept, which ‘for a period of 
time, increases the probability of memories and thoughts associated with that concept, to 
come to mind again’ (Berkowitz and Rogers 1978 cited in Perse 2001:109). What this means 
in practical terms is when a news story is presented in the media, because of previous 
emphasis on some aspects of the issues and not others, the public will associate the story 
with a pre-scripted schema that has previously been provided for them by the media. Once 
again, this results in some issues or aspects of an issue becoming more salient and more 
memorable than others; even though subsequent news stories may be reported in a 
balanced way, because of the priming effect, the public will pay more attention to those 
aspects of the story that come to mind more easily. Priming can also reinforce pre-existing 
stereotypes (Pechmann 2001), defining the situation and producing a ‘desirable’ citizen; for 
example, a woman who has mammograms every two years to ensure early detection of 
breast cancer. 
This thesis intends to explore, whether as a result of the media linking the health 
threat of avian influenza to the 1918 pandemic, or the more recent SARS outbreak, avian 
influenza itself came to be regarded first and foremost as a pandemic, when in actuality, 
each outbreak was isolated and contained.  
Issue‐Attention Cycle 
Observations that public attention to issues do not seem to last very long, despite some 
issues having continued and real consequences, resulted in questions that have focussed on 
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whether public attention can last long enough to effect political or legislative change. 
Anthony Downs (1972) hypothesized that a ‘systematic cycle of heightened public interest 
and then increasing boredom’ (p.1) could be demonstrated when looking at the 
media/public interaction. Furthermore, he proposed that this cycle had five stages, which 
almost always followed a predictable pattern. 
The first of these stages was a ‘pre-problem’ stage, where although experts may 
already be alarmed, the public have yet to pay attention to it. ‘Alarmed discovery and 
euphoric enthusiasm’ is the second stage where the public, through being primed by similar 
past events (past epidemics for example), become ‘both aware and alarmed’ (p. 3). In the 
third stage, there is a recognition that along with the problem there needs to be a solution, 
and this stage often focuses on economic and technological issues. Frequently, the 
problems associated with solving the issue seem overwhelming, and in this fourth stage, 
discouragement and boredom can set in. Moreover, if a new issue has subsequently 
emerged, the public ‘will’ to continue to engage with the original problem wanes.  
The ‘post-problem’ phase is the last stage, where the issue has been firmly 
replaced with a new one, although positive outcomes in the form of policies and campaigns 
may have resulted. Downs (1972) asserts that once an issue has gone through the issue-
attention cycle, and if it were to emerge again, it would ‘receive a higher level of 
attention’ (p.4). The research for this thesis intends to pay attention to the presence of 
this cycle in the New Zealand media and its influence on those who read media accounts of 
the avian influenza. This theory of public reaction to risk events has some similarities to 
Sandman’s adjustment-reaction theory in that a past risk event serves as a rehearsal or 
‘prime’ for a new event, evoking a reaction or cycle that can be predicted. Both theories 
hypothesize that the last stage results in a public that has heightened awareness of the risk 
event.  
THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE 
Background 
Friedman, Dunwoody and Rogers (1986) propose that, in its widest sense, ‘science 
comprises not only the biological, life, and the physical sciences but also the social and 
behavioural sciences and such applied fields as medicine, environmental sciences, 
technology, and engineering’ (p.xv). The domain of science is characterised by uncertainty, 
debate and questioning, subject to continual revision, and is something that cannot be 
assumed to propose absolute forms of knowledge claim. Once it interfaces with the media 
and ‘the publics’, science tends to become transformed into something called 
‘information’, and when this information is communicated, whether it be by scientists 
directly, or via the mass media, it becomes ‘science information’.  
The communication of science is fraught with difficulties, including the 
understanding of what science is, and what it means to many of the ‘actors’ involved in 
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science communication: scientists, researchers, journalists and the public. The relationship 
between scientists and journalists is complicated, with risks and benefits for both. For 
example, a scientist, wanting to raise his profile and secure funding, may give a reporter a 
news story in which he is subsequently ‘misquoted’; alienating his colleagues and possibly 
damaging his reputation. The journalist, through limited understanding of the medical or 
scientific issues, reports the story inadequately, inhibiting the journalist’s chance of future 
access to the scientific community. Pertinent to this thesis, is the role that the media play 
in the communication of science and technology.  
The concern for public ‘science literacy’ has led to measures and surveys of public 
understanding and attitudes towards scientific knowledge. In 1990, a British initiative in 
public understanding of science began to look at the gap between the public domain and 
the world of science by asking three questions: ‘What do people say about science? How do 
people use science? How is scientific knowledge supplied and received?’ Their preliminary 
results showed that first and foremost ‘science’, as a construct, was not a ‘well-bounded, 
coherent thing capable of being more or less understood’ (Ziman 1991:100). Science also 
meant different things to different people depending on the situation in which the 
information was received, the personal agendas and needs of the audience and the 
perceived trust and credibility that was attributed to the source. This and other surveys, 
including the Oxford survey (Durant, Evans and Thomas 1989) and a survey by the [U.S.] 
National Science Board (2002)58 found that a high percentage of adults had little or no 
understanding of even the most rudimentary aspects of scientific knowledge. Moreover, 
both surveys highlighted that interest and knowledge about science were positively 
correlated, but when it came to general attitudes and scientific ‘literacy’, the link was 
weak (Ziman 1991:103).  
 Scientific communities know that it is important to communicate new research or 
scientific information with the public, as public acceptance or uptake of new technology 
often results in the raised profile of projects and further funding and grants. The New 
England Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association preview 
their most important articles for reporters before releasing them to the general public, 
ensuring publicity and directing the dialogue between the researchers and the press. 
Additionally, almost every hospital in the United States has a publicity/media-relations 
department whose main purpose is to translate highly specialized medical information into 
‘lay’ language, which is then circulated via the mass media (Friedman 2004). If, as several 
studies have revealed, most lay people get their science information from the media, then 
the mass media are a vital conduit with a responsibility to report scientific, health and 
medical information in an accurate and careful way.  
 
 
                                                 
58 The survey found, for example, that about half the people surveyed believed that humans and dinosaurs lived 
together on the earth at the same time and that even less, just 10 percent, could define what a molecule was. 
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The role of the Media 
Scientists and journalists use language in very different ways: 
To the academician, the language of the reporter is excessively casual, 
trivialising, and simple minded, if not downright wrong or silly. To the 
journalist, the language of the academicians is excessively passive, 
technical, and complicated, if not downright wordy or pompous…  
(Tavris 1986:25).  
 
Studies have shown that when it comes to evaluating what constitutes good scientific 
communication, neither journalists nor scientists think that the media is doing a good 
enough job (Chappell and Hartz 1998). Understandably, scientists and journalists have 
different agendas when it comes to communicating science to the public; scientists often 
feel that scientific information should educate (Friedman et al. 1986:xii), but journalists 
want to make their story interesting or novel in order to generate interest and sell 
newspapers. Although science information professionals (usually trained journalists) can be 
the intermediary between the scientist and journalists, few have a formal scientific 
education (Weigold 2001).  
When it comes to personal health, a U.S. National Health Council survey conducted 
in 1998, showed that the people surveyed paid either a moderate or a great deal of 
attention to medical information reported in the media. Magazines, journals and 
newspapers were cited as the primary source of health care information – 50 percent – and 
more importantly, 60 percent of people changed their behaviour in some way, with 42 
percent seeking further information from their doctors or the Internet (Lakoff and Johnson 
1981). Studies also showed that the media tended to stay with mainstream scientific 
sources, and favoured using press releases from large health organisations such as the US 
Food and Drug Administration. However, by repeatedly using the same sources, journalists 
run the risk of ‘creating’ experts, when in reality, the source may have been the only one 
available and so participate in the politics of science mentioned above. Several factors 
determine who is used as an expert source; availability, credibility, loyalty and public 
profile are all factors that come into play when a scientific or medical news story is being 
written and information is needed.  
Other constraints on how a scientific or medical story is written have already been 
alluded to and are often editorial, or economic; for example, in order to run a newspaper 
as a profitable business, readership and advertising levels must be maintained. News stories 
have formulas that are strictly adhered to and often do not allow for complex language or 
difficult concepts, which are often characteristic of scientific stories. An example of such a 
formula is a ‘hard news’ article59 that must include ‘what, who, where, when, why and 
how’; all within the first few paragraphs (Friedman et al. 1986:23). This is primarily so that 
                                                 
59 Hard and soft news are terms to denote characteristics of a news story where hard news covers breaking 
stories as well as serious topics such as politics, economics, crime, war, and disasters, as well as law, science, and 
technology. Conversely, soft news is not timely, and includes 'human interest' stories and events like arts, 
entertainment and sports. 
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readers can quickly skim an article and still comprehend all the relevant information. A 
positive aspect of scientific and medical reporting is that the deadlines are usually much 
longer than ‘lead’ stories of disasters or political issues; however, this extra time is often 
necessary, as the complexities of technical medical or health stories requires careful and 
informed investigation. It is interesting to note that New Zealand has almost no specialist 
science journalists, with health reporters operating mostly by hard news deadlines. 
Models of Public Communication of Science and Technology 
This thesis employs a social constructionist methodology and engages in critical discursive 
analysis when exploring how risk is constructed by both the media and the public. Implicit 
in this approach is that there are no ‘givens’ in the social world, and this thesis 
acknowledges that drawing upon models tends to imply an assumption that there is 
something fixed that can be measured. However, reference to models in this thesis is a way 
of putting together a ‘cluster’ of ideas, as a type of heuristic, and for the purposes of a 
particular analysis.  
A desire by the scientific community for public support for scientific work has led 
to research in order to measure public attitudes towards and knowledge of science and 
technology. Recently, research has progressed this question to look at why some 
information is assimilated more easily than others. Models of understanding (outlined 
briefly below) are ‘frameworks for understanding what the problem is, how to measure the 
problem and how to address the problem’ (Lewenstein 2003). 
The deficit model is predicated on the notion that the public have a deficit of 
scientific knowledge that needs to be filled, and that once this need is met then ‘all will be 
well’. Moreover, the assumption that members of the lay public are scientifically illiterate 
raises issues of inequality and power, where the power resides with those who have the 
knowledge. It is also a pejorative and narrow approach in that it assumes that one sort of 
knowledge (that of the ‘experts’) is worth more than another (that of the ‘publics’) which 
is not the approach of this thesis. As stated in the methodology chapter, avian influenza 
will be viewed not only as a health threat about which there is medical and social 
knowledge, but also as a phenomenon that has had particular meanings attributed to it.  
Local knowledge, that is, knowledge ‘based in the lives and histories of real 
communities’ (Lewenstein 2003:4), is regarded as central in the ‘lay expertise’ model. 
Whilst this model can been seen as addressing the knowledge/power imbalance of the 
deficit model, critics argue that this model privileges local knowledge over ‘known’ 
information, and has been labelled as ‘anti-science’. The public-participation model 
(sometimes called the dialogue model), addresses some of these power imbalances by 
promoting public participation – seeking input from the public into science issues – a 
process that has been called the ‘democratizing of science’ (Sclove 1995). However, critics 
of this model say that this public engagement can be seen as having more to do with 
politics than public education and understanding. 
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The model of public communication that has most resonance with this thesis is the 
contextual model as it situates public knowledge within personal experiences and 
acknowledges cultural and social discourses. It also recognises that social norms and 
expectations as well as media representations can attenuate or amplify public anxiety 
about health issues (Kasperson 1988). The way that the media construct health issues and 
how the public perceive them has been an important component in developing a ‘public 
understanding of science’ discipline. Just as the two main ‘actors’ in the public 
understanding of science are the ‘expert’ and ‘lay public’, public health involves a binary 
of professional and lay dimensions, with the media often acting as a conduit between the 
two.  
HEALTH 
Public Health 
The notion that health is a public responsibility is not a recent phenomenon and examples 
of health regulation can be found as far back as 1348, when, in order to try to combat the 
many outbreaks of disease, Venice and Florence commissioned magistrates to oversee the 
first boards of health (Slack 1992:15). One of the many initiatives these boards produced 
were ‘health passports’ that were used during the European outbreaks of bubonic plague to 
ascertain the plague-free status of travellers: quarantining of the sick, burial of the dead 
and record-keeping were just some of the duties that the board managed (Carmichael 
1997). Germanic publications of the 17th  and 18th  century describe the duties of the 
municipal police who, as well as being responsible for religion, highways, customs, 
commerce and beggars, had a division called the ‘medical police’ who were the regulatory 
body that oversaw health and cleanliness (Rose 1994:54). 
Public health, as a civic responsibility, grew out of the increase in urban 
populations with the inherent problems of large towns: for example, issues of town 
planning and the need to provide clean water and efficient sewage systems. The first 
known formal concept of public health was devised by Edwin Chadwick in the Victorian 
1840s, who suggested that epidemic disease was first and foremost a product of dirt and 
miasma,60 found mainly in towns, especially in the least sanitary precincts, and most 
importantly could be ‘remedied’ by public health engineering (Pickstone 1992:126). 
Furthermore, it could be argued that in the attempt to write about disease, health and 
hygiene as a concern for the whole population rather than for the individual, the writers of 
the Enlightenment were anticipating the notion of public health (Riley 1987).  
Public health control mechanisms such as quarantining and segregation are early 
examples of government-sanctioned health policies such as the British Imperial Vaccination 
Act of 1853 and the 1908 Australian Quarantine Act, and is often described in terms of ‘old’ 
and ‘new’. The ‘old’ public health was located in the industrialism of Europe and North 
                                                 
60 A poisonous atmosphere formerly thought to rise from swamps and putrid matter and cause disease 
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America, and was associated with trying to address rapid urbanisation, overcrowding and 
squalor (Costello and Haggart 2003). It was an environmentally based public health that was 
a reaction to disease rather than a focus on prevention. The ‘new’ public health that 
emerged at the turn of the 20th century was characterised by quarantining, isolation 
(sanatoriums for example) and immunisation programmes. Health was increasingly viewed 
not as situated within large institutions such as hospitals, but as an individual responsibility 
where a healthy life-style was the goal, albeit a goal for everyone (Petersen and Lupton 
1996). The relationship between public health and governance, where, through health 
promotion and education, the state acts ‘in the best interests of its citizens’ (Lupton 1995) 
has been problematised in terms of power and social control, where citizens were directed 
by the state to conduct themselves in a certain way; an idea that Michel Foucault called 
‘governmentality’. 
Governmentality 
The power to govern is often presented as the power to heal  
(Waldby 1996:5). 
 
Governmentality can be described as the way that people are governed through organised 
practices; not just a ‘top-down’ mechanism of the state but also through discourses and 
knowledges that are produced by accepted organisations, such as schools or medical 
institutions. In this way, social control is achieved through internalised knowledge that 
produces not only an acceptance of government policies but also an implicit consent; a 
hegemonic device that is most effective. Lull (2000) explains hegemony61 in this context as 
‘the power or dominance that one group holds over others, [gained through] a tacit 
willingness to be governed by principles, rules and laws which they believe operate in their 
best interests, even though in actual practice they may not’ [italics added] (p.51). Dean 
(1999), simplifies the notion of governmentality by suggesting that it is a ‘mentality of 
governing’ or a way of thinking about how we govern others and also how we govern 
ourselves (p.12). It is important to clarify that the concept of governmentality is not just 
about ‘the government’ but encompasses social groups, institutions and organisations at 
both a local and national level.  
In her book, The Imperative of Health: Public Health and the Regulated Body, 
Deborah Lupton (1995) states that the word ‘health’ has come to mean ‘more than a 
medical condition, disease (or lack thereof), and it comprises a group of knowledges used 
to assess different populations for different governmental strategies’ (p.70). She also 
asserts that governmentality, as a concept, is a combination of both coercive and non-
coercive institutional and state strategies, which are ‘urged upon individuals for the sake of 
their own interests’ (p.9). Central to governmentality is ‘the expert’ and their knowledge 
                                                 
61 Hegemony, a term first coined by Antonio Gramsci describes how the domination of one social class over 
others is achieved by a combination of political and ideological means. 
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and expertise, who, according to Miller and Rose (1993) are important mediators between 
individuals and authorities. Health promoters, doctors, spokespeople for health 
organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) embody expert advice, and 
under the guise of improving health through self-regulation they encourage, warn, advise, 
prescribe and recommend. Due to the constantly changing nature of medical and scientific 
knowledge however, it is difficult for the lay public to know how much to trust these 
experts (Giddens, 1992). 
Other health educators, parents, teachers and social workers for example, are part 
of what Kendall and Wickham (1992) call ‘the framework of public health’, and are reliant 
upon other health experts and health knowledges. Although they often have very different 
roles, Lupton (1995) contends that they all encourage certain practices and promote the 
importance of rational action. Health education, which has long been regarded as a good 
thing, can also be seen as a means of control as ‘truths about health’ which are imposed on 
the public, who often possess little or no medical or scientific knowledge (p.11). The terms 
‘health’ and ‘unhealthy’ have come to mean much more than the presence or absence of 
disease, and as Petersen (1997) asserts, have become ‘signifiers of normal and abnormal 
identity: of one’s moral worth’ (p.198).  
Statistics, that is quantitative and quantifiable information about health and 
illness, can also act as a disciplinary power providing incontestable knowledge that 
‘changes things, have effects [and] are a means by which power circulates through the 
social body’ (Bashford 2004:44). In terms of the media use of numbers and statistics to 
report health risk events and construct a level of risk, this critical observation regarding the 
disciplinary power of the use of statistics has relevance for this thesis.  
Public Body 
In this thesis, the word ‘public’ is operationalised as a social body made up of individuals 
who are themselves products of that social body. The theoretical approach of this study is 
to constitute the body as socially constructed, the meaning of which changes according to 
culture, situation and context. Deborah Lupton, in Medicine as Culture elaborates: ‘the 
human body can no longer be considered a given reality, but as the product of certain kinds 
of knowledge and discourses which are subject to change’ [italics added] (p.23). 
Anthropologists Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) describe the body as having three distinct 
but related parts: an individual ‘lived’ body-self, a social body, which is symbolic or 
representational, and a bio-political body, controlled by state organisations interested in 
maintaining social order (p.7).  
Waldby (1996) explains that politically, the public are regarded, not as individuals, 
but ‘as one body, the social body or the body of the polity’ (cited in Bashford 2004:4). The 
social body has been ‘problematised in the vocabulary of medicine’ (Rose 1994:54), and it 
is perceived in public health discourse as ‘dangerous, problematic, ever threatening to run 
out of control, to attract disease, to pose imminent danger to the rest of society’ (Lupton 
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1995:70). A natural progression of this idea is that if the body is deemed by health experts 
to be sick, then it is the role of the public health system to return it to (its previous) well 
‘self’. By the individual ceding responsibility for health and control of disease to 
organisations, (medical or state), the ‘body’ becomes a public body, belonging to the 
collective rather than the individual, and as such, actions to control it are ‘for the good of 
all’.  
Petersen and Lupton (1996) assert that the modern public health includes physical, 
social and environmental elements and encompasses most aspects of everyday life, 
including activities as diverse as health promotion, education, diagnostic screening and 
epidemiology (p. ix). Along with recommendations that people take an individual approach 
to managing their own health (by stopping smoking or keeping fit for example), there are 
also legislative measures to ensure that when these responsibilities are not taken seriously, 
there are safeguards in place. Examples which demonstrate this notion of social 
responsibility are laws requiring the wearing of bicycle helmets, the threat of large fines 
for exceeding the speed limit or prison sentences for those who knowingly infect others 
with the AIDS virus. Discourses of personal freedom and accountability are juxtaposed with 
those of state control of public health, thereby creating tensions and anomalies. For 
example, the government health experts recommendation to new mothers concerning 
vaccinations for their children, has created public discussions about informed consent and 
power relationships, and added to the discourse about what constitutes ‘good mothers’ and 
‘responsible parenting’.  
Social Responsibility 
The individual’s attitude towards himself, the way in which he ensured his 
own freedom, in regard to himself, and the form of supremacy he 
maintained over himself, were a contributing element to the well-being 
and good order over the city (Foucault 1985:79). 
 
During the 20th century there was an increasing emphasis on personal accountability in 
terms of health, and a desire by the state to produce ‘healthy citizens’, generating a 
myriad of health initiatives aimed at getting people to stop smoking, get fit, lose weight 
and eat right. The consequences of ignoring expert advice were depicted explicitly, for 
example actual photographs of cancer victims on cigarette packets. Publicity campaigns, 
both in print media and on television that have attempted to get people to change their 
behaviour and effect an improvement in their health have had limited success, in fact, 
sometimes they have had the opposite effect.62 More recent strategies have focussed on 
the larger society, in order to construct an ‘irresponsible’ or ‘bad citizen’. Examples of this 
are the recent ads on New Zealand television that highlight the effects of passive smoking, 
where wafting carcinogens are seen to float over and into friends and children. 
                                                 
62 ‘Why Some Anti‐smoking Ads Succeed And Others Backfire’ ScienceDaily (July 20, 2007). 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/07/070719170315.htm 
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Increasingly, those close (in terms of family) to the smoker are depicted as fed-up, 
affected, disapproving or, in the ad where the smoke passes over a bassinette, simply 
helpless against such irresponsibility. The message is clear: ‘choosing’ to engage in 
behaviours which may result in sickness and disease impacts negatively, on not just the 
individual, and implies that the chosen behaviours weaken the whole society.  
Social responsibility can be understood through the notion of the ‘good citizenship’ 
or demonstrations of pro-social behaviour. In the media, this is demonstrated by stories of 
heroic acts, as in the recent intervention by an Auckland businessman to save a young 
woman from attack, and who then was himself stabbed to death.63 At a time when empathy 
and civic duty are reported to be in short supply, this incident was front-page news in all 
the main newspapers for several days. This story seemed to strike a chord with the New 
Zealand public and resurrected discourses of social responsibility, neighbourly and 
community involvement. As Petersen and Lupton (1996) explain: ‘for citizens, 
‘participation’ has become not simply a right but a duty. In the discourse of neo-liberal 
democracy, participation is taken as a prerequisite of the fully democratic society’ (p.xvi). 
Deviance and ‘Othering’ 
The social construction of boundaries of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and their 
relationship to boundaries of ‘safety’ and ‘danger’ are particularly relevant 
to understanding notions of health and disease (Flowers 2001:51). 
 
According to Grove and Zwi (2006), ‘othering’ reinforces ideas about ‘normality’, and uses 
differences in others as ‘a point of deviance, effectively creating a separation between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ (p.1993). In mainstream society, there are pressures to conform, dress 
appropriately, and to exhibit behaviour consistent with social norms. Haggart (2003) argues 
that it is within this mainstream group that people expect to be ‘protected, educated, 
employed and have their health needs met’ [italics added] (p.153), and if people choose to 
put themselves outside that group, then their ability to access ‘in-group’ benefits become 
more difficult. According to Turner (1994), public health and medicine ‘have strong 
coercive elements’ (p.27), which function to construct, mould and normalise human 
behaviour (cited in Lupton 1995). Illness too was normalized and classified, allowing for 
control and intervention by those appointed to those roles (health officials for example) by 
a democratized election process. Risk communication, similarly, can be understood as a 
means by which the public are coerced by the privileging of knowledge by the experts and 
by the reporting of disaster predictions as fact.  
The practice of regarding those other than oneself, or other than one's social group, 
as the source of danger or ‘risk’, has been analysed by Joffe (1999). In simple terms, the 
concept of ‘the other’ is a way for people to understand themselves and the roles they 
perceive themselves to play in relation to others around them, in order to feel good about 
themselves by regarding others as different and common, or as subordinate. It has the 
                                                 
63 ‘Accused ‘Quiet Man’’, New Zealand Herald, 28 September, 2008. 
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effect of disowning what is undesirable and recognising it in ‘some other’ (Clarke, 2003), 
and it is an ethnocentric way to regard the world that can contribute to assumptions of 
inferiority. One of the issues that this thesis explores is how ‘problems’ of non-compliance 
(with recommended health imperatives) are represented in media stories about avian 
influenza and how they talked about by the lay public. Of interest also is who decides what 
should be done in regard to the health threat of H5N1 virus, and who is perceived to be 
non-conforming. The practice of 'othering' can result in strategies of exclusion and 
avoidance, as well as promoting stereotypes, for example ‘Asians have unhealthy farming 
practices’, or ‘Asian governments seldom report outbreaks of bird flu’. 
In regard to the media’s role in health risk communication, it is commonly observed 
that the media often accentuate dramatic events and risks that are ‘easily tied to moral 
and political agendas’ (Joffe, 1999). The ‘us’ and ‘them’ paradigm can be applied, in the 
case of H5N1 reporting in New Zealand for example, to those in the community who do 
have a stock of canned goods and bottled water ready for any emergency, and to those who 
do not. Othering can also apply to countries who have had avian influenza appear in their 
midst, but have not openly reported it, with the implication being, if avian influenza broke 
out in New Zealand, the New Zealand government would be responsible in reporting it.  
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis endeavours to situate risk communication within a domain of bio-politics, 
modernity, frameworks of governmentality and the constructions of meaning, but it equally 
attempts to examine how the ‘realities’ of risks (as described by the scientists and medical 
fraternity) are communicated by the media. The development of risk theory (Beck 1992 
1999; Douglas 1992; Giddens 1992) underpins the exploration of risk communication in this 
thesis, as does the research on risk communication (Leiss 1996; Covello et al. 1989; 
Sandman 1993; Palmlund 1992). In particular, the theories of reactance, adjustment 
reaction and warning fatigue will be drawn upon when analysing how the participants of the 
focus groups described how they reacted to media reporting of the avian influenza virus. 
Particular attention will be paid to the self-reported rationale for similarities and 
differences of their reactions, and the role the media were perceived to have played.  
Social amplification of the risk of avian influenza by the media and by social groups 
within New Zealand will be an area of interest for this analysis. It is expected that this will 
be found through the thematic analysis of the newspaper articles, especially in those 
articles that are critical of the pandemic planning messages. The SARF theorists Kasperson, 
Kasperson, Renn, Burns and Slovic, claim effects generated by a perceived risk can often be 
more harmful than the actual risk itself. In relation to the analysis of both the media 
reporting and the focus groups, ‘ripple’ effects of the amplification of the risk of avian 
influenza to the New Zealand public will be examined. 
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By comparing the results of case study of this thesis with the research by Dudo et 
al. (2007) and through reviewing similar literature (Friedman et al. 1987; Nerlich and 
Halliday 2007; Roche and Muskavitch 2003), it is hoped to understand how the New Zealand 
media reported the health risk of avian influenza. The public understanding of science 
literature and models of public communication (Friedman et al. 1986; Ziman 1991; Sclove 
1995; Lewenstein 2003) will be valuable when assessing the self-efficacy and self-
protection information, and when hypothesizing about the differences between the New 
Zealand and U.S. media reporting. In addition, it is hoped that analysis will reveal how the 
public were ‘positioned’ by the media, that is, how they were represented in newspaper 
articles; Sandman’s (1993) critique of existing risk communication theories will be drawn 
upon here.  
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4. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The over-arching purpose of this thesis is to explore the communication of health risk 
messages. Examples of risk messages are many and varied and can originate from a myriad 
of sources; health, bio-security, fire departments, consumer watch-dogs and vying political 
parties. Risk information may be as brief as a newspaper advertisement or as enduring as a 
year-long campaign communicating through billboards, television, ‘advertorials’,64 post-box 
leaflet drops and press releases. The target audiences are usually specific and obvious to 
the recipient. For example campaigns to raise awareness about breast cancer that urge 
women to self-examine are obviously directed at women, and when they are not, as in the 
recent New Zealand breast-cancer awareness urging men to encourage their partners to 
have mammograms, it is equally as obvious. The majority of risk communication messages 
that the public are exposed to are derived from health sources such as government health 
departments, or medical and therapeutic organisations in the form of press releases or 
organised campaigns; the meningococcal vaccination program implemented by the New 
Zealand health department in August 2005 and the advertising that preceded it, is one 
example.  
Other types of health risk messages are not so overt, but operate as risk messages 
nonetheless. These constitute the risk messages related to avian influenza, which are the 
focus of this research. Two methodologies were used: the first was in the form of a content 
analysis of news coverage about the recent65 health threat of avian influenza. Examples of 
health risk communication about avian influenza were sourced from the New Zealand print 
media; the four main newspapers that represent the four largest cities. Equally important 
as the print media’s reporting of avian influenza was how information, statistics and 
warnings about avian influenza were understood and interpreted by the New Zealand 
public. Consequently, the second approach utilized group discussions from four focus 
groups that explored perceptions, feelings and opinions relating to individual and 
community risk resulting from the health threat of avian influenza. The analysis of this data 
took special note of how the people in the groups, as they discussed the various issues 
between them, constructed concepts of illness, risk and contagion. 
The discourses and themes that emerged from the analysis of the newspaper 
articles were used to formulate questions for the focus groups discussion and included 
debates about planning and preparedness (social infrastructures for example), medical and 
health imperatives, past risk events, warning and urgency. Through the analysis of the 
                                                 
64 The word advertorial is a combination of the words 'advertisement' and 'editorial' and was used as early as 
1946. Usually published in magazines and newspapers, they are purposely designed to look like objective, 
legitimate articles but are really selling products, just like any other advertisement. 
65 Avian influenza was first reported by the World Health Organisation in 1997 as a potential threat to global  
health. 
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newspaper articles, definite themes about and around the issue of avian influenza emerged 
and were identified, even so, it was not assumed that the focus groups would reflect these 
same themes. It was important to hear what people said about their experience of reading 
about avian influenza, rather than imposing a rigid framework on the discussions. Although 
two distinct methods have been used in the gathering of data from newspapers and focus 
groups, and the methods complement each other in many respects, there is no attempt to 
combine them too rigidly.  
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 
The methodological approach for this thesis is constructionist, and is situated within an 
interpretive epistemology; however, rather than assuming that knowledge in the social 
domain is determinate it endeavours to look at trends within the wider contingent 
processes. This interpretive approach assumes that the nature of the social world is an on-
going, constituted, socially constructed phenomenon, and that this phenomenon and 
associated meanings are being continually produced by social actors.  
Human behaviour is a product of how people view their world, a phenomenological 
idea, first attributed to the work of Alfred Schutz (1899-1959). This thesis attempts to 
understand people’s concept of risk associated with avian influenza (H5N1) from their point 
of view, with an assumption that each is constantly interpreting his or her environment. 
This phenomenological approach is particularly useful for this case study because 
constructionist ontology would suggest that the avian influenza pandemic is not just being 
understood as a medical and social fact, but it also has particular meanings attributed to it. 
It could be for example, that blame or stigma has been attached to those who catch the 
disease or to those countries that seemingly fail to inform the wider global community and 
are perceived to have spread the disease as a result of (politically or economically 
motivated) concealment. Of particular interest is how the New Zealand public learnt about 
avian influenza, and how they made a risk assessment about it. 
In terms of research for this thesis, knowledge gained is regarded as situated and 
indeterminate because the categories that people employ in helping them to understand 
the natural and social world are in fact social products; that is, their meaning is 
constructed in and through interaction. Explanation for findings arising out of this 
exploratory research is undertaken ‘with reference to the interpretive understanding of 
social action, rather than to external forces that have no meaning for those involved in that 
social action’ (Bryman 2004:13). Social constructionism implies an active rather than a 
passive process, and it describes the process of meaning-making where individuals 
construct their own mental models that enable them to make sense of what they see 
happening around them, in other words, that the ‘real’ world can be a different place for 
each person.  
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A key feature of this theoretical approach is the recognition that social 
constructionism considers that language is constantly changing and varied in its meanings, 
and that people’s understandings of their world are shaped by their ways of using language. 
Sociolinguist Deborah Cameron describes this understanding of reality as discursively 
constructed, meaning that ‘reality is made and remade as people talk about things using 
discourses they have access to’ (Cameron 2001:15). Lemke (1995) defined discourses as ‘a 
social activity that makes meanings with language…in some particular kind of situation or 
setting’ (p.6). As philosopher and theorist on the history of ideas Michel Foucault argued, 
discourse constructs the topic; it defines and produces the objects of our knowledge and 
governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked and reasoned about. More than 
just ways of thinking and producing meaning, discourses are a way of incorporating 
knowledge; they constitute the ‘nature of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and 
emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern’ (Weedon 1987:108). Discourses can both 
constrain the production of knowledge and enable new knowledges and differences.  
The methodology for the newspaper portion of the research for this thesis is based 
on methodology used in a similar study carried out in 2007 by three researchers in the 
United States who, using the concept of quality, assessed the U.S. media reporting of avian 
influenza (Dudo et al. 2007). Media influences, such as the way a story is framed and the 
types of news stories used, were also investigated. The methodology for my research used 
similar (but not identical) measurables as the U.S. paper and the differences between the 
two methodologies will be discussed in further detail. Through an analysis of discourses of 
risk and contagion arising out of the analysis of newspaper articles and focus group 
transcripts, I sought to understand how the media have contributed to health and disease 
discourses about avian influenza. 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
Rationale 
 
The content analysis was based on a similar method used by Dudo, Dahlstrom and Brossard 
in their 2007 article ‘Reporting a Potential Pandemic: A Risk-Related Assessment of Avian 
Influenza Coverage in U.S. Newspapers’. However, as the research for this case study 
developed, several main differences in emphasis emerged, and as such the research 
methods used were similar but not identical to the methods used in the U.S. study. Dudo et 
al. utilised, as an overarching criterion, the concept of quality and chose to explore this 
with a five-dimension conceptualization that included variables of risk magnitude, self-
efficacy, risk comparison, sensationalism and episodic and thematic framing. They 
underpinned their analyses with two assumptions: first, that in order to understand public 
perceptions of risk related to avian influenza , an assessment of the quality of risk-related 
information in newspapers was necessary and second, as McCombs and Reynolds (2002) 
describe, intermedia effects were likely.  
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Dudo et al. based their analysis on a content analysis method used by Roche and 
Muskavitch (2003) in their assessment of the West Nile virus outbreak in 2000. Unlike the 
U.S. paper, this thesis’ approach to the analysis was exploratory, so there were no 
overarching assumptions of quality or efficacy; nonetheless, the five-dimension 
conceptualization, with similar variables, was utilised. Content analysis has some 
drawbacks, in that it only captures a snapshot in time, can be prone to subjectivity and is 
very time consuming. Nonetheless, I believe it to be a thorough way to analyse the avian 
influenza articles, as I could gather data over the entire 6-year period, identify trends and 
observe broad patterns. I am cognisant that by only looking for variables I am coding for, 
there is a potential for missing other possibilities, and the capacity to take sentences out of 
context. However, being aware of these issues will go some way towards mitigating these 
issues, and as content analysis combines both qualitative and quantitative processes, I 
believe this approach will enhance the depth of analysis and quality of results.  
 Dudo et al. chose a date range that spanned six years and this thesis does the 
same. For reasons not yet understood by this researcher, the majority of avian influenza 
stories appeared in the New Zealand press between 2002 and 2008, not between 2000 and 
2006, as in the United States. Therefore, the date range chosen was January 1, 2002 to 
January 31, 2008. Articles included were those with a word count of over 60 words which 
eliminated the ‘briefs’.66 The U.S. research restricted their count to over 175 words, to 
‘ensure that there was sufficient avian influenza content’ (Dudo et al. 2007:439). I think 
that even news stories that are relatively short will be noteworthy for precisely what they 
do not say, and for the discourse upon which they drew, so for these reasons this aspect of 
the U.S. research was not replicated. 
Preliminary pilot 
 
The Dudo et al. study looked for examples of sensational language and established a list of 
words they called ‘loaded’. It was important for my research that the criteria for deciding 
what was meant by ‘a loaded word’ were clear. I decided that the criteria for evaluating 
words or phrases as ‘loaded’ or ‘not loaded’ would be the same as described by Friedman 
et al. (1987) and Dudo et al. (2007), that is, words that constituted ‘emotionally charged 
language’. In order to establish if the list of words used by Dudo et al. was sufficient for 
this study, or whether the list needed to be added to from New Zealand examples, a 
preliminary pilot was run using articles about an outbreak of the highly contagious norovirus 
in a Dunedin hospital between 06 August and 01 September 2008. 
                                                 
66 Items that are short summaries rather than larger stories, and are usually between 20 and 60 words. 
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Using the Factiva67 database, 31 articles about the norovirus outbreak printed in 
The Dominion, The New Zealand Herald, The Press, The Otago Daily Times and the Sunday 
Star Times were coded for loaded words, loaded phrases and worst-case scenarios. These 
words were evaluated for the criteria of emotionally charged language by two independent 
observers familiar with the premise of the research. Words the same as the U.S. article 
were ignored, but loaded words, loaded phrases and worst-case scenarios words that were 
different and were deemed useful and relevant were compiled for reference and as a 
guide.  
Avian influenza pilot 
  
Ten avian influenza articles were randomly selected from 261 articles (see selection 
process below), to establish whether the coding schema designed from that of Dudo et al. 
was appropriate and sufficient to satisfy the objectives of the case study. These 10 articles 
were coded according to the method described by Dudo et al. and as a result, several 
changes were made to the final coding schema. 
I decided that in addition to Dudo et al.’s coding categories, there was value in 
coding for whether the article tried to educate the reader by reporting scientific 
information, and the context in which ‘other risks scenarios’ and references to 1918 were 
reported. A variable of ‘content’ was added to establish whether the story was 
predominantly about New Zealand or overseas interests, as I was interested to see whether 
‘content’ made any differences in the way the avian influenza was portrayed. 
Dudo et al. assessed each paragraph for its framing: episodic,68 thematic,69 mixed 
or neither and I intended to use the same method for the analysis of the newspaper data. 
However, when the avian influenza newspaper articles were printed from the electronic 
database ‘Factiva’, they printed off in such a way that the paragraphing was far from clear. 
When the pilot study was conducted, the articles were analysed for framing in two ways: 
firstly, the articles were subjectively divided into paragraphs; the variables were coded for 
and the framing assessment (episodic or thematic) was made. The second method used a 
colour-coding schema:70 warm colours coded variables denoted that an episodic framing 
had been used, and cool colours coded variables denoted thematic framing. The entire 
article was then visually assessed to see whether 66 percent or more of the total coded 
words were representative of either an episodic or thematic frame. The results from using 
both the subjective paragraph and colour coding methods were compared, and as there 
                                                 
67 Factiva.com is a global news and business information service that combines the content sets of Dow Jones 
and Reuters. Over 10,000 leading news and business publications from around the world are available, including 
foreign language content. The collection includes newspapers, journals, newswires, Web sites, pictures and 
company reports, including charts and graphs (http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/databases/factiva.shtml). 
68 Episodic: news stories that present single, specific event‐driven matters which are reported in emotive and 
sensationalist language 
69 Thematic: news stories that combine incidents into a central theme, and that also put the issue into a general 
context 
70 see Appendix I for colour‐coding exemplar 
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appeared to be no substantive differences between the outcomes for each method, I chose 
to evaluate the avian influenza articles using the colour-coding method.  
Newspaper article method 
 
The print news stories came from four regional daily newspapers based in New Zealand’s 
four largest cities: The New Zealand Herald, Auckland; The Dominion, Wellington; The 
Press, Christchurch; and The Otago Daily Times, Dunedin. These newspapers reach the 
majority of New Zealand’s news-reading public, with a combined readership71 of 1,734,000 
and circulation of 638,172.72 Importantly, these four newspapers represent three different 
media publishing companies; Fairfax Media, Allied Press Limited and APN News Media. This 
is an aggregate analysis of all four newspapers and each newspaper story comprises a unit 
of analysis.  
Articles were collected from the electronic news media database Factiva using the 
search keywords ‘(avian or bird) and flu’ for the period 01-01-2002 to 31-01-2008. The 
inclusion of the term ‘H5N1’ resulted in only 5 articles, in which the words ‘bird flu’ 
already appeared, so for this reason H5N1 was not used in the search criteria. The original 
search resulted in 953 articles. Articles less than 60 words, editorials, opinion columns, 
duplicate articles from multiple editions of the same newspaper on the same day and 
articles that were not primarily about avian influenza were excluded (n = 445).  
Stories about issues not directly related to avian influenza (n = 133) and articles 
that had two or less code-able variables (n = 114) were neither counted nor coded as an 
avian influenza article, but were still included for the thematic analysis. This was because 
they highlighted many issues around avian influenza that concerned different groups in the 
New Zealand community and showed how the New Zealand media represented the threat of 
avian influenza. The final number of articles selected for coding was 261. This number was 
considered to be adequate for comparison purposes to the U.S. case-study, which coded 
360 newspaper articles in total. The 261 articles were coded for a total of 21 variables 
including emotionally loaded words, phrases and worst-case scenarios, use of risk 
comparisons such as SARS, Hong Kong Flu and the 1918 influenza pandemic.  
Coding 
 
As described by Friedman et al. (1987) the variables of loaded words, phrases and worst-
case scenarios give a good indication of the level of sensationalism in each news story. 
Examples of words agreed upon to be ‘loaded’ included: ‘devastate’, ‘vicious’, blitzed’, 
‘rampage’ and ‘villain’. In the Dudo et al. paper, the word ‘pandemic’ was not coded as a 
loaded word, however, for this study, if it was used in a phrase like ‘could trigger a global 
                                                 
71 Readership is defined as an estimation of how many people in each household will read the paper and for the 
newspapers accessed for this thesis, this number is 2.5. 
72 http://www.nzpa‐online.co.nz/statistics.php  
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pandemic’ it was coded as a worst-case scenario.73 Loaded phrases74 were evaluated in the 
same way and included phrases such as ‘wreak havoc’, ‘not able to cope’, ‘super-
contagious’, ‘killer-disease’ and ‘cut a swathe’. Worst-case scenarios were variations of the 
scenarios mentioned in the Dudo et al. paper but if events seemingly less dire were 
preceded by the words ‘worst case scenario’, these events or predictions were coded as an 
example of a worst-case scenario. These included ‘close New Zealand’s borders’, ‘200 
children made orphans’, ‘stop tourism for months on end’ and ‘at the mercy of the killer 
disease’. 
Placement of loaded words, phrases and worst-case scenarios were coded to see 
whether they appeared in the headline, first four sentences, elsewhere (or if they did not 
appear at all), as research has shown that a reader’s understanding of a news issues can be 
skewed if certain types of information and not others, consistently appear in the first few 
paragraphs of an article. 
Risk-magnitude information75 was evaluated using three variables: qualitative76 and 
two categories of quantitative77 information. The quantitative information was divided into 
information that did or did not use a contextual denominator78 (Roche and Muskavitch 
2003); for example ‘250 people died’ as opposed to ‘1 percent of 2,500 (or 250 people)’ 
died. Both qualitative and quantitative risk-magnitude information, quantitative with a 
contextual denominator and quantitative without a contextual denominator were evaluated 
the same way: major if it appeared more than the other, minor if it appeared less and 
minor if it appeared the same. There was also a coding value of ‘did not appear’.  
Self-efficacy information was coded as a thematic variable and included symptom 
information79 and personal protection information.80 An example of symptom information is 
‘people will feel very unwell, with headaches and severe congestion’ and examples of 
personal protection information are ‘wash and dry hands thoroughly’ and ‘keep the room 
well ventilated’. Dudo et al. coded both these variables as major or minor, but this schema 
meant that a variable could be coded as minor even when it did not appear in the article at 
all. So I chose to code these two variables as ‘present’ or ‘not present’.  
A third self-efficacy variable was added: that of the public understanding of 
science. The public understanding of science underpins a large part of the theoretical 
approach for this thesis, so for this reason I decided that this was an important variable to 
measure. Therefore, if an article attempted to educate the reader with research or 
                                                 
73 Worst‐case scenarios ‐ use of the most extreme negative outcome 
74 Loaded phrases – phrases that evoke an emotional response 
75 Information about how likely it is that individuals could contract, or become ill and die from avian influenza  
76 Qualitative risk magnitude information: words that describe risk: for example ‘a threat of’ or ‘possibly a risk of’. 
77 Quantitative information: use of numbers to convey meaning. 
78 Number, percentage or other information that is used to put the news story, in particular fatalities or 
casualties, in context 
79 Information that describes how readers can evaluate if or when they may have been infected with avian 
influenza and when or how to get medical help 
80 Information on how readers can protect themselves against, or have control over, contracting avian‐flu 
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medical knowledge about avian influenza, or used scientific language, it was evaluated as 
P.U.S (Public Understanding of Science) and then colour-coded as ‘thematic’.  
One example is:  
When a new variant emerges the virus is said to have drifted. The shift to a 
new  strain  happens  when  a  group  of  genetic  mutations  combines  to 
produce a virus with new properties (The Press, 23 July 2005) 
 
Risk comparison information,81 similarly to the Dudo et al. paper, coded references 
to the Spanish flu separately to other risk comparison. References to other risk scenarios, 
(SARS, past influenza outbreaks, earthquakes) and references to 1918 Spanish influenza 
pandemic were coded as thematic. However, when reading many of the avian influenza 
articles, it became evident that these risk comparison references could be interpreted as 
‘hyping up’ the threat possibility, or depicting avian influenza as a worst-case scenario. For 
this reason, a ‘context’ variable was added that asked the coder to subjectively assess (by 
reading the reference in context) whether risk comparison references were reported in a 
thematic or episodic way. This added to the overall ‘thematic’ or ‘episodic’ assessment of 
the articles. The episodic and thematic assessment of the articles were coded as detailed in 
the pilot. Finally, articles that had two or fewer coded words were assessed as neutral, 
because evaluating whole articles as thematic or episodic, based on just two appearances 
of a variable, was not compelling evidence of a media frame.  
Reliability testing 
 
Two independent coders were used to assess inter-rater (or inter-coder) reliability.82 A 
random sample of 10 percent of the overall articles83 were selected using a random integer 
generator.84 Coders read the Dudo et al. paper and were trained to use the coding schema; 
they coded independently of each other and myself. Kappa for nominal data between 
multiple raters was used to calculate the inter-rater reliability which resulted in a 
reliability score of .722. This is an acceptable level of reliability where .41-.60 is 
considered a moderate agreement, .61-.80 a substantial level of agreement and over .80 is 
regarded as outstanding (Landis and Koch 1977).  
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Information that compares the likelihood of contracting avian influenzawith other health risks. 
82 Inter‐coder or inter‐rater reliability or agreement, is a widely used term for the extent to which independent 
coders evaluate a characteristic of a variable and reach the same conclusion. 
83 26 from total of 261 articles 
84 http://www.random.org/integer/ 
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FOCUS GROUPS 
Rationale 
 
The second research method used the focus group technique as a method of generating 
spoken data. Focus groups are, in general, more exploratory and less structured than group 
interviews, tending to concentrate on the interaction between participants and the ensuing 
development of ideas.  
The reason for using focus groups for this research was to explore general perceptions, 
feelings and opinions relating to personal risk, health reporting and influence of the media 
and to discover what social constructs and common understandings are drawn upon when 
assessing health risks. It was hoped that participants would share anecdotal stories of 
personal reactions to the spectre of an avian influenza pandemic and that group discussions 
would be as unstructured as possible with the researcher acting as a facilitator. Of interest 
was how the concepts of illness, risk and contagion were constructed by the group as they 
discussed the issue.  
Composition 
 
 Each of the four focus groups had between five and eight participants85 excluding the 
facilitator. Participants were recruited through identifying and approaching people who 
were interested in taking part in a focus group on the topic of avian influenza and were 
made up of ‘general population groups’.86 For convenience, I approached people whom I 
knew personally in the first instance, asking them for further contacts who they knew 
through their own personal social network, a participant-recruiting technique called 
snowballing. This method worked well, resulting in participants drawn from four general 
population groups: work colleagues, friends from university, friends outside university and 
family. The participants did not represent a diverse educational group, being mostly (but 
not exclusively) tertiary educated.87 In terms of gender, the focus groups were 
predominantly female. It was not readily apparent this changed the content of the 
discussions, especially regarding access to, and opinions about, the media. However, an 
argument could be advanced that the gender composition influenced the way that the 
groups talked about and evaluated the threat that H5N1 posed. The gender variable 
therefore, is something that, should I run focus groups in the future, needs to be 
considered. 
It is probable that because most of the participants were tertiary educated, the 
way that they thought about the topic presented to them, and the way they expressed their 
ideas and views would be different from other groups with a different educational 
                                                 
85 Focus group (FG) 1: n = 5, FG 2: n = 6, FG 3: n = 6  and FG 4: n = 8. 
86 Groups of people from a variety of different situations 
87 See Appendix VIII for description of age, ethnicity and gender. 
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composition. Whilst this may have been a problem for research requiring more broadly 
representative data, for the qualitative component of this research, the emphasis of my 
research lay in understanding how the groups constructed the issues of risk communication 
during their discussions. There was no effort made to divide or arrange the focus groups by 
any specific criterion; for example, by gender, ethnicity, economic or educational 
considerations. Neither did I consider familiarity with each other or the facilitator to be a 
constraint. In fact, familiarity with the facilitator, location and at least one other person in 
the group was a deliberate strategy, as research has shown that groups of people who know 
each other interact more naturally and discuss topics more easily than groups of people 
who do not know each other (Kitzinger 1994). The participants were all based in 
Christchurch, and although the analysis of media coverage showed that there was slightly 
more press coverage in Christchurch than in Wellington and Dunedin, it was not considered 
to be a biasing influence. 
Location and Preparation 
 
For familiarity purposes and because of limited time and resources, the four focus groups 
were held in the facilitator’s home, during two weeks in November 2008. These focus 
groups, although semi-structured, resembled a coffee evening rather than a meeting-room 
type environment, with the location and structure of the meetings allowing for a relaxed 
atmosphere and easy interaction. The focus groups began at 7.30pm with participants 
offered refreshments, and at the end of the discussions, supper was offered and most 
participants chose to stay and chat informally.  
Each group was asked to read an information sheet88 and to complete a consent 
form that had been approved by the Human Ethics Committee. It was explained that the 
session was being recorded, and it was reiterated that they could withdraw at any time and 
have access to the finished data. In order to begin the discussion and to focus the 
participants on the topic, a ‘cue’ article was given to participants to read at the beginning 
of the discussion.89 It was explained to the group that the purpose of this article was to 
familiarise them with how the avian influenza was reported, in order to possibly ‘jog’ their 
memories in terms of what they may have thought or read over the past few years. It was 
also explained that this was an actual article (not a composite), one of over 400 articles 
found by the facilitator during her research. This article was chosen as it included many of 
the variables that were of interest for the research and was neither overly sensational nor 
solely scientific. Time was allowed for the participants to read the article, and then the 
facilitator asked a previously prepared opening question.  
                                                 
88 See Appendix VI 
89 Bird Flu could kill 150m, says UN’, 01 October 2005, New Zealand Herald. See Appendix III 
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Questions and prompts for the group discussion had been composed in order to 
allow as much open-discussion without ‘leading’ or ‘priming’ the participants.90 The 
opening question was ‘So, do you remember when you first heard about bird flu, and what 
you thought about it?’ The groups were then free to talk about it in any way they wanted, 
with minimal input from myself. The session began and the discussions lasted 52 minutes, 
58 minutes, 1 hour and 8 minutes and one hour and 31 minutes respectively. There were no 
strict guidelines for discussion and whatever the groups decided to talk about was 
acceptable and encouraged; however, the groups seemed to self-regulate and almost 
without exception, kept on topic. As the facilitator, I spoke very little, and was able, 
within the groups’ natural discussion, to ask all the questions I had prepared.  
The Data 
 
It is important to stress that the transcript of the group session was analysed for what was 
said, not how it was said. This distinction is made here because there are many ways to 
transcribe spoken data, from linguistic analysis of spoken syntax that documents in fine 
detail: for example micro-pauses, intakes of breath, multiple uses of symbols to denote 
speaking order, interruptions or speed, to a more functional approach, that is more 
interested in ‘how language communicates when it is used purposefully in particular 
instances and contexts’ (Cameron 2001:13). The context in which these discussions took 
place cannot be ignored; the participants knew what the discussion topic was prior to the 
group meeting and they also knew that it was important that the subject was taken 
seriously enough to be discussed in a meaningful way so that it could be transcribed and 
used for a post-graduate thesis.  
Does this mean that the data gathered was in any way ‘less authentic’ than if the 
data had been gathered from people talking spontaneously? It is something I have 
considered however, in privileging ‘ordinary talk’ over talk that has been ‘manufactured’ 
for research purposes, an assumption must be made that one sort of talk is more natural 
than the other. Whilst acknowledging that all talk is shaped by the context in which it is 
produced, Deborah Cameron (2001) in Working with Spoken Discourse states that she does 
not think that ‘anyone has shown convincingly that the talking research subjects do in a 
laboratory is a different thing from “normal” talk’ (p. 20).  
Transcription 
 
Firstly, the focus group session was listened to in its entirety to gain a sense of the whole. 
Commonality between the different groups was noted, for example, what was talked about 
first; in each focus group without exception the same feature from the cue article was 
mentioned by the first speaker. In transcribing the recorded data, I had to make a decision 
                                                 
90 For full list of questions and prompts see Appendix IV 
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about the way I would do this, and once again there were no set rules. I decided to 
transcribe only those things that I wished to examine, so narrative and text were more 
important than pauses, tone or exact reproduction of speaker order. For example, if 
several people spoke at once, and it was largely unclear who was saying what, I transcribed 
that as [overtalking], but if one voice made a clear statement within that multiple talk, 
then it was transcribed as the next thing someone said. 
As in Cameron’s research, I was more interested in the text than in the finer points 
of spoken interaction, hence ‘there was a clear trade-off between accuracy and detail on 
one hand and readability on the other’ (Cameron 2001: 39). Having stated that, however, 
the accuracy of what is said is as close to the original recording as possible, with small 
changes for ease of reading such as transcribing ‘and’, instead of ‘n’, and making a 
judgement call as to whether to notate a full-stop or comma. In some but not all instances, 
repeated words or ‘filler’ words such as ‘um’, ‘er’, ‘ah’, ‘you know’, ‘sort of’, and ‘I mean’ 
were not transcribed.91 
Analysis 
 
The analysis of the focus group data was transcript-based, using textual analysis. Using an 
interpretive approach, ideas that emerged out of the narrative were identified and 
categorised. Kvale (1996) calls this ‘meaning condensation’ or interpretation, where the 
context for interpretation of a statement may be provided by the entire focus group 
discussion (p.193). These emergent ideas were further categorised into themes, sub-
themes, narratives and discourses. During the transcription, ‘units of meaning’ were 
identified in as simple terms as possible, for example: themes of risk, or preparedness or 
scepticism. With respect to the purpose of this thesis (that is to explore themes of risk 
communication, media conventions of reporting and public perception of health risk 
messages), the transcribed data were analysed initially through the ‘filter’ of these themes 
and then further analysed for any other ideas. This formed the initial ‘pass’ of the data.  
A flow chart was compiled from the ideas where groupings and connections were 
made between the various themes and sub-themes, depending on how they related to the 
aims of the thesis. The transcribed data was analysed by systematically reading each 
participant’s contribution line by line. Using ‘copy and paste’ for any conversation that 
pertained to any one or more of the headings and subheadings, these excerpts were copied 
in and under that heading. This was done for all four focus groups. The results of the 
subsequent analysis are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 The conventions I used when transcribing the focus groups can be found in Appendix II. 
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5. ANALYSIS: NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
INTRODUCTION92 
 
The analysis of the newspaper articles used two different methods: the first was a content 
analysis of the New Zealand newspapers reporting of avian influenza between 2002 and 
2008 that compared the results with a similar study carried out in the United States by 
Dudo et al (2007). The aim was to identify the dominant frames that the New Zealand 
newspapers used to report the health risk of avian influenza: either episodic, which is an 
event-orientated frame which uses language tending towards the sensational, or a thematic 
frame. This frame is more generalised and provides useful information about the issue; for 
example in reference to avian influenza, providing symptom information and ways to 
protect oneself. Additionally, in using thematic framing to report avian influenza, the 
threat event may be situated within a wider context and reference past health events.  
 
The second method was a textual analysis that explored emergent themes, topics and 
interpretive frames that represented the way that health risk of avian influenza was 
reported. One of the reasons for a textual analysis approach was to understand how the risk 
of avian influenza was constructed by the New Zealand media, so that, observations could 
be made about similarities or differences. The body of text used for the textual analysis 
contained more articles (n = 508) than in the content analysis (n = 261). 
 
A clarification of the word ‘thematic’ used in this chapter is important. In reference to 
media framing, ‘thematic’ refers to an interpretation of Iyengar’s (1991) exegesis on 
framing, where articles can said to be ‘thematically framed’ when they predominantly 
present issues in a factual, contextual and situational manner, give self-protection and/or 
self-efficacy information and include the provision of scientific and medical information. 
The textual analysis in the second section of this chapter used the word ‘thematic’ to mean 
themes, topics or ideas and was concerned with societal implications, historical trends and 
in terms of the reporting of avian influenza, the contextualization of the threat with regard 
to avian influenza in reference to other health events. 
                                                 
92 The analysis chapters, 5 & 6, will not use indenting to denote paragraphs. This is because these two chapters 
make extensive use of indented excerpts. This also clarifies whose voice is being used.  
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CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Coverage 
 
The U.S. case study selected news stories from four newspapers: the New York Times, 
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Atlanta Journal-Constitution describing them as 
urban newspapers with high circulations. Similarly, this thesis chose four New Zealand 
urban newspapers with the four highest circulations: the New Zealand Herald, Dominion, 
The Press, and Otago Daily Times. The New Zealand papers are much smaller however, and 
a comparison can only be made with caution. 
 
Despite avian influenza being in the world public arena since 1997, the search for 
newspaper stories found very little New Zealand press coverage until 2005. Media reports 
about avian influenza and its predicted effects began with just one story in February 2002, 
increasing to the highest incidence of reporting with 189 articles, in 2005.  
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of H5N1 articles in U.S. media (Dudo et al 2007:442) Used with permission. 
 
This reporting period is different to the U.S. study (Dudo et al. 2007) which analysed 
articles printed in four main U.S. newspapers beginning in 2000 and concluded in 2006. As 
no articles about avian influenza were found in the NZ media preceding 2002, I chose to 
analyse a six-year period (as the U.S. study did), but I used articles printed between 2002 
to 2008. Figure 1 (above) shows the frequency of reporting about avian influenza in the 
U.S. and shows two peaks of increased reporting.  
 66
 Timeline for NZ Newspaper Coverage of Avian Influenza
60 
50 
40 Num er of Articles b
30 
20 
10 
Figure 3: Frequency of H5N1 articles in NZ media 
 
Figure 2 (above) shows the frequency of reporting for New Zealand articles over the six-
year period and highlights a marked increase in flu-related stories in mid 2005. The graph 
also shows peaks of increased reporting (2003 and 2005) which mirrored similar peaks (2004 
and 2006) in the U.S. 
 
However, the New Zealand peaks occurred earlier than in the US reporting. It is possible 
that the New Zealand media are more responsive to overseas events? (Fig 7), or that the 
‘Issue-Attention’ cycle (Downs 1972), manifested itself in different ways in New Zealand 
from the U.S. It appears that the ‘pre-problem’ stage in the U.S. was much longer (4 years) 
than in New Zealand (1 year). In terms of Sandman’s (2005) adjustment reaction, the New 
Zealand media appeared to react more quickly to overseas reports of avian influenza 
events, and then it settled down into the ‘new normal’ sooner than in the U.S. This finding 
is puzzling and demonstrates that even though there seems to be some correlation between 
the reported cases and resultant deaths from avian influenza (Fig 5), there are many 
factors that shape why some news is reported. Although there are similarities between the 
two graphs that show similar tracking by the media of the reported death toll from H5N1, 
exploring the reasons for these factors is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Between January and December 2003, there were only 8 articles about avian influenza 
printed in New Zealand newspapers: one from The Dominion Post and the remaining seven 
from The New Zealand Herald.  
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The 2005 peak in reporting in all newspapers broadly reflects media response to the rise 
and fall of infections and deaths from contracting the H5N1 virus. In the 6 years following 
1997, there had been just 7 avian influenza-related deaths, but beginning in early 2004 and 
within a few months, 43 people had been confirmed as dying from the H5N1 virus. 
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Figure 5: Number of H5N1 cases & deaths worldwide by year 1997‐2008 
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Figure 5 above shows both the number of reported cases and the number of reported 
deaths worldwide from avian influenza, beginning in 1997, when the first cases were 
reported in Hong Kong, through to 10 September 2008. 
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Figure 6: Percentage of H5N1 newspaper stories per newspaper 2002‐2008 
 
Overall, The New Zealand Herald printed the most avian influenza-related stories (n = 111 
or 42.5 percent), followed by The Press (n = 85, 32.5 percent), The Dominion Post (n = 37, 
14.1 percent) and The Otago Daily Times (n = 28, 10.8 percent). The high percentage of 
reporting about avian influenza from The New Zealand Herald is most likely because this 
paper has the largest international section of the four newspapers. The results of individual 
newspaper coverage of avian influenza show that there is variability between newspapers, 
and demonstrates that there are idiosyncratic decisions that influence which stories are 
printed. 
 
Interestingly, the Christchurch Press, not the Wellington-based Dominion Post, had the next 
highest percentage of avian influenza articles. Wellington is the next largest city to 
Auckland and the capital of New Zealand where governmental issues are represented 
strongly. Considering that many of the articles voiced governmental concern and action 
about avian influenza, it is perhaps an unexpected finding that the Dominion Post printed 
less stories on avian influenza than The Press. It is difficult to know why there were 
differing amounts of coverage by each newspaper as there are many things that determine 
whether a story is printed; for example, differences may be due to external forces, such as 
what is happening in New Zealand at the time, or institutional and editorial dynamics of 
format and available space. 
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Placement and Word Length 
 
The majority of articles were printed in the first section of each newspaper; the exceptions 
were a few stories that appeared in a separate ‘Health’ or ‘Business’ section of the 
newspaper. The Factiva database did not provide the origin of the story (whether the story 
was sourced from an external agency or syndication service or written in-house, or a 
mixture of both), so this aspect of the articles was not analysed. 
 
 Ninety-six percent of all stories were between 100 and 1000 words, with 17 articles 
consisting of more than 1000 words. The longest article was 2222 words and the shortest 66 
words; the average length of a news story was 530 words. The New Zealand Herald printed 
53 percent of the longer stories, and articles over 1000 words were evenly spread over the 
six-year period. The average length of the U.S. articles was 766 words, the difference 
possibly reflecting the size of the respective newspapers as well as the more specialised 
roles of the U.S. journalists.  
Content 
 
The majority of stories about avian influenza in the New Zealand sample related to New 
Zealand content (59 percent), with just under a third of all stories (29 percent) relating to 
overseas concerns. Content that reported avian influenza in both a New Zealand and 
overseas context appeared in 13 percent of articles. In the first three years that avian 
influenza threat was reported, for every story containing New Zealand content, there were 
five stories with overseas content. 
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Figure 7: Comparison of content of NZ newspapers – Overseas, NZ & Mixed 
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However, at the peak of reporting (2005), New Zealand content was more prevalent (65 
percent) than overseas content (31 percent), and by 2007, overseas, New Zealand and 
mixed content were equally represented. During the first half of the reporting period, 60 
percent of reporting was primarily overseas content. From January 2005 to July 2006, this 
content had dropped to just under 20 percent, and in the last quarter, 81 percent of 
articles had mostly New Zealand content. Over the entire reporting period, (2002-2008), 
under three-quarters of stories had news content coded as New Zealand and mixed 
(containing some New Zealand content). Avian influenza clearly began as an overseas story, 
becoming localised from January 2005 onwards. This change from stories that framed H5N1 
as an overseas problem to one which could impact and affect all things related to New 
Zealand, paralleled the progression from episodic to thematic framing (see Fig 17).  
Risk Magnitude information 
 
In total, qualitative (descriptive risk estimates) and quantitative (numerical) estimates of 
avian influenza-related risks appeared in 74 percent of New Zealand stories and 77 percent 
of U.S. stories. A story printed in the New Zealand media in February 2004, demonstrates 
how risk magnitude estimates are used to describe the avian influenza: ‘highly pathogenic’, 
‘particularly vicious’ and ‘potentially dangerous’. Quantitative examples include ‘six more 
outbreaks’, ‘killed 14 people’ and ‘death toll hits 19’. Qualitative estimates appeared less 
frequently by a factor of less than half, with a major presence in 21 percent of the stories 
and a minor presence in 53 percent. Mirroring the results of the U.S. paper (where 
quantitative risk estimates outnumbered qualitative estimates), quantitative estimates 
appeared more often, with a major presence in 45 percent of the stories and a minor 
presence in 29 percent.  
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Figure 8: Risk magnitude NZ & U.S. comparison 
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Whilst the major and minor presence of quantitative and qualitative variables differ 
between the New Zealand and U.S. results, what is important for purposes of comparison is 
the similarity in the major/minor ratio (see Fig 8 above). For both New Zealand and U.S. 
results, it is clear that the minor/major ratio is very similar; in other words, the media, in 
both the U.S. and New Zealand, reported the potential risk from avian influenza in terms of 
numbers (deaths and/or predicted deaths) rather than with the use of descriptive language. 
Contextual Denominators 
 
Sixty-seven percent of articles contained quantitative risk information: 28 percent with a 
contextual denominator and 39 percent without a contextual denominator. These results 
were similar to those of the U.S. newspapers with 60 percent of articles containing 
quantitative risk information; 31 percent with a contextual denominator and 29 percent 
without. The number of stories that presented equal amounts of quantitative risk 
information (with and without contextual denominators) was 10 percent for both New 
Zealand and the U.S.  
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Figure 9: Quantitative Contextual Comparison 
 
Examples of risk information that do not contain a quantitative denominator are: 
‘death toll hits 19’, ‘five people have died’, ‘fourteen human deaths’ 
 
A quantitative risk estimate situated within a context can be shown by an article printed in 
The Press in early 2004 : 
In  total  17 Vietnamese have been  infected with H5N1, of whom  13 have died,  two 
have recovered and two remain in hospital. (NZ Herald, 10 February 2004) 
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 However, it is also possible to report numbers contextually:  
The  model  estimated  that  1600  New  Zealanders  would  die  if  15  percent  of  the 
population became ill in a flu pandemic. That increased to 3700 with an incidence of 
35  percent.  The  death  toll  would  still  be  less  than  ministry  estimates  for  annual 
deaths due to poor diet  (about 8500), tobacco  (5000) and cholesterol  (4700), the 
researchers point out. (NZ Herald, 11 March 2005) 
 
Comparatively, both New Zealand and U.S. papers situated quantitative risk information 
within a context about a third of the time. Importantly, the majority of the news articles 
about avian influenza did not use statistics about actual or predicted deaths from avian 
influenza in a way that enabled the audience to judge for themselves whether avian 
influenza was a small or large risk. 
Risk Comparison Information 
 
Risk information can be analysed through noting references to previous health scares: 1918, 
SARS, AIDS, ‘disease-ridden’ England of 1665, Ebola and the 1997 Hong Kong for example. 
The following article used dates as its main risk references: 
Then  the  mutated  virus  could  spread  among  humans  in  a  world  that  has  no 
immunity to this strain of flu. That, experts say, could lead to a pandemic that could 
kill people world‐wide, much  like  the past  super‐epidemics  in  1918,  1957 and  1968. 
[The key question  in  controlling  the outbreak  is what  is  causing  the  flu  to hop all 
over Southeast Asia] when previous outbreaks were contained in Hong Kong in 1997, 
1999 and 2007 (New Zealand Herald, 28 January 2004) 
 
The New Zealand media provided comparisons to other risk scenarios or the 1918 influenza 
pandemic risks in just under half of the articles (54 percent).  
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Figure 10: Comparison of 1918 & other risk comparisons to H5N1 
As Fig 10 above shows, the 1918 pandemic (also called the Spanish flu), was used by the 
New Zealand media as a risk comparison more often (32 percent) than other risk 
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comparisons (28 percent), which is to be expected as it was the most severe health event in 
New Zealand’s recent history, killing over 8,000 New Zealanders. These percentages are 
similar to the U.S. results where avian influenza was compared less to the 1918 outbreak 
(25 percent) than to other risk scenarios (38 percent of articles). There is very little 
percentage difference between the use of the 1918 reference and other risk comparisons in 
both New Zealand and the U.S. This suggests that when one risk scenario was mentioned, 
the other was also; detailed analysis shows that only 14 percent of New Zealand articles 
mentioned both risk comparisons. 
 
In the New Zealand study, both risk comparisons were also read ‘in-context’; this means 
that the sentence or sentences that described the risk variables were assessed to see 
whether they framed the risk variables using thematic or episodic language. Results showed 
that when using a risk comparison to discuss avian influenza, the media used thematic 
language (33 percent) three times as often as episodic language (11 percent). As past large 
health scares often conjure up worst-case scenarios, the use of moderated thematic 
language was unexpected. Upon reflection, an explanation for this result may be that as 
these past risk events are ‘known’ risk events, speculation, ‘hype’, or the use of emotive 
language is not a useful way to recount these events.  
Self‐Efficacy 
 
Three self-efficacy categories were coded for: self-protection, symptom and scientific 
information, and analysis showed that newspaper stories that provided self-efficacy 
information were in the minority. One example entitled ‘Being Prepared’ was printed in the 
Dominion Post in August 2005: 
Most have fallen sick after direct contact with contagious birds. Human symptoms 
include fever, sore throat, cough and severe respiratory disease such as pneumonia. 
 
Personal protection appeared in 22 percent of all news stories with the US media reporting 
personal protection information much less (9 percent). Personal protection was the main 
theme of a story in The Press in October 2005, which also included detailed description of a 
recommended survival kit: 
Individuals  should  take  extra  care  to  wash  and  dry  hands  after  going  to  the 
bathroom,  [make  sure  their  faces  are]  properly  covered  when  they  sneeze,  use 
tissues to sneeze in, and stay more than one metre away from people who are sick. 
  
The recommended kit contained: 
• At least two weeks supply of water 
• Two weeks supply of canned dried food (and a can opener) 
• A battery‐operated radio with spare batteries and a first‐aid kit 
• Protective clothing including gloves and face masks 
• Paracetemol to reduce fevers 
• Warm clothing and sleeping bags 
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Symptom information was rare with content describing how individuals could determine if 
they may have been infected with avian influenza appearing in only 5 percent of all news 
stories, compared to 12 percent in the U.S. stories. A possible reason for this disparity 
between the New Zealand and U.S. results is that many of the stories about avian influenza 
originated overseas and concerned international issues. In another words many of the 
stories had a wider generalised worldview and would not have focussed on individual issues. 
 
Research has shown that even though the public are interested in scientific issues, their 
scientific ‘literacy’ was poor (Ziman 1991). Perhaps one of the contributing factors to 
‘poor’ literacy is the amount of scientific information provided in newspaper stories when 
reporting on health issues. Articles were coded to determine whether they explained the 
health risk of avian influenza using scientific or medical language, or gave scientific or 
medical information. Stories discussing avian influenza using scientific language usually 
limited the medical and scientific information to one or two sentences in the main body of 
the article: 
Large amounts of virus are secreted in bird droppings, contaminating dust and soil. 
Airborne virus can spread the disease from bird to bird, causing infection when the 
virus is inhaled (The Press, 1 October 2005) 
 
Another example from The Press talked about genetics: 
If two different strains of the influenza virus, human flu (1) and bird flu (2), infect a 
cell, genetic segments from both can get jumbled together to form a third 
 (The Press, 23 July 2005) 
 
Other articles described the flu’s impact in terms of immunology and physiology: 
Although flu is a viral infection of the lining of the lungs and throat, it makes people 
severely unwell partly because of  the  intensity of  the body’s  immune  response.  It 
may go on to affect the  lungs…it also  leaves the  lining on the  lungs damaged and 
open to infections with bacteria, causing pneumonia (The Press, 12 October 2005) 
  
Sometimes scientific reporting was mixed in with protection content: 
Tamiflu is an antiviral medicine effective against the strains of bird flu circulating in 
birds in Asia. If taken within 48 hours of becoming ill, it stops the virus bursting out 
of infected cells, infecting news cells and possibly other people 
 (The Press, 15 September 2005) 
 
Thirty percent of all articles (almost a third) contained such information. Compared to the 
other two self-efficacy categories (protection and symptom advice), this is considered high. 
In the U.S. study (Dudo et al. 2007), there was no measurement of scientific information, so 
it is not possible to compare how the larger U.S. newspapers (The New York Times for 
example, which employs scientific journalists), represented avian influenza in terms of 
scientific knowledge. However, the low number of U.S. articles that had a thematic frame 
(19 percent) suggests that the scientific information ‘quotient’ was less than that of the 
New Zealand articles. Only 3 percent of all stories included all three self-efficacy variables 
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and they were not present at all in almost two-thirds of all articles. Self-efficacy content 
was positively correlated to word length (r = .71); of the 8 articles that contained all three 
self-efficacy variables, the average word length was 1,019 words which was much higher 
than the average word length (530 words) of the overall articles. It seems that when the 
article was longer, there was a higher likelihood that symptom and self-protection as well 
as scientific information would be reported. 
Sensational Content 
 
The use of sensational language, that is words and phrases that were emotionally ‘loaded’, 
was evident in over 85 percent of all articles, and only 14 percent of stories did not contain 
any sensational content (loaded words, phrases and worst-case scenarios). The newspaper 
articles contained a myriad of loaded words, with emotionally charged adjectives and/or 
adverbs appearing at least once in 85 percent of all stories with three or more loaded 
words in 34 percent of stories. This result is close to what was found in the U.S. case study 
(73 and 29 percent).  
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Figure 11: Number of sensational words per 1000 words by newspaper 
 
An analysis of the number of sensational words per 1000 words per newspaper (based on 
actual count of loaded words, phrases and worst-case scenarios in each article), found that 
the New Zealand Herald had the highest number of sensational words, with the Otago Daily 
Times the least. This is not to say that the New Zealand Herald was the most sensational or 
episodic of the newspapers, as an article was assessed as being episodic or thematic if the 
total episodic or thematic content constituted at least 66 percent (two-thirds or more) of 
the total coded words.93 A more accurate representation of sensational content per 
newspaper can be found in Figure 16 that shows overall framing by newspaper.  
                                                 
93 see Appendix I. 
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An example of what is meant by loaded words can be illustrated by this list of words and 
phrases from just one article published in the New Zealand Herald on 28th April 2003: 
hypochondria,  plague,  war,  pestilence,  doom,  crush,  lethal,  spurious,  nasty, 
attacked, draconian, and extinction. 
Loaded phrases in the same article included: 
‘death‐to‐go’,  ‘armoury of manmade destruction’,’ viral meltdown’,’ clueless  in the 
face  of  pathogens’,  ‘nature’s  bioterrorist’,  ‘danse  macabre’  and  ‘Big  Mac  of 
morbidity’.  
 
The article was entitled ‘One plague for rich and poor’ and opened with this sentence:  
First  war,  now  pestilence.  In  these  days  of  high  tech‐doom,  the  riders  of  the 
apocalypse (plague division) have switched from horseback to airline business class. 
(NZ Herald, 28 April 2003) 
 
Common portrayals of illness, or the threat of illness in newspaper articles, often 
incorporate imagery drawn from an identifiable range of ideologies and discourses (Lupton, 
2004). The use of war metaphors in the avian influenza articles was strong, as these 
examples from The Press show: 
strike…stockpiling…caught off‐guard…kill…slaughter…resistance…bullet… 
shooting…’Know‐the‐Enemy’…sickbeds…blown‐up…stockpile…trigger… 
bombarded…rationing…combating…‘War‐of‐the‐Worlds’…white‐crosses… 
carnage… battling…’let our guard down’…’scale up our response’…’tightened  its 
grip’…frontline…second‐wave…hole‐up…best  defence…bunker  down…’every 
weapon at its disposal’ (The Press, 2002‐2004) 
 
The New Zealand newspapers used emotive and sensational language more than twice as 
often (60.5 percent) in the opening paragraphs as the U.S. media (33 percent). 
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Figure 12: Sensational content in Headline, first 4 sentences & elsewhere 
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Loaded words and phrases appeared in the headline in 23 percent of articles and in just 
over 60 percent of stories in the first four sentences. Headline and loaded phrase 
placement results were not reported in the U.S. paper so cannot be compared. 51 percent 
of articles mentioned at least one worst-case scenario, and 26 percent of stories referenced 
two or more worst-case scenarios - the U.S. articles reported at least one worst-case 
scenario in 43 percent of articles. However, a worst-case scenario appeared in the headline 
in just 4 stories, less than one percent compared with the U.S. finding of 7 percent. These 
findings are important, as just 17 percent of all articles did not have any sensational 
language in either the headline or first 4 sentences, with 27 percent of the articles 
presenting sensational content elsewhere.  
 
For readers this means that the majority of the stories began in a sensational manner, with 
emotionally loaded language used to describe avian influenza issues rather than presenting 
the issue in a factual and emotionally-neutral way. As Kitzinger (2000) argues, this way of 
reporting can create templates for how the issue of avian influenza is written about and 
understood, not only by the media but by the audience as well. In this way, avian influenza 
is framed early on as something to be scared of, possibly creating high anxiety (for a time) 
in the audience; frequent use of sensational language can also be perceived as an ‘over-
hyping’ of the issue, and may lead to ‘reactance’, or a deliberate taking of an opposing 
view (Brehm 1966). When all the indicators of sensationalism are gathered together in 
order to assess the overall framing of avian influenza articles, it becomes clear that, with 
the exception of 1918 and symptom information, the New Zealand media reported all major 
indexes more than the U.S. media.   
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Figure 13: Comparison of New Zealand and U.S. ‐ results for six variables 
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Thematic and Episodic Frames 
 
Determining the dominant framing of the newspaper articles was a core objective of this 
content analysis (as it was also for Dudo et al.’s case study), and clearly illustrated how the 
New Zealand media defined and represented the health threat of avian to the New Zealand 
public. Episodic framing was the dominant way that newspapers reported the potential 
avian influenza and was used in over half of all stories, whereas thematic framing was used 
in only 17 percent of all articles.  
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Figure 14: Comparisons of Article Framing – entire article & first 4 sentences 
 
The two frames co-occurred in 26 percent of articles, in that both episodic and thematic 
framing was used equally. In relation to how the first four sentences were framed, episodic 
framing was dominant (66 percent) whilst only 10 percent of all stories framed their first 
four sentences thematically. Compared to the U.S. results, the New Zealand media’s use of 
episodic framing was very close to that of the U.S. newspapers (as assessed by Dudo et al. 
2007), as was the use of thematic framing. For both episodic and thematic framing, the 
results from my analysis were almost identical with what was found in the U.S. study. 
Moreover, episodic and thematic framing of the first four sentences were also similar with 
10 percent of New Zealand articles and 16 percent of U.S. stories beginning with a thematic 
frame. In reference to article length, 53 percent of the larger length articles were framed 
episodically. This is an interesting finding, and it could be hypothesized that as the articles 
were much longer, there was more opportunity for scientific, factual and helpful 
information, and the stories would have had a thematic or mixed frame. However, as in the 
overall framing of all the coded articles, thematic framing was in the minority. In assessing 
17 articles that were over 1000 words, 53 percent were framed episodically and as the 
graph below shows, the framing ratios were similar with thematic framing occurring less in 
longer articles than in the shorter ones.  
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Figure 15: Correlation of article length to framing 
 
This can be further illustrated by the percentage of episodic and thematic framing per 
newspaper. The Press had the most episodically framed articles (60 percent), with the New 
Zealand Herald framing their articles episodically less than the other three newspapers (53 
percent). An interesting finding was that although the episodic framing of all newspapers 
fell within 7 percentage points, the Dominion Post framed only two of their articles in a 
thematic way (less than one percent).  
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Figure 16: Percentage of episodic & thematic framed articles by newspaper 
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As the avian influenza issue continued to be reported in the newspapers without the 
increase in severity that was predicted, the prevalence of sensational language decreased 
with more generalised, factual and useful (thematic) language being used.  
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Figure 17: Percentage per year of episodic and thematic framed articles 2002‐2008 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
Hypotheses about the role of the media and its effects often begins with a fundamental 
question: do the media influence what people talk about, or do the media reflect what 
people are already talking about? The rationale for using a textual analysis approach that 
include the articles used for the content analysis, is to discover how the media represented 
avian influenza to the New Zealand public. What themes, categories, tropes or voices were 
used to ‘paint the risk picture’ of the impending health threat?  
 
Whilst the content analysis of the newspaper articles illuminated the way New Zealand 
newspapers framed the health threat of avian influenza, it did not show what issues or 
topics were deemed important when reporting avian influenza. Not only did this method of 
textual analysis accomplish this, but it also provided a valuable reference point for the 
analysis of the focus group data, and revealed what the media made available for New 
Zealanders to assess the risk of avian influenza. The sample size used for this textual 
analysis was larger (n = 508) than that of the content analysis (n = 261), because articles 
that had two or less code-able words, and those that were about issues concerning, but not 
directly about avian influenza, were included.  
 
The five main areas of content or topics that the media used to report the issue of avian 
influenza were: Notification, Planning and Preparedness, Impacts, Bio-security and Antiviral 
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medications. Within these topics were related content areas, which have been illustrated 
with excerpts from the newspapers articles. Additionally, there were stories that 
functioned as interpretive frameworks through which the threat of avian influenza was 
communicated: Expert/authority, Sensationalism, Dissenting Views, Social Control and 
notions of Social Responsibility, ‘The good citizen’ and ‘Othering’. These are also 
highlighted with examples from newspaper articles. 
TOPIC AREAS 
Notification 
 
One of the main topics was that of ‘notification’ which included a) descriptions of avian 
influenza, b) references to past health scares, c) information about recent outbreaks of 
avian influenza and other health scares and d) predictions about what may happen if the 
pandemic were to ‘strike’. Examples of each type of notification are as follows: 
a) The viruses responsible for all the major pandemics this century are thought to 
have come initially from birds. However, humans cannot be infected with a new 
bird  strain directly  as human  cells don’t  carry  a  receptor  that  avian  influenza 
recognises (New Zealand Herald, 03 May 2003) 
 
b) The  Asian  and  Hong  Kong  pandemics  happened  in  our  time,  and  our 
grandparents clearly  remember the  1918 pandemic. We’ve got a good  idea  it’s 
going  to happen again, but we don’t know when  (New Zealand Herald, 03 May 
2003) 
 
c) Thai officials were battling to contain mounting public panic over the outbreak 
of avian  influenza, which has  left millions of  chickens dead  and  killed  at  least 
eight people across Asia…Governments  in Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, South 
Korea,  Japan  and  Taiwan  have  ordered mass  culls  of  chickens  to  combat  the 
spread of the virus (NZ Herald, 26 January 2004) 
 
d) The strain of avian flu circulating  in Southeast Asia is twice as lethal to humans 
as smallpox…the fear now is that it is only a matter of time before avian flu‘ re‐
assorts’  with  human  flu  to  create  a  pandemic  strain.  Should  that  happen  it 
would become the 21st century’s plague [and poses a greater threat than that 
of] bio‐terrorism, natural disaster or nuclear accident            (New Zealand Herald, 
05 February, 2005) 
 
Planning and Preparedness 
 
Planning and preparedness (both domestic and international) were pervasive themes in the 
reporting of avian influenza. These included accounts of a) international planning, b) 
infrastructure planning, c) planning at a governmental level d) at a local government level  
and e) civil defence:  
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a) Governments  and  international  agencies  responsible  for  human  and  animal 
health have been holding meetings and issuing warnings on the potential threat 
of a new global outbreak of virulent  influenza... HSBC, the world’s third  largest 
bank, which has its headquarters in Hong Kong, is estimating that half of its staff 
could  fall  ill  or  be  absent  from  work  at  the  peak  of  the  next  flu  pandemic          
(NZ Herald, 01 May 2006) 
 
b) Hospitals will be overwhelmed and thousands of sick and dying New Zealanders 
will  have  to  be  cared  for  at  home  if  a  bird  flu  pandemic  strikes,  experts 
warn…Flu  victims may  be  asked  to  stay  at  home,  rather  than  flood  hospital 
emergency  departments,  and  have  their  symptoms  assessed  at  home               
(The Press, 09 September 2005) 
 
c) The Director General of Health, Dr Karen Poutasi, said the predictions reinforce 
the need to take the  illness seriously and continue preparations to deal with a 
major  outbreak  of  flu…[she  said]  new  research…was  part  of  the  ministry’s 
‘ongoing’ preparation for a pandemic which  included a national pandemic plan 
developed in 2002 (NZ Herald, 11 March 2005) 
 
d) More than a dozen Dunedin community organisations were urged to plan for a 
possible avian influenza (H5N1) outbreak in New Zealand during a Poverty Action 
network  Dunedin  Otepoti  (Pando)  meeting  in  the  city 
yesterday…Representatives  were  urged  to  plan  ahead  so  workplaces  could 
remain operational if they became understaffed during a pandemic. Their ability 
to  remain  operational  would  keep  the  community  functional  during  a 
pandemic” (Otago Daily Times, 24 February 2006) 
 
e) A  report  released  this  week  by  Canterbury’s  Civil  defence  Emergency 
Management  (CDEM)  group  highlights  the  dangers  Canterbury  faces  from  a 
range  of  disaster  scenarios…such  as  SARS  and  bird  flu  (The  Press,  13  January 
2005) 
 
There were also articles that a) signalled intentions for public education and b) gave the 
public specific instructions:  
a) The  Herald  understands  that  the  Ministry  of  Health  is  planning  to  send  out 
brochures  with  a  covering  letter  and  fact  sheet  to  1.4  millions  households  in 
March94…containing  information  on  setting  up  emergency  kits,  hygiene  and 
guides for those working from home or running a business, should a pandemic 
strike (NZ Herald, 18 January 2006) 
 
b) Civil Defence  recommends  that people keep  three  litres of water per person a 
day, toilet paper, canned food, a transistor radio, torch, barbeque, or means of 
cooking, and spare batteries in case of disaster” (The Press, 13 January 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 See Appendix IX & X 
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Impacts 
 
 Articles about the flu’s impact on infrastructures were common and seemed to serve not 
only as information about how different infrastructures were planning to cope with an 
outbreak, but as in most of the planning and preparedness articles, operated as a 
reassuring confirmation that organisations had the threat ‘under control’.  
Infrastructures included a) fuel supplies b) funeral homes, c) airports and airlines d) 
hospitals e) public transport and f) prisons: 
a) Fuel supplies spokesman for BP, Neil Green, says that there are implications for 
the availability of fuel in New Zealand…sufficient fuel, which is mostly imported, 
is held to see the country through  in  the short  term, but  if borders closed, so 
would shipping (NZ Herald, 27 January 2006) 
 
b) Church services or tangi will be banned because public funerals spread the 1918 
Spanish  influenza.  A  draft  plan  is  being  finalised  this  week  by  the  Funeral 
Directors Association, Government  agencies and  local  authorities  to deal with 
the projected number of casualties (NZ Herald, 25 January 2006) 
 
c) A Wellington seminar on managing the risks of a pandemic heard yesterday that 
the  country’s  borders  would  be  likely  to  close  if  there  was  an  outbreak  of 
human‐to‐human bird flu abroad…those people would be either turned around, 
or potentially placed into quarantine on arrival. ‘No‐one will get in, nobody will 
get  out’,  said  the  Ministry  of  Health’s  manager  of  pandemic  planning,  Steve 
Brazier (NZ Herald, 02 November 2005) 
 
d) Every major hospital in the country had two bird flu ‘victims’ turn up yesterday 
as  the  country’s  readiness  for  a  pandemic  was  tested  during  a  ‘table‐top’ 
exercise costing at least $100,000. Getting test results to confirm whether they 
had bird flu took about 10 hours, but each board was sent about 1000 doses of 
antiviral  medication  before  the  results  were  confirmed                                     
(Otago Daily Times, 10 November 2006) 
 
e) Russell Turnbull of Stagecoach says bus services could be reduced, depending on 
the  level of staff  illness and the availability of fuel…taxi drivers are seen to be 
particularly  vulnerable...plans may  include  the use of gas masks. Train drivers 
have  the  advantage  of  a  driving  cab  isolated  from  the  public…the  Auckland 
Regional Transport Authority  is  considering different ways of  collecting  fares. 
Air New  Zealand  has done  extensive business  continuity planning…with  staff 
concerns  about  travelling  to  some  destinations  being  taken  into  account          
(NZ Herald, 27 January 2006) 
 
f) The  Corrections Department  said  an  outbreak would  ‘significantly  impact’  on 
prison operations.  ‘We are  looking at what essential services would need to be 
maintained  in  the  event  of  a  pandemic,  how  to  address  issues  specific  to 
Corrections  and  how  to  ensure  there  is  enough  staff  to  provide  the  required 
services’…the department was part of a law and order group, led by police, that 
was planning for a pandemic (The Press, 09 January 2006) 
 
 
 
 84
Preparedness accounts extended to predictions about impacts on a) businesses b) the 
economy c) banking and d) tourism: 
a) Department of Labour workplace deputy secretary Andrew Annakin said under 
existing  laws,  employees  could  refuse  to  do  work  which  could  cause  them 
serious harm. The priority was to ensure essential services would continue and 
for  employers  to  consider  how  they  would  protect  their  staff  and  business 
(Otago Daily Times, 26 October 2005) 
 
b) A new report for the poultry industry warns of potential costs if allowing fresh 
chicken  imports  compromises  New  Zealand’s  freedom  from  avian 
diseases…allowing  imports  could  put  downward  pressure  on  chicken 
prices….but  the biggest  financial  impact  on  the  industry would be  consumer 
flight from poultry (NZ Herald, 03 July 2006). 
 
c) The Reserve Bank says it is able to intervene in the foreign exchange market to 
tackle a currency crisis during such ‘shocks’ as a bird flu pandemic. The bank was 
working  to ensure  its  internal operations were as  resilient as possible….[and] 
had  informally  discussed  a  pandemic  scenario  with  other  banks  in  the 
Australasian and East Asian region (Dominion Post, 19 November 2005) 
 
d) The  tourist  industry  is  keeping  a  wary  eye  on  the  spread  of  Asian  flu  and  is 
already planning its response to a pandemic that could see New Zealand seal off 
its borders. ‘How we manage visitors during this pandemic  is going to have big 
implications  for  the  post‐pandemic  recovery  of  the  industry’                                  
(NZ Herald, 20 October 2005)  
Bio‐security 
 
Considering that New Zealand is an island nation with unique flora and fauna economically 
reliant on its dairy and agricultural exports, and dependent on its agricultural industries, it 
is not surprising that the protection of New Zealand’s borders, especially in terms of bio- 
security, was a major theme. Topics used to frame avian influenza as a unique and dire 
threat to New Zealand agriculture, bio-economy and wildlife were: a) Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, b) border control, c) Department of Conservation d) bio-security 
and e) the economic impacts on farmers: 
a) MAF spokesman Ron Thornton says international experts, migration studies and 
MAF surveys point to a ‘low risk of bird introduction [of avian flu]…but we can’t 
say anything  is zero risk’.  If there was an outbreak, MAF would quarantine any 
affected poultry,  trace  their movements  to detect any  further virus cases and 
most likely kill the infected birds (The Press, 01 October 2005)  
 
b) Director of Public Health Dr Mark Jacobs said no firm decisions had been made 
on how borders would be closed…[and] efforts to slow the spread of the virus 
did not  stop at  the border, with planning also under way  to  consider how  to 
stamp  out  small  clusters  of  disease.  Yesterday,  border  agencies  tested  their 
plans in a tabletop exercise (The Press, 04 November 2005) 
 
c) Plans have been hatched  to  transfer  kakapo by helicopter  to  Campbell  Island 
should  bird  flu  come  to  New  Zealand...Other  scenarios  would  include 
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vaccinations,  if  the  strain was  slow moving…DOC national biosecurity advisor 
said ever since bird flu became an issue, the department had been working with 
the  Ministry  of  Health  and  Biosecurity  New  Zealand                                      
(Otago Daily Times, 30 October 2005) 
 
d) “Bio‐security chiefs have imported the deadly strain of bird flu and are keeping 
it under ‘Fort Knox’‐style security”. Bio‐security Minister Jim Anderton told MPs 
samples  of  the  H5N1  virus  had  been  imported  to  allow  scientists  to  quickly 
identify whether suspected cases were real. The samples were brought in at the 
end of April and are being kept at Biosecurity New Zealand’s  Investigation and 
Diagnostic  Centres  in  Wallaceville,  Upper  Hutt.  “It’s  the  highest  security 
containment laboratory of its type in the country. The virus is held in a very low 
temperature freezer” (The Press, 16 June 2006) 
 
e) Lamb  leaders are playing down any gains  to be made  from  the bird‐flu  scare, 
despite a  falling market. Bird  flu has  led to conclusions by farmers that  it may 
turn overseas shoppers away from chicken and on to red meat such as  lamb… 
the  reaction  against  beef  during  the  BSE  scare  was  nothing  like  what  it  was 
predicted, so  I don’t think  it will be  for chicken. The chance of getting bird  flu 
from  eating  chicken  is,  as  I  understand  it,  statistically  nil                                        
(The Press, 10 March 2006) 
Antivirals 
 
Antiviral medication information was another major topic area contained in many articles. 
It could be assumed that these articles would have included self-efficacy information 
(symptom, protection and scientific), but the content analysis showed the stories did not 
provide much information to help people understand the disease. Nevertheless, scientific 
language and medical references of various kinds were used. Antiviral medications were 
talked about in several ways a) informative a) availability c) allocation issues and d) price: 
a) Antiviral drug Peramivir, developed by US pharmaceutical company BioCryst,  is 
currently  being  trialled  on  influenza‐infected  patients  at  seven  New  Zealand 
‘study  centres’.  A  single  injection  of  the  drug,  which  like  Tamiflu  is  a 
neuraminidase  inhibitor,  stunts  the  growth  of  the  enzyme  neuraminidase 
needed for the flu virus to flourish in the body (NZ Herald, 05 August 2007) 
 
b) A  waiting  list  of  thousands  of  New  Zealanders  wanting  their  own  supply  of 
Tamiflu will not be met by  the  latest delivery of  the antiviral drug. Fears of a 
deadly  influenza pandemic have sparked a massive demand for Tamiflu…it has 
been  out  of  stock  in  New  Zealand  for  several  weeks                                      
(The Press, 01 November 2005) 
 
c) Cabinet  ministers  are  on  a  secret  list  of  workers  likely  to  be  first  in  line  for 
limited  stocks  of  potentially  life‐saving  treatment  in  a  flu  pandemic.  Health 
workers, police, the military, prison officers, border control agencies, key social 
services  and  infrastructure  industries  are  also  on  a  draft  list  of  people  who 
would be given special reserves of the anti‐viral drug Tamiflu, which would be 
the frontline response to a pandemic (Dominion Post, 23 November 2005) 
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d) Roche has announced that new stocks of Tamiflu capsules were distributed to 
pharmacy wholesalers nationally last week, six weeks earlier than expected and 
15 percent cheaper due to  larger manufacturing volumes…a course of Tamiflu 
cost  between  $69  and  $88.  The  wholesale  price  was  about  $52  before  GST       
(The Press, 29 March 2006) 
INTERPRETIVE FRAMES 
Expert/Authority  
 
A common way to report the threat of avian influenza was to draw upon the voice of the 
expert or authority, the most common expert being a virologist, a scientist or a World 
Health official. In fact, the first word in the first article,95 (that could be regarded as 
introducing the threat of avian influenza to the New Zealand public), was ‘Virologists’. 
Early use of ‘the expert’ defined the terms of the debate around avian influenza, as is 
common when the subject matter is largely scientific and facts are not readily available to 
the lay public. An article printed early in 2004 had in its heading ‘New Zealand virologist 
says…’, and it quoted five experts: a New Zealand virologist, the World Health 
Organisation, a Massey University professor of animal health, the New Zealand Ministry of 
Health and a Poultry Industry Association chairman. 96 
 
In the same way that opinions of experts were often used in a factual way, statistics in the 
form predicted numbers of infections and/or deaths, acted as an authoritative voice and 
were powerful symbols: 
The projected worst‐case scenario for New Zealand  in a pandemic 33,000 potential 
New  Zealand death  toll  if  the pandemic  is  as  severe  as  the  1918‐1919  Spanish  Flu. 
10,000 deaths possible during  the worst week. 40% of  the population  could  catch 
the flu, some 1.6 million people. 200 children could be orphaned, [and] 800 children 
could  need  alternative  care  because  their  parents  would  be  in  hospital.  15  to  27 
weeks  [is]  the  time  required  to  fill New Zealand’s vaccine needs with  stocks  from 
Australia. 2 million to 7.4 million is the potential international death toll, as forecast 
by the World Health Organisation (NZ Herald, 17 November, 2005) 
The ‘Lay’ voice 
 
Several articles represented what the ‘ordinary New Zealander’ thought. One article, in an 
attempt to put people’s concern about H5N1 in comparison with other past health scares, 
reported the number of telephone calls to the Ministry of Health’s helpline: 
Figures obtained by  the Dominion Post  show  that more  than  four  times as many 
people  called  the Health Ministry’s Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome helpline  in 
the  three  months  to  August  as  called  the  free  avian  influenza  phone 
                                                 
95 ‘Researchers detect threat of Flu Pandemic in Dairy Cattle’, The Dominion, 23 February, 2002 
96 ‘High death rate in bird‐flu outbreak; New Zealand virologist says children most at risk’, New Zealand Herald, 
30 January 2004. 
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line…somewhat  surprisingly,  an  average  of  393  people  a  month  called  the  SARS 
helpline compared with just 93 for the bird flu line  (Dominion Post, 16 October 2006) 
 
An informal poll carried out by the Dominion Post on 22 October 2005 asked the public to 
respond to an article about avian influenza . It asked whether they were concerned about 
the threat of a flu pandemic reaching New Zealand, and what – if anything – they had done 
to prepare. Whilst these articles cannot be regarded as a representative sample, (they are 
rather what is journalistically referred to as ‘vox pop’ or ‘voice of the people’), they are 
nevertheless important as they signal to the media audience that these articles are 
indicative of what ‘ordinary people’ think:  
[A 34 yr old man from Wellington] 
‘[I’m] a bit concerned and already quite prepared…we have a disaster kit at home 
with food and paracetamol’ 
 
[An 18 year woman from Wilton] 
‘I heard you can get a vaccine.  If  it does come  to New Zealand  I will definitely get 
vaccinated’ 
 
[A teenager from Naenae] 
 ‘I’ve never really thought about it’  
 
[A 47 year old man from Karori] 
‘I think it’s like a lot of other stories that have come out – scaremongering’ 
 
As previously stated, many articles evoked the ‘expert’ when talking about avian influenza, 
which represents a point of view most of the media audience would not personally identify 
with. The examples of a ‘lay voice’ above, however, represent ‘ordinary people like us’, 
and serve as a balancing mechanism, providing an important ‘reply’ to the expert/authority 
discourse.  
Dissenting views 
 
Antiviral medications were almost always represented as a logical and safe way to combat 
the avian influenza. This was a representation that was uncontested until 2007, when the 
following excerpt appeared: 
New Zealand’s drug  safety agency  is  investigating a possible  link between Tamiflu 
and bizarre suicidal behaviour among children in Japan. The Japanese Government is 
warning doctors against prescribing Tamiflu to people aged 10 to 19 after the deaths 
of at least 18 youths as a result of irrational behaviour (The Press, 23 March 2007) 
 
As in other articles that took a dissenting or opposing view to the majority of reporting, 
these ‘dissenting’ articles were published late in the reporting timeline. This was the case 
for several articles that questioned: a) the seriousness of the threat of avian influenza, b) 
the advice that had been given thus far, c) the ramifications of too many warnings too early 
and d) the adequacy of the pandemic planning: 
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a) Given that there has not been one case of person‐to‐person transmission, then 
for  health  officials  to  be  advancing  the  worst‐case  pandemic  scenarios  is 
irresponsible, Laws said (The Press, 30 January, 2006) 
 
b) According  to  ‘Those  That  Claim  To  Know’,  the  best  defence  against  this 
contagion is simply to wash our hands. I haven’t felt so reassured by any official 
advice since I saw an instructional video that said crouching under thin wooden 
desks would protect people  from  the brief unpleasantness of a nuclear attack 
(NZ Herald, 21 April 2006) 
 
c) However, New Zealand experts say since the public’s fears about bird flu seem 
to  have  dimmed  –  even  while  the  threat  of  a  pandemic  remains  as  real  as 
ever…Christchurch virologist Lance Jennings [said]  ‘Just because people aren’t 
hearing  about H5N1  as much  as before,  that doesn’t mean  it has gone  away’. 
Jennings  believed  people  could  be  tired  of  worrying  about  the  threat  of  a 
pandemic (The Press, 29 October 2007) 
 
d) The  Government’s  emergency  planning  has  been  called  unlawful,  unclear  and 
insufficient, with a critic warning of  ‘total confusion’  if disaster struck. Lawyer 
Mai Chen said yesterday that the national emergency plan lacked detail, and was 
ambiguously worded and unclear about who would  lead a response. ‘There is a 
big gaping hole in the national plan which does not state and provide for hazard 
and risk’ she said (Dominion Post, 16 May 2006) 
 
Another article addressed perceived public apathy and was critical of both the 
Governments planning and the public’s response to it: 
Most  New  Zealanders  have  done  nothing  to  prepare  themselves  for  a  deadly  flu 
pandemic  despite  high  public  awareness  of  the  threat…only  a  third  of  the  1000 
people  contacted  had  taken  precautions…  ‘There  are  major  gaps  in  the 
Government’s pandemic planning  that will put  lives at  risk’  [National Party Health 
spokesman Tony Ryall said] (Dominion Post, 06 February 2006) 
Sensationalism 
 
As demonstrated in the content analysis, there were many sensationalist elements in the 
avian influenza stories, and this was evident in the textual analysis, in the way that the 
topics were framed in terms of past epidemics. Whilst sensationalism as such is not a 
theme, it can be regarded as an exemplar of how H5N1 was reported, and how the 
potential risk was portrayed. A common melodramatic device, when explaining about avian 
influenza, was to talk about the 1918 pandemic and SARS. A typical example is as follows 
(note also the use of ‘expert’ in both the text and headline): 
Experts track down avian flu culprits 
Then  the  mutated  virus  could  spread  among  humans  in  a  world  that  has  no 
immunity to this strain of flu. That, experts say, could lead to a pandemic that could 
kill people worldwide, much like past super‐epidemics in 1918, 1957 and 1968. The key 
question  in  controlling  the  outbreak  is  what  is  causing  the  flu  to  hop  all  over 
Southeast Asia when previous outbreaks were controlled in Hong Kong in 1997, 1999 
and last year ( NZ Herald, 28 January, 2004) 
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This textual analysis is qualitative and does not quantify specific words; however, I make 
one exception to this approach in mentioning the use of the word ‘mutate’ and/or 
‘mutation’. As demonstrated in the excerpt above Experts track down avian flu culprits, 
the word ‘mutate’ seems to be a pivotal word for media reports about avian influenza. It 
lends credence and importance to the possible threat of avian influenza, as without it, the 
threat is ‘not a threat at all’. What makes this virus seem such a risk, is its ability to 
mutate, so the debate around this threat centres on the likelihood of this question: ‘will it, 
won’t it, and if so, when?’ 
 
The words ‘mutate’, ‘mutation’ and ‘mutating’ are seldom used without corollaries such as 
‘could’, ‘maybe’, possible’, which are media caveats, and should make the suggestion of a 
pandemic less worrisome or sensational. However, this does not seem to happen in the case 
of H5N1 articles, as the word ‘mutate’, a scientific word that carries some authority of its 
own, seems to over-ride the uncertain and provisional caveats. Following are five excerpts 
from articles printed in early 2006 [caveats in bold]: 
1) Scientists have reported a sign that the bird flu virus H5N1 may be mutating into a 
form more infectious to humans (Dominion Post, 28 February 2006) 
 
2) Scientists believe H5N1 or a subsequent bird flu could mutate  into a form which 
could pass easily between people, sparking a global pandemic 
(New Zealand Herald, 27 February 2006) 
 
3) A mutation of the bird  flu H5N1 virus  ‐‐ deadly to birds but not easily passed to 
humans ‐‐ was the most likely source of a widespread pandemic, he said (The Press, 
24 February 2006) 
 
4) and  there were  fears  it could mutate  into a  strain  that  spreads easily between 
humans (The Press, 27 February 2006) 
 
5)  the  present  epidemic  of  lethal  bird  flu  strain H5N1  could  be  the  trigger  if  the 
disease mutates  to  a  form  easily  spread  between  humans  (The  Press,  20  February 
2006) 
 
The word ‘mutate’,’ mutation’ or ‘mutating’ was used at least once in 67 percent of the 
articles surveyed. Focus group data analysis will clarify whether the word ‘mutate’ was 
perceived as the newspapers seemed to intend. 
Social Control  
 
Notions of social control were evident in how the media framed appropriate responses to 
the threat. Governmental news releases had, to date, revolved around infrastructure 
planning and ensuring antivirals were available to those most in need. Increasingly 
however, news stories appeared outlining social controls and measures that the 
government, in the event of an epidemic, would put into effect. Several of these suggested 
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measures that were adopted as policies and passed into legislation in response to 
recommendations, resulting in changes to the a) Health Act (1956), b) Criminal Justice Act 
(1985) and c) the Immigration Act (1987):  
a) The  Epidemic  Preparedness  Bill,  being  considered  by  the  Government 
administration select committee, allows ministers to relax statutory restrictions 
or requirements to deal with the flu. ‘The actions that need to be taken should 
be  clear  to  the  health  authorities  from  their  operational  plan  for  such 
events’…[in  a  pandemic]  politicians  and  officials  [would]  be  able  to  assume 
draconian powers over people’s individual rights (NZ Herald, 12 October 2006) 
 
b) New legislation gives medical officers powers of detention in an epidemic…The 
bill gives medical officers of health the power to detain people suffering  from 
pandemic flu and keep them under surveillance for up to 28 days…People who 
refuse  to  follow medical officers’ orders could be arrested and  imprisoned  for 
six  months  or  fined  up  to  $4000…Medical  officers  of  health  will  be  able  to 
commandeer  land,  buildings  and  vehicles  to  deal  with  a  pandemic  outbreak     
(NZ Herald, 07 April, 2006) 
 
c) Police  will  have  the  power  to  detain  people  for  medical  tests  and  treatment 
under  Government  plans  to  control  a  bird‐flu  outbreak…under  a  bill  that 
includes clearer  rules  for quarantining patients and tougher checks at airports 
during an epidemic or pandemic…the provision was designed to allow measures 
such as welfare payments and automatic visa extensions to tourists trapped  in 
New Zealand (The Press, 07 April 2006) 
 
Another article evoked social responsibility as its rationale: 
Mr Adam said the bill tried to balance an infected person’s rights to freedom against 
a person’s right not to become infected (Dominion Post, 07 April 2006) 
Social Responsibility, ‘The Good Citizen’ and Othering 
 
Talking about the pandemic in terms of accountability to the whole community drew upon a 
social responsibility discourse: 
Christchurch virologist Lance Jennings said the healthcare professionals had a social 
responsibility  to  be  vaccinated  against  flu  to  protect  patients  and  fellow  staff. 
Infection control nurse specialist Julianne Toop said ‘I would like people to consider 
[the vaccination]  in relation to protecting their patients, their colleagues and their 
own families’ (The Press, 05 May, 2006) 
 
Hawke’s Bay nurses are putting themselves and the hospital at risk by not taking up 
the flu jabs, the region’s health board says…only 24 percent of nursing staff took up 
the  free vaccinations…in comparison, every  senior doctor at  the hospital had  the 
jab…‘it  is  a  risk  to  our  service  in  the  event  the  pandemic  arrives’                        
(Dominion Post, 24 June 2006) 
 
Flu vaccination rates among hospital staff are ‘abysmal’, despite their importance as 
role models to patients, a leading virologist says. ‘They (healthcare workers) have a 
role, as advocates to their patients, and as advocates to their own colleagues. It is an 
issue of social responsibility (Dominion Post, 06 May 2006)  
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Drawing further upon the interpretive framework of social responsibility were stories that 
a) constructed the notion of a ‘good citizen’ b) stressed the importance of community or c) 
used a combination of both: 
a) Watching  their welfare  [is] Carmel Gregan‐Ford, mother of Angus,  five, Molly, 
four and Rosa,  10 months, nurse and education manager  for  the New Zealand 
Kidney  Foundation:  “I  have  a  food  pack  ready  in  case  we  have  to  isolate 
ourselves  for  a period of  time…I  feel  that with  three  young  children  it  is my 
responsibility  to make  sure  their welfare  is  taken  care of…I’m going  to  store 
water  in  airtight  containers  and  I  will  get  masks  next”                                      
(The Press, 29 October 2005) 
 
b) Get to know your neighbours – it might just save your life. Rice, who has written 
a book on the impact of the 1918 influenza pandemic on New Zealand, said it was 
a  strong  community  spirit which helped pull  the  country  through…[Rice  said 
“volunteers  in  Christchurch  rallied  to  ensure  everyone  was  looked  after...I 
wonder  today  how  many  people  would  adopt  the  same  brave  attitude?”        
(The Press, 30 November 2005) 
 
c) Cashmere accountant Hilary marks said she planned to ‘bunker down’ if the bird 
flu pandemic arrived. She had ordered a carton of 100 surgical masks that she 
planned to share with friends… “it comes down to responsibility, if I don’t make 
preparations,  then  I’m putting myself  into  an unsafe position…that’s putting 
extra stress on the medical system” (The Press, 13 October 2005)  
 
A discourse of ‘othering’ was reflected in stories that blamed the avian influenza outbreak 
on other cultures in two specific ways: a) implying of irresponsibility and b) description of 
Southeast Asian culture:  
a) Badly affected countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia could not afford all the 
necessary  control  measures.  `There  was  a  big  need  particularly  to  vaccinate 
poultry and to take whatever measures were appropriate, for example, through 
live bird markets. The countries have taken measures.  `They were pressured  in 
the  early  days  to  cull  large  numbers  of  poultry,’  Massey  University  Professor 
Roger  Morris  said  yesterday.  `Village  farmers  were  told  they  would  be 
compensated.  Most  were  not  compensated  or  were  not  compensated 
adequately, so they have hidden the disease since (NZ Herald, 26 October 2005) 
 
b) Come December the build‐up to the Lunar New Year, known as the Tet Festival, 
sees poultry overload the dinner plates and backyards of Vietnam and Thailand. 
Among  the  poultry‐feasting  during  the  Tet  festival  months  is  a  dish  that 
scientists have linked to some of the early bird‐flu deaths: duck’s blood pudding. 
This soup  is a staple, made from simmered duck  innards and raw duck’s blood, 
and provides ample opportunity for the virus to jump from bird to human in the 
often  bloody  unsanitary  preparation  and  consumption  conditions                      
(The Press, 01 October, 2005) 
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The second way was to lay the blame for spreading the disease outside of Asia’s borders on 
the governments of infected countries: 
The doomsday scenario is that the Chinese will use a poor quality vaccine that does 
nothing  more  than  force  the  virus  to  mutate  into  something  more  lethal             
(Otago Daily Times, 23 November, 2005) 
 
It’s  not  really  surprising  in  countries  like  Indonesia  that  there  are  possibly 
unrecognised  pockets  of  infection  still  bubbling  away….quite  frankly,  Indonesia 
probably doesn’t enjoy First World public health services (The Press, 02 August, 2006) 
DISCUSSION 
Content Analysis 
There appears to be a great deal of similarity between the way avian influenza was framed 
in the news reporting in both U.S. and New Zealand newspapers. Due to the inclusion in the 
New Zealand study of additional variables of scientific information, overseas and local 
content, risk comparison context and the widened scope of the loaded words however, a 
direct comparison cannot be made.  
 
With regards to the differences found between the New Zealand and U.S. media reporting, 
a possible reason for the higher sensationalism content in New Zealand newspapers could 
be that New Zealanders consider themselves protected by two geographical realities: New 
Zealand is isolated by water, and it is theoretically capable of completely closing its 
borders. Therefore, the New Zealand public may consider that they possess a geographic 
invulnerability, resulting in health risk messages needing to be higher in sensationalism to 
penetrate this perceived sense of security. Analysis of the focus group data will indicate 
whether this hypothesis has merit. 
 
As to why the New Zealand media reported less protection and symptom information, it 
could be that, regardless of what the journalists personally believed, the news value of 
avian influenza during this reporting period was not considered to be high. For example, 
media maxims such as ‘bad news is more newsworthy than good news’ would mean that the 
‘good’ news that one could protect oneself from the pandemic would be reported less 
often. Moreover, the media prefer to report issues in terms of personalisation;97 the avian 
influenza was primarily an abstract concept in that it had not as yet affected any birds or 
humans in New Zealand, so it is not surprising that personal issues of self protection and 
symptom information were not well represented. Another way to explain the dearth of 
scientific information may be to understand that, compared to the U.S. media, New 
Zealand newspapers are much smaller and have fewer resources in terms of specialised 
medical and scientific journalists. Access to medical and scientific personnel may be 
                                                 
97 Personalisation: events which can be portrayed as the actions of individuals will be more attractive than those 
where there is no such ‘human interest’. 
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problematic, but as the relationship between New Zealand journalists and the scientific 
community has not been examined, this hypothesis remains speculative.  
 
The lack of thematic framing highlights that news reporting of health issues such as avian 
influenza, contained little scientific information, social contextualisation and self-efficacy 
content. Risk communication literature (Davies et al. 1986) argues that these types of 
information are important to readers when wanting to assess their personal risk of 
impending threats. Analysis of the focus group data may reveal whether scientific 
information is important to the New Zealand public when they are trying to assess health 
risks, and it may also indicate what sort of scientific information they find meaningful.  
 
The implications of the findings that episodic content dominated the opening paragraphs of 
stories are significant in the way New Zealanders perceived the threat of avian influenza. 
For example, research in the 1980s that assessed eye-tracking movements98 has shown that 
people quickly scan the headlines and the first couple of paragraphs, and then only 
continue reading if something has caught their eye. Not surprisingly, a later study 
(EyeTrackIII) found that more people read shorter paragraphs than longer ones, and stories 
with short paragraphs were more likely to be read from beginning to end than those with a 
longer paragraph format. Therefore, if the first part of a story was framed episodically, 
with little or no useful or contextual information, then the effect on the reader’s 
perception of a news issue could be considerable.  
Textual analysis 
The textual analysis revealed that when reporting the avian influenza, the media reflected 
a number of topic or content areas and used several interpretive frames. The textual 
analysis was qualitative, so the different themes were not compared against other themes 
to see if one or more dominated. However, it was apparent that there were many stories 
regarding the protection of New Zealand’s economic and bio-security interests, which can 
be confirmed by referring to the results in the content analysis, where almost three-
quarters of all stories were coded as having some New Zealand content. The ‘closing of 
borders’ rhetoric was used in multiple articles; further to the finding that the New Zealand 
newspapers reported the threat of H5N1 in a highly sensational way, it is of interest to 
determine whether the focus group participants reflected similar attitudes.  
 
It could be argued that these themes operate as media templates for the reporting of avian 
influenza, and as such, are now well established. I suggest that any subsequent articles 
printed in the New Zealand media about H5N1 ( or indeed, any predicted health threat) will 
fit into one of these templates, or ways of talking about the issue, and will draw upon 
                                                 
98 'Eyes on the News': Print Eyetracking ‐ 1990‐91, The Poynter Institute. 
http://www.poynterextra.org/eyetrack2004/history.htm 
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discourses of ‘the ‘expert’, ‘othering’, social responsibility and social control. Additionally, 
any suggestions of medications will be uncontested and critiques of planning or questioning 
of the veracity of the potential threat will be limited or published later in the news cycle. 
As demonstrated in the content analysis, the use of past health events and the use of war 
metaphors were dominant ways to report an impending health threat.  
 
How the results and analysis of the newspaper articles relate to, or informed the analysis of 
the focus groups, and how the emergent themes and discourses of this chapter reflected 
and demonstrated existing theories and literature will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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6. ANALYSIS: FOCUS GROUPS 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the focus group analysis, as stated in the introductory chapter, was to 
examine attitudes and perceptions about the media reporting of avian influenza of the New 
Zealand public. How did I intend to ‘make sense’ of the participants’ sense-making? The 
analysis of this data used a thematic analysis approach, and is situated within a 
constructionist epistemology. In relation to the aims of this thesis, a major question in 
approaching the analysis for this chapter is what patterns, themes and sub-themes are 
evidenced as the participants discussed the issue of avian influenza between them.  
 
Other questions that arose were: why did the participants talk about avian influenza in 
some ways but not others? Were all, some or any of the ways they talked about avian 
influenza related to risk, or the media, and how did they construct the topic between 
them? Were there tensions and contradictions apparent in the conversations, and if so what 
were they, and how were they resolved? Did they engage in the possibility of the risk of 
avian influenza or find ways to avoid engaging? If so, how did they do this and why? How did 
they perceive risk in relation to avian influenza, and was that perception constructed as a 
personal or social risk? If so, how was it talked about?  
 
Importantly, as I approached this analysis I was aware that categories, themes and topic 
areas had been ascertained through the newspaper content analysis, and I did not want 
these to influence how I coded the focus group transcriptions. This is not to imply that the 
previous analysis did not inform how I thought about the coding and certainly, my research 
directives of risk, health and media guided my analysis. However, rather than look for 
these ideas within the text (as one will always find what one looks for), I allowed the data 
to reveal the predominant conceptualisations used by the participants and did not pre-
suppose what these might be. I actively determined not to simply describe what the 
participants were saying, but to interpret and theorize about the patterns and themes. 
 
Even though there were differences between how the groups interacted,99 the analysis is 
not presented separately for the different groups; they were analysed sequentially, and 
treated analytically as a single text. Overall however, each group talked about avian 
influenza in similar ways which demonstrated comparable patterns and themes, albeit with 
slightly different emphases. For the sake of brevity, the illustrative excerpts are a 
representation of themes, patterns and sub-themes but are not comprehensive; the 
excerpts used are the most pertinent examples. 
                                                 
99 Reflections and observations of the focus group idiosyncrasies and interactions can be found in Appendix VIII. 
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THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
 
Thematic analysis is a flexible qualitative methodology that not only enables a 
comprehensive and rich description of the data, but it can also be applied ‘across a range 
of theoretical and epistemological approaches’ (Braun and Clarke 2006:78). To identify the 
themes, sub-themes and patterns, this analysis involved looking for the concepts or terms 
that the participants drew upon to describe and ‘evaluate events and actions’ (Potter, 
Wetherell, Gill and Edwards 1990). For example, when engaging in the idea that H5N1 
could be a health risk, the participants talked about how to keep themselves safe (a 
‘protection’ theme) by being mindful of washing hands and using hand sanitizers (a 
protection sub-theme of ‘hygiene’).  
 
In contrast to discourses, which can be understood as bodies of knowledge, or ‘systemised 
wholes’ (Potter et al. 1990:190), these narratives revealed patterns and topics that can be 
regarded as the content of discourses. In keeping with constructionist methodology, this 
analysis examined the ways in which ‘events, realities, meanings and experiences are the 
effects of a range of discourses operating within society’ (Braun and Clarke 2006:81). 
Additionally, for the purposes of this analysis, narrative refers to the focus group 
discussions that included discourse components of ‘description, chronology, evaluation and 
explanation [as well as] questions, clarifications, challenges and speculations’ (Ochs and 
Capps 2001:18).  
 
The data showed several predominant themes which were categorised as central ideas or 
‘higher level’ themes; these were Risk, Media and ‘Othering’. Additionally, within these 
themes were sub-themes, but this is not to say that these categories were fixed and 
distinct, and in fact, there was a great deal of fluidity and overlap. Nevertheless, in 
analysing the talk between participants, it became obvious that in discussing avian 
influenza, the participants were consistently engaging the same three ‘higher level’ 
themes. It could be argued that the two themes of ‘Risk and ‘Media’ were to be expected, 
as these ideas were present when introducing the cue article. ‘Othering’ however, was an 
unexpected and interesting finding. The following examples and excerpts from participants’ 
conversations will demonstrate that rather than having discrete themes, the material is 
highly interwoven.  
RISK 
The risk associated with avian influenza emerged as a central issue or pivotal point around 
which much of the discussion focussed and served as an analytic anchor, not only for this 
section but for the substantive themes of ‘media’ and ‘othering’ as well. In responding to 
the cue article and through assessing risk in relation to the potential threat of avian 
influenza, the participants’ discussions revealed thirteen sub-themes, which could be 
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further categorised as representing two minor themes: believability and manageability. 
Believability sub-themes revolved around participants’ feelings about the risk, and the ways 
that they negotiated how they felt, including distancing themselves from the threat, 
contextualising the threat, looking at how others responded and raising questions of trust 
and credibility. The manageability sub-themes were primarily concerned with 
organisational preparedness: how this planning affected not only themselves, but also the 
wider community and the country in which they lived.  
Believability  
The participants addressed the question of personal risk directly, and engaged with 
scenarios proposed by the cue article:100 ‘I feel like it is actually a risk, so you’re right, clearly 
I  do  take  into  account  whether  I  think  this  could  really  happen  to  me  or  not’  (Rs:1),  101 
whereas others assessed the risk as non-existent: ‘as far as I’m concerned it’s gone, I don’t 
even see it as a potential threat …anymore’ (J:1). This talk about risk was distinguished by 
the perception of risk in relation to time, as the following show: 
P(1): I think I probably took it with a reasonable pinch of salt then [laughs] but I take 
it with a bigger pinch of salt now. 
 
M(4): yes, we’ve got a higher Asian content to our population now so certainly the 
risk was perceived as being greater now than perhaps  it was 20 years ago because 
there’s a lot more inter‐travel  
 
The idea that the risk still seemed a chronologically far-away concept was further 
illustrated by discussions about when the participants would begin to worry or act in 
response to the threat: 
B(2): I have a friend who lives in Jakarta, an old university friend and if she were to 
contact me and say my husband has got bird flu, suddenly it would become more of 
a deal 
 
A(2): it might come here, but until it comes here I don’t really have to worry. 
 
G(3):  for  me  there  would  have  been  nothing  to  worry  about  unless  someone 
knocked on  the door  in a boiler  suit and  [laughter] …a mask and….said  ‘get out 
now’ 
 
B(2):  um…yeah,  but  I  really  honestly  did  not  think…  I  mean,  I  did  not  think  I 
would’ve worried unless it had been in New Zealand 
 
                                                 
100 For  cue article see Appendix III. 
101 Participants’ comments are indicated in the text by italics. Within text, the Speaker is denoted by a letter, and 
the focus group by a number. For example, if the excerpt is from Linda from the second focus group, it will be 
denoted as (L:2). At the beginning of excerpts, this will be denoted as L(2). Additionally, *?* denotes a rise in 
intonation, not necessarily a question – see Appendix II. 
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These responses show that, in assessing their personal risk from an impending health 
threat, these participants were relying on personal experience, personal contacts and past 
personal knowledge, rather than anything that they may have read, scientific or otherwise, 
in the media. This finding concurs with Lupton and Tulloch’s (2003) assertion that people’s 
understanding of risk is developed not only through cultural and sub-cultural membership, 
but also through personal experience as well (p:1). Additionally, Anderson (2006) concludes 
that ‘family, work colleagues, friends and health professionals can influence knowledge and 
attitudes towards risk issues’ (p.124). 
 
Whilst the participants considered that they could be at risk from avian influenza, ideas 
such as the following seemed to indicate that they were not worried about it at all: ‘I think 
I’m more  likely to be run over by a car, (laughs) than to be’... (W:4), [and] ‘I still wouldn’t 
rate it actually, even though I...I just haven’t got the feeling that it’s… that I’m going to get 
it’ (D:2).  
 
The two sentiments above represent the opinion of most members of the focus groups 
however, as the participants discussed this between them, the certainty of the ‘no-risk’ 
stance was belied by debates that were clearly trying to evaluate and clarify the risk. This 
showed that they were a lot less certain about it:  
K(2):  and  the  consequences  are  so  unknown  that  it’s  very  difficult  to  really 
anticipate so… 
 
J(3): when it really does then you’re on your own, you really are…so that’s the risk 
you  take, you  say  ‘oh well’…then you  think…what’s  the  chance  really, you know 
so… 
 
W(4): they found a swan and…in Scotland and  it had  it and then you think  ‘whoa, 
well, maybe it can come here’ 
 
Anxiety, Fear and Panic 
 
The uncertainty that the epidemiology of the H5N1 virus presented was evident in many 
comments that illustrated another sub-theme, that of anxiety, fear and panic:  
L(4):  I  was  going  to  say  I  think  this  is  one  of  the  scariest  things  that  it’s  not 
transmission from human to human that’s um…or  it’s well, animals have suddenly 
become involved and I remember seeing a Time magazine article where it had a kind 
of um...loop and I think there was a pig in there 
 
Rs(1): it looked like it was following that pattern you were saying about earlier, that 
it  had  started  somewhere  and  seemed  to  grow  from  somewhere  out  from  there 
which did make it more realistic and panicky 
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These comments indicated a level of confusion about whether scientists really know enough 
about avian influenza to predict a pandemic, with an implication that perhaps they should 
be managing ( or know more about) the risk; however, there were doubts that this is so: 
‘well, I did heaps of research into immunisation and it was conflicting .. and it was hard, and I 
spoke to people who I thought um…were...um…experts and um, yeah, I just did not come 
out, I don’t think very much wiser’ (C:1). These comments suggest a preference for certainty 
or more confident scientific claims, as this group member said: ‘but it says, in this article it 
says lots of things like ‘claims’, ‘maybe there’ll be this’, um ‘…if possibly it mutates’, there’s 
nothing concrete, it’s all maybe, possibly...so for me that was it, there was nothing like ‘OK, 
it’s here you will die  in 5 days’, concrete, you know?  It’s all sort of  like  ‘eeh, maybe’  (G:3). 
However, as previously stated in the literature chapter of this thesis, the very domain of 
science is characterised by uncertainty, debate and questioning, and cannot be expected to 
provide absolute forms of knowledge. 
Assessment via others 
 
The participants seemed to be worried about a variety of things to do with the possibility of 
a pandemic, with some estimating the risk by judging how worried others around them 
were: 
V(1): I tend to be influenced by other people to a certain degree, not over.. probably, 
you were saying ‘oh there won’t be this’, I wouldn’t do a lot of research on it myself 
*?*, so I tend to listen to other people which is probably…. 
 
Rs(1): he sort of…became quite panicked...cause this guy’s normally seems a fairly 
logical kind of person who doesn’t panic easily…  I remember  it began to be quite 
frightening for me 
 
J(1): but it did make me think twice because people who seemed quite rational were 
panicking rather than it just being people who you’d assume were wacko panickers 
anyway 
 
C(1): a PhD  in philosophy, and he doesn’t panic and he doesn’t get…but he did do 
this [laughs] and  I don’t know whether  it was about being a father or about avian 
bird flu 
 
Given that individuals function in society by interacting with those around them, the need 
to evaluate one’s position or opinion about an issue in relation to someone else is not 
unique to these participants. As American sociologist Herbert Blumer (1969), founder of 
symbolic interactionism,102 stated: ‘human beings act toward things on the basis of the 
                                                 
102 ‘Symbolic interactionism’ is a down‐to‐earth approach to the scientific study of human group life and human 
conduct. Its empirical world is the natural world of such group life and conduct. It lodges its problems in this 
natural world, conducts its studies in it, and derives its interpretations from such naturalistic studies’ (Blumer, 
1986: 47). 
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meanings that the things have for them’ (p.2), but more importantly, the meanings of 
things arise out of social interaction (cited in Lindsmith, Strauss and Denzin 1999:11). 
Moreover, Palmlund’s (1992) solution to effective risk communication is based on social 
interaction and positions all those involved in risk communication as actors, who need to 
consult with each other. This awareness of those around them was illustrated further by 
discussions that reflected a sub-theme of social responsibility, especially in regards to 
immunisations and antivirals: 
V(1): and  it’s like the whole playground thing where were the parents, why did not 
they do this’ you know,  like, god  forbid,  if you did not have your child  immunised 
and something happened 
 
J(1): well, I came under huge pressure from my children, over not buying them...and 
everyday they keep saying...‘oh so and so’s mother’s bought them, you're the only 
parents who haven’t bought Tamiflu’ 
 
L(2):  if you’re a health professional you should have a  flu vaccination as  far as  I’m 
concerned…it’s irresponsible not to 
 
L(3):  I  think  it’s  important...that  you will not have  exposed other people  to  your 
particular flu if you had got it 
 
These statements demonstrate that when deciding what to do about the potential risk of 
avian influenza the participants were indeed using ‘interpersonal channels of 
communication’ (Dunwoody and Neuwirth 1991: 12). A core question for this thesis is ‘how 
are people assessing and evaluating risk?’; so in light of these comments that suggest the 
attitudes of others influence risk assessment, a more pertinent question in terms of risk 
communication might be: how much a part do others’ views play? 
Contextualisation 
 
Lupton and Tulloch (2003) state that people situate risk-knowledges in the historical as well 
as the local (p.1). The focus group participants confirmed this premise as they compared 
the risk of avian influenza to common illnesses and past health scares: 
Ls(4):  I did not get  anxious  about SARS but  I made  a  link with  the  the …1918 or 
whenever it was 
 
In a way to make sense of the present scare by contextualising the risk associated with it, 
participants talked about present and past health events (1918 pandemic, SARS, Mad Cow 
and AIDS) of which they had knowledge but no experience: ‘from my understanding it was 
fed from the troops in the trenches who were in really desperate conditions’ (R:1). Illnesses 
of which they had experience (whooping cough, scarlet fever, cancer, salmonella, 
diphtheria and polio) were discussed at length, possibly to reassure themselves that as they 
had come through these things, they could fight off avian influenza as well: ‘Well, my  19 
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year old son had scarlet fever last year, well as close to scarlet fever as you could get. He was 
very very sick, it was, like he was hot hot sweats for weeks and weeks until a late diagnosis, 
a  rash  covering his entire body and  it was only afterwards  that we were  told  that  it was 
probably as close as you could get to scarlet  fever  in today’s world….but where he got  it 
from I wouldn’t have a clue’ (M:4). 
Joffe (1999) would say that the participants were defining themselves as ‘sanitary citizens’ 
and were positioning themselves as outside the defined risk category in order to create a 
sense of protection (cited in Eichelberger 2007: 1286). Personal narrative was a feature of 
the focus group conversations; some participants had their own stories: 
Ls(4): 1918, yeah, cause I could remember my grandmother telling me stories about 
that and about what she did to protect my grandfather and those kind of things you 
know 
 
A(2): I remember my grandmother used to talk about that cause she had it and her 
sister who died had it 
 
M(2): because I know with the 1918 thing, I always remember my nanna used to say 
that 
 
C(1):  I,  I… At the time  I was pregnant and  I remember um, um, not being aware of 
this, even though  it was really topical, whatever, cause  I was preoccupied, but my 
dad‐in‐law, um, went out and bought me water, and you know, wanted to stock up, 
[laughs] and yeah, he sort of… 
 
These accounts have the word ‘remember’ in common; a factual mental verb that linguists 
say ‘authenticates’ the narrative (Chafe and Nichols 1986). This serves to make the 
narrative more credible and gives the story-teller authority in respect to a topic of concern 
(Ochs and Capps 2001:284). As the focus group were discussing an uncertain topic – a 
potential health risk – interspersing discussion with narratives of remembering were 
attempts to add certainty and make the present threat ‘knowable’. 
 
Past risk events appeared to be used as a way of ‘down-playing’ the severity of the risk of 
avian influenza; this theme of contextualisation seemed to act as a reassurance 
mechanism: 
V(1): you know, SARS came and went, and Y2K came and went and… 
 
J(3): I just assume people are over reacting and it’s like…after 2000, you know with 
the whole…um…um Y2K stuff*?* 
 
C(3): well,  somebody wrote  in  the paper  that bird  flu was  just Y2K with  feathers 
which was… 
 
C(1): I was never convinced by Y2K. 
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These series of comments highlight an interesting contradiction: on the one hand, 
participants were dismissive of these past events in terms of the risk not coming to pass. 
However, it almost seems as if there was a disappointment or annoyance that this was so; 
they had been warned, some had gone ‘to the trouble of preparing’, others had worried 
about it, but ultimately, all their efforts seemed to be for naught. The following excerpts 
illustrate this sentiment further: 
J(3):  It’s  like  Y2K,  you  know  planes  dropping  out  of  the  sky?  ...it’s  not  going  to 
happen you know.  It’s not that you know but, the things people did, and plan, you 
know.  I mean we were travelling overseas and we were on planes we...yeah… and 
we were actually oh we were in the UK in 2000 but um… you know when the clock 
ticked  over  but we’d  been  travelling  and  people  yeah,  people weren’t  flying  you 
know… 
 
Rs(1): I go ‘what the hell is this now’? [laughs] 
Reactance and Distancing 
 
Reactions of annoyance and scorn are consistent with the psychological theory of 
reactance, first developed by James Brehm (1966). As previously explained in chapter 3, 
this theory assumes that there are ‘free behaviours’ that individuals know about, and 
reactance happens when there is a perception that these free behaviours are being 
threatened; for example J(3) explained that her family had been told they should not fly on 
the dates that they had planned. There was a feeling of annoyance about being ‘dictated 
to’ as these comments illustrate: 
B(2): I had never been a particularly high income person, and you know…it’s actually 
quite expensive….to go out and stock up and everything… 
 
M(4):  to  set  yourself  up,  that’s  quite  a  lot  of  money  and  sometimes  you  don’t 
actually have that money…in one lump 
 
People who exhibit reactance most often deliberately take an opposing stance. Against 
widespread travel advice at the time A(3) made this decision, albeit an opportunistic one:  
When SARS was…hit, it dropped all the prices to Asia and just nobody went *?* so I 
went in 2004 cause the prices were really low *?*…and there was...you know for the 
destruction it probably caused their economies, there was just nothing going on *?*, 
it wasn’t an event at all*?*, it wasn’t really there, it wasn’t what I was hearing *?*. 
Yeah, so with avian influenza I guess when that came along I was…not as concerned. 
 
Suggesting to participants that they spend their money in a certain way, or restrict or 
change travel plans are ‘restrictions of freedoms’ which can elicit emotional reactions. One 
of the main tenets of reactance theory is that when certain ‘free’ behaviours are 
threatened, people feel that more restrictions may follow, so in the light of repeated 
health-risk warnings about a possible pandemic that did not eventuate, both the strength 
and frequency of ‘reactance’ could increase. 
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Another reassurance mechanism that the focus groups used was ‘distancing’, where they 
removed themselves from the likelihood of an H5N1 outbreak by positioning themselves as 
living in a much-changed society to the ones that gave rise to past pandemics: 
R(1):  I  just think the odds are,  I was  just wondering whether  it was  just something 
random  that, by chance, but  I  think  the odds are  it probably wasn’t because  they 
were pretty extreme and nasty conditions. No...the trench warfare conditions were 
unusual in our history for a start… so the stress people were living with was pretty 
phenomenal…just the scale of living and dying….just living amongst that 
 
Other participants had similar views: 
C(1): Those people had such terrible things like trench foot and scabies and lice and 
all those sorts of things….. 
 
J(1): from my understanding it was fed from the troops in the trenches who were in 
really desperate conditions 
 
One means of distancing was the taking of a sceptical and cynical stance, illustrated here 
as the focus groups speculated on the likelihood of an avian influenza pandemic: 
J(3): I’m so sceptical at anything like this...I just don’t take it seriously...I just assume 
people are over‐reacting 
 
P(3): whereas you know the chance of getting it was so remote… 
 
(J:3): ‘I  just go ‘OK, Yeah whatever’…and  I  just wait...I don’t get all neurotic about 
it’  
 
These comments were personal points of view, rather than based on anything they might 
have read. Discussion about this particular aspect of risk was often animated, and one 
group in particular almost seemed to try to outdo each other in demonstrating that they did 
not take the risk at all seriously: 
C(3):  I  remember when  it  first  came  out  thinking  ‘oh  God,  it’s  just  SARS  all  over 
again, who gives a shit 
 
G(3): I just saw it as another kind of….mass hysteria type thing 
 
This last comment is one of several references to mass hysteria, and here, by talking about 
society’s reaction as an abstract ‘thing’, the speaker is positioned as outside of that 
hysteria and therefore as sensible and rational: 
J(3): I just thought ‘oh yeah, it’s just another craze, not craze, you know fruit loops, 
another hysteria sort of thing 
 
L(3): you don’t have to get alarmed, and go berserk 
 
P(3): I knew it was a waste of time…a complete crazy crazy thing…it’s really pie‐in‐
the‐sky this stuff 
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Like many public issues, debate around the veracity of warnings about the avian influenza 
became an opportunity for identity performance, where people could demonstrate that, 
unlike ‘everyone else’ they were not deceived by the rhetoric. Lupton (1995) calls this 
sense of self-identity ‘subjectivity’, which enables understanding of how ‘people negotiate 
the imperatives of public health and health promotion’ (p.6). In a society where individuals 
have been increasingly tasked with managing their own health, perhaps these statements 
are a way for the participants to show ‘what sort of managers they were’. Further to these 
observations about irrational behaviour were comments that labelled these reactions to 
potential risk as ‘crazy’, and ‘completely over the top’. They also placed responsibility for 
evoking these reactions on various groups, including pharmaceutical companies:  
W(4):  the  cynical  part  of  me  always  thinks  ‘how  much  of  this  panic  is  being 
engendered by people just wanting to make money’?  
 
B(4): watched the panic increase as the pharmaceuticals got into the act 
Warning Fatigue 
 
Some of the participants were cognisant about what could happen or had happened as a 
result of continuing hype: 
Ls(4): But what happens when  it doesn’t happen at the time of all the talk  is that 
people then get that kind of ‘cry wolf’ syndrome happening 
 
K(2): ‘or a crisis fatigue’ 
 
R(1): they cried wolf on that one 
 
The biggest problem that warning fatigue creates is the tendency for people to ignore 
future warnings, and the discussions amongst the focus group members would seem to 
confirm this. Embedded within the ‘warning fatigue’ debate are questions of rationality: 
what sort of reaction to a risk is rational, and who gets to judge? The discussions revealed 
that it really seems to depend on whether the risk materialises; those who ‘reacted’ to the 
threat are considered prudent in the event that it happened as predicted. However, when 
the risk passes without the anticipated calamity, those same people are often ridiculed: 
‘the phrase {in a silly child’s voice} ‘the sky is falling, the sky is falling’ kept going through my 
mind’  (A:1)  [and] {in a  silly,  ‘molly‐coddling’ voice}  ‘everybody’s got  those  little bottles  in 
their bags, don’t touch the supermarket trolley’ (G:4). This last comment harks back to the 
discussion on reactance theory, and could be interpreted as irritation that the advertising 
industry strongly recommends a hygiene practice that, this participant thinks, is patently 
ridiculous. Others personalised the hype describing it as a sort of ‘fatigue’: 
E(2): cause we keep hearing it. And I was horribly, you know, in Iraq, every...there’s 
so much violence going on that when we hear that another bombs gone off and has 
killed 10 people, it really doesn’t have that great an effect 
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B(2): you know, in the end I just kind of become immune to it all… 
 
It seemed that uncertainty was underpinning many of these comments, with some of the 
participants wanting to eliminate the uncertainty by taking a fatalistic stance: 
A(4):  I’ll be dead  in  the  first wave anyway  so  that’s OK  if  it hits,  it hits,  I’ll die or 
survive that’s not, you know, a decision I can make. It’s beyond my control 
 
M(2): the chance of you surviving is just lap‐of‐the‐gods stuff 
 
L(4): there’s a certain sense that  it’s out of our control,  like the cancers that we’re 
getting and so on 
  
These remarks are in contrast to past comments about personally experienced family health 
issues or sceptical views, in that they are removed and ‘outside the self’. By acknowledging 
that the risk was so large it was out of their control, they could abdicate taking 
responsibility for trying to manage it, or explain why they hadn’t bothered to react to it at 
all. 
Credibility 
 
An important sub-theme was that of trustworthiness: 
M(2): it depends on the source once again the credibility, and the amount, if you’re 
hearing it from a number of credible sources or it’s just coming from one, um… 
 
Mx(4): so who in the midst of all these things are the commentators THAT we trust 
 
J(1): the hospital organisations lend a lot of credibility to that sort of a rumour 
 
K(2):  I think people tend to pay attention to  flu’s or tsunamis or catastrophes  if  it 
becomes what I call a credible threat, and credibility is lent to the threat um… if it’s 
um…promulgated  by  such  people  as  the  World  Health  Organisation  or  national 
governments or you know, figures of leadership around the world 
 
The concept of credibility is central to most existing risk communication literature, in that 
authors posit that trust and credibility are ‘critical elements in effective risk management 
and communication’ (Covello et al. 1989:132), and if the communicator is a scientist and 
judged as being impartial and knowledgeable, so much the better (p.142). It is interesting 
to see that, in terms of whether to believe a threat is real or not, credibility is viewed by 
the participants as an important factor. As K(2) said: ‘so  I sort of take [M’s] view and say 
there are a couple of things that you can do, you can sort of  listen to various  local experts 
and say ‘well if that’s what their recommendation is, that seems sensible’. 
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Manageability 
Experts and Organisations 
 
In the introduction of this chapter, I stated that the theme of risk assessment can be found 
throughout all of the discussions, and even though this particular discussion is about 
veracity and credibility, the participants are ‘sorting through’ these ideas in order to assess 
their personal risk from avian influenza as reported to them by the media. For example, 
the comments below imply that because various organisations were involved in 
communicating risk about the avian influenza, then the risk must be more serious: 
J(1): the feeling I got was that the health‐care industry took the threat of pandemic 
influenza reasonably seriously 
 
A(2): I remember thinking ‘wow, they must be serious if they’re actually pooling all 
the services together’ 
 
R(1):  that health boards were  taking  it  seriously, as  in  the potential,  I do  seem  to 
recall going on about the risk 
 
M(2): … it was coming out from World Health, and they’re learning all the time, but 
it  just doesn’t hit once…So  I took  it quite seriously, cause these people were quite 
linked  into  um…what  was  going  on  in  World  Health,  so  they  were  getting  a  lot 
of…and the data they were giving me was actually very serious 
 
This sub-theme of ‘authority’ included ‘experts’, although ‘expert in what’ was often not 
clarified ‘you  can  sort of  listen  to  various  local  experts  and  say  ‘well  if  that’s what  their 
recommendation  is,  that  seems  sensible’  (K:2). Moreover, in the participants’ search for 
clarity, accessing expert opinion sometimes did not seem to help: 
C(1): and I spoke to people who I thought um…were...um... experts and um, yeah, I 
just did not come out, I don’t think very much wiser 
 
Rs(1): we assume their experts disagree all the time on things, and perhaps that’s at 
the core of it 
  
New Zealand organisations such as Civil Defence, the Ministry of Health and local health 
boards, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations were all institutions 
to which the focus group members attributed ‘expertise’ or knowledge about the avian 
influenza. Spokespeople, such as virologist Lance Jennings, embody expert advice, and as 
such are mediators between lay individuals and the authorities (Miller and Rose 1993):  
L(4): and  the other  thing  I  remember was when  I…we  first  came  to Christchurch 
um,  at  the beginning of  2006  I was  asked  to  speak  at  the  conference,  and  Lance 
Jennings was  speaking before me, and he’s Mr Bird  Flu, Mr Respiratory Pandemic 
Diseases  person  in  New  Zealand  really,  based  in  Christchurch  and  he  did  a  very 
fascinating presentation,  very  scientific  and he um,  they’re  really  serious  about  it 
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and the CDHB still has a large pandemic, kind of um, policy and plan and everything 
in place and they meet regularly because….ah it could happen. 
  
G(3): I think he’s says it’s not ‘if’, it’s ‘when’ 
 
The participants not only talked about the credibility of people and the organisations that 
they represented, but they also questioned motivations for communicating the risk, as this 
conversation from the fourth focus group illustrates: 
 G: but who’s paying for Lance Jennings 
W: that’s my cynical streak coming through 
L: I kind‐of thought that until those sorts of people started coming…. 
G: there’s no money in it for Lance Jennings to keep saying ‘yes, it’s coming’ is there? 
W: oh no, you just need to have the behind that to keep pushing it….I mean 
L: He’s not a drug company though 
G: no he’s not but he’s still out there reporting it’s coming isn’t he? 
W: you’ve got to have enough money to have research …to…to have the research 
financed as well 
L: He’s a physician as well… 
 
M(4): The pharmaceutical companies will only come on board when there’s money 
involved 
 
A(3): and the media want to sell papers *?*…they’re there to make money  
 
The participants debated whether the organisations who broadcast the risk messages had 
hidden agendas, which seemed to add to their uncertainty: 
P(3): I think they have to over react and then it’s up to is to do what we want to do 
but if they under react, they will subsequently be blamed 
 
J(3):  I  always  think  when  I  get  that  sort  of  stuff  in  the  mail  I  just  think  it’s 
government departments covering their arses 
 
J(1): I think the the…people like the health boards, as I said earlier, I think they have 
to take, take things seriously, I think they’d be heavily criticised if they did not take 
them seriously. 
 
Rs(1):  I  just  assumed  it  was  just  to  cover  their  arses  though...like  I  remember 
thinking, oh, they just have to say this for...in case……. If anything goes wrong, they 
have to show they’ve done everything possible, I assumed was the case 
Public Health and Governmentality 
 
With the creation of the very first Public Health Act (1872),103 an organised system of 
public health was first introduced in New Zealand. This means that over five generations of 
New Zealanders have lived within the framework of public health, been subjected to state 
interventions and health promotions and have conformed to the government’s health 
imperatives and practices. As Lupton (1995) points out, the institution of public health has 
                                                 
103 For a brief overview of Public Health in New Zealand see Appendix VII 
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‘served as a network of expert advice…directed at improving individuals’ health through 
self-regulation’ (p.10). The notion of self-regulation is central to the concept of 
governmentality; Dean (1991) states that governmentality includes ‘forms of treatment, 
relief, discipline, deterrence and administration’ (p.9), which is perhaps why some of the 
participants showed that they had responded in ‘recommended ways’ to the idea of 
managing their personal risk from avian influenza: 
M(2): I take these, sort of civil defence stuff quite seriously 
 
E(2): because I mean I took a little bit of notice of things um….public health….civil 
defence things, you know 
 
G(4):  I’ve  a  big  box  in  our  garage  which  I’ve  completely  waterproofed  and 
earthquake proof and  in the box  is about 50 bottles of empty 1.5  litre fizzy bottles 
which  have  been  sterilized  and  filled  with  water  right  to  the  top  *?*  and 
um…canned fruit and baked beans and... 
 
E(2):  and  you have  these…you  know...whatever  they  are,  these  infomercials  that 
tell you to get ready and its like ‘ooh’, I don’t quite know what I was supposed to get 
ready for, but I did actually go and buy some baked beans 
 
Other participants did not seem to be worried about ‘what they should do’, and 
demonstrated an expectation that large social institutions such as the government or civil 
defence would handle any health crisis. These following comments are entirely logical in 
light of New Zealand’s long-standing and omnipresent public health system: 
B(2):  I  very much grew up with  that  Social Welfare mentality,  you  know…that  if 
things went wrong… ‘oh well, that the government would look after you’ 
 
R(1): yeah that’s right, There’s a civil defence unit that prepared for it all the time 
 
C(3):Yeah, I guess, I guess, because of when I grew up and everything there’s always 
that little thing of thinking ‘ oh well, the government will come and save me’ 
 
Therefore, when the media are warning individuals about risk from avian influenza, the 
participants’ conversations revealed that there was an assumption that, in governmental 
organisations such as civil defence, the health threat of avian influenza had already been 
taken care of.  
 
Related to organisations and institutions that ‘take care of everyday life’ are large-scale 
infrastructures, such as hospitals, local city councils, police and utility companies: ‘you 
have to recognise that you’re not going to able to rely on the same number of people as you 
would normally...that people are either going to be  locked…whether they’re  locked down 
because of a pandemic or...you might not be able to go to hospital (Mx:4). The groups that 
engaged with the potential risk of avian influenza, extrapolated out the consequences of a 
large-scale pandemic and hypothesized about possible scenarios. After discussing the 
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possible breakdown on infrastructures like rubbish collection and health care, one 
participant (who was to an extent, self-sufficient, owning her own septic tank, water 
supply and having a large garden) commented: 
D(2): so a health thing would affect me more than a national disaster, I hadn’t really 
taken that on board 
 
Additional concerns about infrastructure failure included: 
K(2): or things like the electricity fails, and it’s in the middle of winter 
 
A(2): mass graves, you know the details of documenting, burying people 
 
A(4): I mean you can have 8 rubbish bags piled up outside one house you imagine if 
those aren’t collected for even just one week… 
 
These comments were in contrast to other dialogue, in that they were an acknowledgment 
that they (the participants) were part of a wider community, and despite some of the 
earlier bravado rhetoric - ‘ I live in a ‘she’ll be right land’ (B:2) [and] ‘I’m bulletproof’ (K:2) - 
people began to realise that, in the event of a pandemic, they could be vulnerable:  
M(4):  look  you  know,  one  out  of  every  eight  people  will  be  unable  to  function, 
doctors won’t be available, ‘cause nursing staff won’t be available, ‘cause hospitals 
will be compromised and you won’t be able  to go  to  them because of  the  fear of 
infection and you’re thinking… 
 
B(2): and you watch out for raw sewage... 
 
E: I can’t see clearly a plan because people would be dying not from the bird flu but 
from  lack  of…  there’d  have  to  be  some  sort  of  supply  police  coming  round  and 
volunteers 
 
A(2):  but  in  that  situation  money  wouldn’t  do  you  any  good...because  there’s 
nothing to buy, there’s no‐one to pay 
  
Organisations and the effectiveness of infrastructures, whilst talked about in risk mitigation 
terms, were also part of the preparation and preparedness theme. 
Preparation, Preparedness and Protection 
 
L(4): So as you  say,  if  it’s not about  ‘if’,  it’s  ‘when’, we have  to be prepared with 
isolation techniques…. 
 
As mentioned earlier, in relation to the public health system, there was almost a ‘taken-
for-grantedness’ amongst the participants that the large organisations would have prepared 
for the possibility of a large-scale pandemic, and participants who had stockpiled in the 
event of emergency were in the minority.  
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One such person explained: 
M(2):  I  actually  took  it  very  seriously,  I was one of  those people who did get  the 
kits…I bought certain things they were sort of  like  ‘why have we got all of these’ 
you know, candles and batteries and torches and all these things… then I put them 
into backpacks so that they could sort of take them if they wanted to 
 
Most participants treated such preparation as an over-reaction to the risk, and they wanted 
to distance themselves from similar actions as described above: 
B(2): the thought of stocking up on stuff because there might be a disease just never 
occurred to me 
 
D(2): I’d probably just get some Nurofen...and put a cross on the door… 
 
C(3):I went and bought a few cans which are still rolling around in the bottom of the 
pantry 
 
It was interesting to note that, without exception, those participants who professed to 
taking stocking up seriously were the ones who still had dependent children: ‘yeah, if you’ve 
got someone whose dependent on you…um more concerned about looking after your own 
health (B:2): 
Ls(4): if people start getting really sick then I might kind of do a bit of a lock down 
here  and  I  was  imagining  this  sort  of  scenario  with  my  kids  who  are  young 
teenagers, or  in their 20’s and don’t take that sort of thing at all with the anxiety 
like I might do and imagining myself kind of getting into situations where I’d have to 
talk that through with them, how would I do that and that sort of thing, so I must 
have  gotten  pretty…I  must  have  thought  about  to  quite  an  extent  to  get  into 
that… 
 
V(1):  I’ve got a  radio so  I can  find out what’s going on,  I’ve got candles,  I’ve got a 
torch, I’ve got stuff because if the kid is in bed… 
 
M(2): I just made light of it with the kids, this is what we should do to make sure you 
can cope with what’s never going to happen 
 
V(1): I’ve got friends who are husband and wife are both doctors at the hospital and 
I remember her talking about it saying...like….not having made any great plans but 
they had talked about if…there was some sort of outbreak that one of them would 
step down and stay home with the children and.. 
 
One mother of four had thought through ‘being prepared’ very seriously: 
G(4): but if you’ve got a stockpile, you need a gun…yeah, your neighbours will know 
you’ve got the stockpile so they’ll come round to get it, so you’ll need a gun as well 
 
The group members with dependent children engaged in risk scenarios and hypothetical 
situations, and, as the comments above illustrate, had considered different possibilities 
before discussing them in the focus group situation. The difference between comments 
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from participants with close family members, and those who lived on their own was quite 
marked, and raises questions whether a ‘one size fits all’ model of risk communication 
could ever work effectively. 
Geography/Proximity 
 
Discussion about the protection of oneself and one’s family, often led to wider themes of 
protection, that of guarding New Zealand’s geographic boundaries. 
B(2):  I’ve  always  had  this  perception  that  we  watch  our  borders  really  really 
diligently 
 
Mx(4): I remember reading, one of the other advantages for New Zealand was that 
we are one of the few countries, ‘a)’ likely to be affected, but ‘b)’ able to shut down 
our borders 
 
M(2): we’re always so vigilant anyway that it probably won’t get here 
 
Whilst this could be seen as another way to justify why there was no need for personal 
protection processes, it does indicate a change in focus, from the personal (me, my family) 
to a much wider conceptualization of identity: that of someone as part of the community 
that is New Zealand. This indicates that there is a strong sense that there are other things 
‘outside of oneself’ that, in a pandemic situation, could work to protect or hinder. For this 
reason perhaps, proximity and geographic isolation were sub-themes that appeared 
frequently in the focus groups discussion. The fact that New Zealand was ‘quite  isolated 
geographically’ (E:2), seemed to lessen the anxiety about the risk: 
W(4): I think my first thoughts were ‘it’s very far away, it’s Asia, and you think ‘ah, 
it’s not really likely to come here  
 
J(3): it won’t affect it...you know you’ll be safe down here’ 
 
L(4): New Zealand’s just a tiny speck and our population could either go like that or 
we could remain isolated from the whole thing 
 
Additionally, there was an acknowledgment about New Zealand’s lack of proximity to other 
(reassuringly) faraway places: 
G(3): we aren’t that worried because it’s ‘over there’ 
 
B(2): and I think for me bird flu was something that happens to people ‘over there’ 
 
More often than not however, the ‘proximity sub-theme’ highlighted the relative safety of 
New Zealanders compared to other people: 
J(3): it’s because we can sit in New Zealand and it probably won’t be us 
 
Mx(4): you know people are immigrating all the time because they think we’re safe 
down here 
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Proximity discussions included talk about the advantages of New Zealand being ‘the  last 
people to get anything that comes along’(G:3): 
J(3): it wouldn’t be too bad if the pandemic started somewhere else...you’d be able 
to see what happened elsewhere and then tailor your responses 
 
Preparation and protection themes enabled talk about practical stockpiling and 
geographical distancing, and was also evidenced in sub-themes of vaccinations, antivirals 
and expert medical advice. 
Pharmaceuticals and Science 
 
The preparation sub-theme – who is preparing for and/or getting worried about avian 
influenza – was linked to a personal ability to confront and cope with problems associated 
with avoiding or dealing with avian influenza. An assumption that ‘science’ or medical 
expertise will be at the forefront of combating an avian influenza outbreak was expressed 
in other comments and was part of a ‘risk-reducing’ rationalisation: 
 M(4): it’s not going to happen again, medical science will stop that  
 
K(2): I mean the advances in medical sciences in the last 100 years has  
been phenomenal 
 
W(4):  you  seem  to  think  in  today’s day  and  age  that medical  science will  stop  it 
spreading 
 
Here, the last comment refers to science as a kind of agent, as something that will act ‘on 
behalf of them’; additionally, in the same vein, comments that society had benefited 
greatly from scientific and medical advances in vaccines and antivirals were not 
questioned:  ‘well,  we  should  be  glad  for  pharmaceuticals’  (L:4). However, in relation to 
‘medical’ protection from or mitigation of the effects from contracting avian influenza, 
participants were sceptical: 
 C(1): well, I did heaps of research into immunisation and it was conflicting  
 
L(4): But  I’ve had this conversation with nurses and a  lot of them are very against 
the flu vaccination 
 
The talk about immunisations and vaccines often progressed to discussions about specific 
antivirals promoted by pharmaceutical companies and health departments as effective 
ways to combat avian influenza. However, this was not in order to increase knowledge 
about antivirals, and as the conversation from the third group below shows, there was 
uncertainty as to whether Tamiflu worked. The conversations revolved around availability 
and efficacy: 
P(3): and how much of it’s driven by the, you know, the pharmaceutical companies 
making millions and millions of dollars on some 
[oh, that’s a very different story] 
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J(3): yeah, all that Tamiflu 
P: yeah 
J(3): how much did the government spend on that stuff 
[oh heaps] 
P(3): it’s scary and nobody knows if a generic thing like Tamiflu even worked 
J(3): exactly, cause if it mutated as it would need to do, to actually do some serious 
damage to the population  in New Zealand, then yeah, who knows  if Tamiflu would 
even touch it  
P(3): there were a lot of studies, well yeah articles in the paper were saying ‘well, it 
wouldn’t make any difference’, it would make a difference for a certain percentage 
but overall it may not be effective 
 
R(1): the department was putting out a huge budget for buying this Tamiflu tablets, 
and then new evidence came out that it wasn’t even very effective 
 
A(2): they made it sound like Tamiflu was the God didn’t they? 
Mutation 
 
The following comments illustrate a sub-theme of scientific information where the 
participants used the word ‘mutate’ to talk about the scientific rationale for concern about 
avian influenza:  
Ls(4):  it  was  when  they  started  to  talk  about  it  mutating,  shifting  to  human‐to‐
human contact 
 
C(4): all it will take is a minor mutation in the flu virus for it to be transferable from 
human‐to‐human 
 
‘Mutate’ was used to flag the seriousness of the risk, and would often change the tone of 
the discussion from light-hearted to more considered: ‘and to me it’s the potential of what 
it could be, you know, looking at it scientifically, you know, it could mutate, it’s theoretically 
possible’  D(2). The possibility of mutation had a sobering effect on the participants’ 
conversation, and in these discussions the outcome appeared less certain. The word 
‘mutate’ was a key linguistic signifier, without which many of the newspaper articles that 
suggested that avian influenza was a significant risk, would have been unremarkable: ‘but 
the… this whole point about this particular bug is that it mutates’ (L:3) [and] ‘I thought the 
genetic make‐up was such that it was of a higher risk’ (C:3).  
 
The likelihood of the H5N1 epidemic or pandemic revolves around the possibility of the 
virus mutating from an avian-bound virus, to one that could cross over from birds to humans 
and then from human-to-human. Brown and Crawford (2009) describe a discourse of patient 
vulnerability and drug resistance, where the responsibility for protection from infection has 
shifted from the hospitals to the immune-compromised individual. This rhetoric 
communicates to the public that they are now constantly susceptible to the ‘Darwinian 
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processes of microbe mutation that evades all human attempts at elimination’ (p:508). In 
the presence of the word ‘mutate’, words like ‘potential’, ‘could’, ‘maybe’, and ‘if’ 
somewhat lose their effect as linguistic caveats, but the following participants’ comments 
purposely drew attention back to these words:  
C(3):  the  virus  could  pass  if  it  mutates  and  those  are  big  ‘ifs’,  and  it  just  hasn’t 
happened so…yeah 
 
R(1): But first you’ve got to prove that  it’s actually going to mutate  in a form that 
we’ve got no protection against so it still that… 
 
G(3): what’s their evidence for the mutation, and there was none 
 
A(3):  it  could mutate  but  it  doesn’t  mean  it’s  going  to mutate  into  a  dangerous 
virus, it could mutate a hundred times and still be safe 
Hygiene 
 
Accessing and using commercially developed drugs was discussed as a way of taking 
responsibility for protection against getting sick. These conversations often developed into 
debates that demonstrated another sub-theme: that of hygiene - ‘But  it seems to me that 
there are things you can do so that you don’t have to use pharmaceuticals’ (B:2), and was an 
idea that resonated with several of the participants. Focus group members saw hygiene as 
necessary ‘we’ve  got  quite  stringent  hygiene  practices’  (A:2), but they saw it also as 
something that had contributed to the agreed problem of lowered immunity generally: ‘and 
they’re not eating dirt and they’re not washing their hands like we all used to’ (M:4). Media 
representations of contagion and hygiene in the form of television campaigns came in for 
particular ridicule: 
M(4):  it does and on the ad, on TV, you see children drawing with their crayons or 
their  felt pens or  something and  then  it  shows  ...the  focus goes on  the  jar of  felt 
pens and then all of a sudden there’s these  fluorescent germs all crawling all over 
the felt pens and she comes with her aerosol can of Dettol… and sprays all the pens 
 
C: you might as well be wiping the place down with a bit of raw chicken [laughs] 
 
This derisive attitude towards media over-simplification of infection is a good example of 
the difficulty that the disciplines of science and medicine have with communicating 
complex concepts of disease. As Allan, Anderson and Petersen (2005) note: ‘the preferred 
models of the scientist do not translate easily into the reportorial strategies of the 
journalist anxious to convey their meaning to the intended audience’ (p.169). Moreover, 
Miller (1986) asserts that even people who are interested in scientific concepts find them 
hard to understand. He calls these people ‘the attentive public’, (a category into which 
most of the focus group participants fall), but notes that most of the lay public do not pay 
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attention to medical matters, which makes the communication of important scientific and 
technological information, such as health risks, problematic. 
 
Part of the risk assessment discussions were about how people and nations other than New 
Zealand were preparing, and how they were contributing to the global health risk of avian 
influenza. Whilst this talk was part of the way the group constructed risk, it was a narrative 
that was distinct, and so warranted being analysed as a major theme. 
OTHERING 
Crawford (1994) and Joffe (1999) state that individuals and groups may project the risk of 
infection and death onto an ‘Other’ in order to reduce the powerlessness experienced 
during a deadly epidemic. This observation was useful when analysing various and overt 
‘othering’ devices that were used by the participants during their discussion. In groups 
where consensus about a topic has been reached, there was little or no debate about 
statements such as  ‘very  little  point  in  doing  anything  because  they  are  all  so  crowded 
they’re all going to be killed off in one hit anyway’ (M:2). Van Djik’s (1992) claims that when 
there are no opposing views, overtly stigmatizing or racist comments can be expressed 
more strongly. I think this phenomenon played a part in some of these conversations. 
 
The identification of a risk group is part of a ‘boundary maintenance’ that creates and 
legitimizes the stigmatization of already marginalized populations, resulting in their 
identification with a disease (Goldin 1994). The media’s role in this identification is key, as 
it promulgates a framework by which potential health risks can be understood by distant 
‘often unaffected’ populations (Ungar 1998), pronouncing attribution and causation, as well 
as using ‘a vocabulary of risk and responsibility’ (Eichelberger 2007:1285).  
‘Us and Them’ 
 
The use of othering words such as ‘They’, over-‘There’, ‘Those’ and ‘Them’ were 
significant in the discussions by the focus groups; in the excerpts below ‘they’ indicates 
Asians, and ‘them’ signifies chickens:  
J(3): seeing how badly [laughs] they prepare meat and the way  it’s stored and the 
way it’s left open out in the sun and things and I thought ‘well’ 
 
J(1):  those  other  countries  that…as  you  say…they  sort  of  have  their  faces  up 
against them…living with them…rolling in them just about 
 
The participants discussed the health threat through a ‘cultural lens’ in ways that were 
reflective of a positive positioning of New Zealand culture: 
B(2): But  I know that,  I don’t know, we do seem to have a sort of thing culturally 
where we’re into toughing it out*?* 
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D(2): we don’t talk about the kiwi ‘she’ll be right’ thing for nothing. We’re  like ‘ok, 
we’ll just, you know, we can fix it with number eight wire' 
 
and negative positioning of other cultures: 
C(4): that case in Turkey came on the news they were speaking about his family and I 
think the son had died and the father was unwell, but they wouldn’t kill the chickens 
 
J(3): in China they all have their own chickens they all have you know 
 
M(4): but it will be people in Asia and Africa and India and things that will cop it and 
we’ll be like ‘oh well’… 
 
R(1): Asian people, you know, cheek‐by‐jowl with chickens, and handling them and 
living  with  them…  all  these  villages  of  people  handling  chickens….Asian  people 
handling chickens 
  
There was an identification with other Western cultures and, despite being geographically 
closer to Asian cultures, there seemed to be an assumption that New Zealanders would be 
more at risk if cultures similar to its own were to have an avian influenza outbreak:  
J(1): and as you were saying if it was in America or France we’d look at it and think 
‘oh well, it’s happening to them, it could happen to us’ 
 
Mx(4): the fact that it had spread to Europe was somehow worse for us… 
 
When talking about other countries, the participants speculated as to why those countries 
had outbreaks of avian influenza. Inferred in these discussions but not explicitly stated, 
were the reasons that New Zealand did not have it. These comments have overtones of 
suspicion: 
P(3):  ...I  couldn’t  trust  the  China  authorities…I  suspect  the  real number  is  ten or 
hundred times to what they’re actually admitting. 
 
A(3):  well,  we’re  probably  not  getting  the  truth  because  the  Chinese  authorities 
aren’t declaring the true numbers 
 
Whereas these following comments seemed to imply that the reason for infection 
originated from the citizens themselves: 
R(1):  they  often  showed  shots  of  Asian  people,  you  know,  cheek‐by‐jowl  with 
chickens, and handling them and living with them 
 
C(4): you sort of make a, small … a few small leaps from ‘OK, this guys not going to 
kill  his  chickens  and  you  know,  what’s  the  chances  that  the  rest  of  the  village 
um…becoming infected’… um 
 
L(4): and you go just a couple of steps on from that and you think ‘well, that’s pretty 
stupid’ and before you know it there’s going to be loads of people really sick and…. 
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Or the conditions in which they lived: 
M(4):  it  like a  lower socio‐economic...a  ‘village‐y’ sort of situation, people would’ve 
probably be dying of this that and the next thing… 
 
W(4): but they talked about the conditions they  lived  in and how chickens  lived  in 
stacks and other  food was underneath and  stuff  like  that and  if  those  conditions 
weren’t changed and  they probably wouldn’t be because China used a very cheap 
labour force and those who got infected often went back to the countryside where 
they come from 
 
Mx(4):  people  who  live  with  their  poultry...that  was  the  thing  that  was  coming 
through that  Indonesia and so on who have them under the house or  in the house 
or... 
 
As mentioned previously, discussions about ‘they’ and ‘them’ and ‘those people’ seemed to 
function as another distancing device, between ‘them and us’ or ‘they and we’. Interwoven 
within the conversations that juxtaposed ‘they’ with ‘we’, was a presumption that, in the 
eventuality of H5N1 coming to New Zealand, the New Zealanders’ ‘way of life’ would 
somehow be a mitigating protection mechanism: 
B(2): that was a lot of what people were saying the whole time was the way we live 
and interact with our bird life is so totally different to those other countries that…  
 
D(2): also we did not  live  in those hugely public places, you know we get on a bus 
and  there  is  usually  6  inches  between  us  and  the  next  person…so we  have  that 
luxury 
 
J(1): I think we do tend to take the attitude that our lifestyle is so far removed from 
those people…that is probably won’t happen to us in the same way 
  
Eichelberger (2007) claims that ‘in this process of othering, disease origins and risk of 
infection are explained through moralizing metaphors of cultural superiority so as to locate 
risk and responsibility among marginalized populations’ (p.1283). The ‘othering’ discourse 
was also evidenced in a ‘not-in-New Zealand’ sub-theme: 
A(2):  and  I  think  for  me  bird  flu  was  something  that  happens  to  people  ‘over 
there’...and  it hadn’t affected anybody  that  I knew and  so  it was  just  this kind of 
‘thing’ 
 
W(4): that it wouldn’t be too bad if the pandemic started somewhere else 
 
A(3): I mean I felt like I was fine over in New Zealand...and I sort of think well yeah, 
it’s because we can sit in New Zealand and it probably won’t be us 
 
J(3):  ...it won’t affect us...yeah,  I’ve heard people say that sort of thing and that’s 
the reason they come down here... 
 
L(4): we do have a thing here  I think though about being away  from everything...I 
don’t know if it’s a protected thing or a safe or an isolated  
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‘Death by plague’ a natural process 
 
In the cue article, Dr David Nabarro of the World Health Organisation warned that the 
number of people that could be killed from an avian influenza pandemic ‘could be anything 
between 5 million and 150 million’. In responding to that prediction J(3) said ‘we won’t be 
the 150 million’ which is a sentiment also found in this comment: ‘and they’re very very poor 
people, and you just think ‘ ooer…’ {doubtful sound} still not really affecting us’ (W:4). 
 
The idea that large numbers could die as a result of the possible pandemic was explored in 
one group in particular which resulted in an exchange of ideas about the merits of losing a 
large body of people, and was couched in terms of it being a good and natural process: 
P(3): as hugely populated as  it  is,  something has  to  change and  something has  to 
give  and  for  instance,  ‘natures  way’.  At  some  point  something’s  gotta  bring  the 
population down – we can’t do it well, nature will do it…so I don’t see it necessarily, 
in the big scheme of things, a bad thing 
 
C(3): as you were saying, there’s a natural cycle to things and  it wouldn’t be bad  if 
you know, a few million died anyway 
 
P(3):  to me  I don’t  see  it  as  necessarily  a bad  thing  if  it  killed  150 million people 
around the world 
 
In order to emphasise this point, this comment cited evolution and recent New Zealand 
history: 
G(3): well  it could  just be an evolutionary thing where um...if we did succumb to  it 
we would eventually become immune to it….like when Europeans bought croup to 
the Maori, and a lot of them were wiped out 
 
Focus group 3 was not the only group to discuss this in this manner, with China once again 
named as a country that ‘could afford to lose a few’: 
C(4): I was going to say if they were all Chinese you wouldn’t bat an eyelid [laughs] 
 
M(4):  I mean  it’s ghastly, but they can have 180 thousand people killed  in a decent 
earthquake, can’t they 
 
These comments that reflect what Farmer (1992) calls a tendency to ‘label the sick as 
wilfully dangerous and inferior’ (cited in Eichelberger 2007: 1293), where the process of 
stigmatisation enables the stigmatised to be thought about, not as human beings who have 
feelings, family, friends, but almost as an abstract concept. Once this happens, then 
regarding loss of life on a grand scale as a natural event, which ‘is needed now and again’, 
becomes morally acceptable.  
 
Othering and the positioning of one’s self in relation to ‘the other’ is a form of racism, 
which serves to privilege the dominant view, in this instance the New Zealand western 
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first-world view, over that of the third-world Asian ‘negative other’. This sort of talk 
enhances group membership, contributes to a sense of belonging, which was evident in the 
group104 which had more examples of this type of talk than the other groups.  
 
During one of these ‘othering’ discussions, one of the focus group members offered a 
contrary comment: 
J(3):  ‘oh well you know, China can  stand  to  lose a  few million people,  they’ve got 
lots’ and  I’m  like um…yes, but  they all have  children and  they have mothers and 
they have fathers and they’ve got lives and they’re as valid as we are [laughs] so just 
because they live in a big country doesn’t meant they are less value’ 
 
Although this comment seems in contradiction to the discussion that went before, van 
Djik’s (1992) theory of denial of racism makes sense of this comment. He argues that: 
‘language users who say negative things about minorities are well aware of the fact that 
they may be understood as breaking the social norm of tolerance or acceptance’ (p.89). 
The above comment by (J:3) is a defence device that is part of a strategy of impression 
management and serves as a face-saving mechanism. ‘Othering’ should not be regarded as 
just a cognitive racial response, but as a way of thinking that can have real and lasting 
consequences; as Eichelberger (2007) suggests, ‘othering’ can contribute to the way a 
health risk is socially constructed, and in the event of a pandemic eventuating, can 
‘hamper the containment of contagion and shape further responses to a disease’ (p.1293). 
 
There is no doubt that without the mass media, fast and efficient communication about 
health risks, especially in the event of a potential pandemic, would not be possible. 
Nonetheless, the media can frame and endorse misleading discourses about risk, adding to 
already established notions of prejudice and stigma. The focus group participants referred 
to instances where the media was their source of information about avian influenza: 
R(1): they were saying that, you know, OK, once  it started there, they were saying 
people  living with  chickens  could have  it mutated  and  they would  catch  it  and  it 
would spread there 
 
B(4): I just watched the newspapers to see who was dying where and then began to 
monitor when…  
 
M(4): gave you an inside view, turned it inside out a bit more to what the media was 
saying and some of the facts and figures we had and I actually learnt from that that 
it came from Southern China, and how the people had got there and you’re talking 
about it being spread virally.  
 
Mx(4): we were hugely bombarded by the media.  It was on every news and  if you 
watch news, it just kept coming up and coming up… 
 
                                                 
104 Focus group 3 
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The substantive theme of ‘othering’ shows how some of the participants expressed these 
ideas of intolerance, which may have been cultural reflections of the society in which they 
lived, or personal views influenced in part, by what was printed in the media. The last 
section ‘media’ explores the participants’ general impressions of the media, and in 
particular what they saw as good media reporting of health risks, and what they felt was 
lacking, or needed in order for them to understand and respond to risk messages in a way 
that helped but not hindered them. 
MEDIA  
Individuals rely on the media to provide their main source of information about science and 
environmental-related risks, as these risks are often not directly experienced (Allan 2002; 
Signorielli 1993; Ader 1995; cited in Dudo et al. 2007:430). ‘Media’ constituted a 
substantive theme, quite possibly because all participants had personally experienced 
‘instances’ of media reporting of avian influenza, and had expectations of the role they 
thought the media should play in mediating between them and risk issues about which they 
had no experience. Additionally, I had introduced the focus group sessions by providing 
them with a cue article from the New Zealand media, which gave the discussions a specific 
focus. 
Opinions and Views 
 
The first part of the media theme section reflects opinions and views of the participants 
about various aspects of the media. These descriptions are important as they show the 
different ways the participants engaged with the media, and how they perceived the way 
the media reported risk. The ‘media’ referred to in the focus group transcripts was 
predominantly print media, however there were a few references to the internet and 
television. In the following analysis of the focus groups views on the media’s reporting of 
avian influenza, references to ‘they’ by the participants refers to the media or journalists, 
unless stated otherwise. In reading through the comments, I found few positive references 
to the media; for example, the following rationales for why the media was printing stories: 
R(1): well  I don’t think they’re doing  it deliberately, but they genuinely think  it’s a 
story, well there’s something in it, you know 
 
Rs(1): they follow up stories and they’ll create stories in order to...um.. sell papers.. 
to have something interesting that people want to buy it for 
 
Some participants were entirely dismissive of the value of print or television media for 
anything useful:  ‘on any night you can get a 30 second sound bite…about the most...what 
you would hope to be the appropriate  information but that wasn’t probably the case…so 
you get, at best 30 seconds with 5 seconds  interview with somebody and that would  it for 
the night…um…in  the papers you probably get possibly a better um…(G:3). J(3) finds a 
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solution for poor television reporting in another type of mass media: the internet: ‘I  find 
trawling the internet way more useful…if you’ve got the time you can actually find so much 
more  from  all  sorts  of  different  sources’. Ironically the sites they were accessing were 
probably newspapers from other countries: ‘I’ll go to the internet and I’ll look at British stuff 
and  I’ll  look at American papers’  (A:3). The following question embodies one of the most 
significant conundrums about the role of the media: 
M(4):  to what  extent does  the media  report  the news  and what  extent does  the 
media create the news? 
 
In attempting to answer this question, some participants speculated where the story about 
the risk might have originated, or who was originally responsible for bringing it to the 
public attention: ‘my picture of the scenario was that, this organisation generated the initial 
reports,  the media picked  it up because  it was a  story’  (R:1)  [and] ‘how did  it get  to  the 
media,  was  it  the  health  organisations  organising  it?’  (M:4). However, others were 
unequivocal in why stories were printed, which linked into the earlier sceptical discourse: 
 J(3): the media decides an issue and it doesn’t matter how crazy it sounds 
 
V(1):  they want  to be  the  first,  they wanna get out  there and  so  they  just grab  it 
and…and...run…whether it gets blown up or not...and then, it gets dealt with later 
 
J(1): they want to breed the whole story so that people will keep on reading it every 
day, and keen for the next fact about it 
 
There were also references to hype and scaremongering, which, in line with the social 
amplification of risk framework (SARF), is seen as originating from the media: 
 A(2): I just thought it was a huge media hype 
 
M(2): I agree it was hyped, it was scaremongering 
 
K(2): if you look at this article, it starts off with 150 million people could die, I mean 
that’s, call it scaremongering but what it is 
 
J(3):…I guess I’d dismissed it as kind of over, you know it was you know, media hype 
 
These statements reflect what Brown (2003) observed, when he said that cynicism, 
disengagement and a decline in trust in science and science-based policies result when 
there are too many early warnings. Sandman (1993) also agrees that the exaggeration of 
risk can cause an undermining of trust, which the following comments confirm: 
A(3):so…you  know  it’s  pretty  hard  to  trust  what  you’re  actually  reading…or 
hearing  
 
Rs(1):…like, you know, nothing happened with SARS, nothings going to happen to 
me, it’s all a load of shit’ 
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P(3):  ah,  I  think  it diminishes  credence  cause  it...ah…adds  to  the  scaremongering 
ah…thing. They’re not there to give you information on the…it wasn’t given there 
to  provide  information  it  was  there  to  scare  you,  into  thinking  you  should  do 
something 
 
The overall tone of the comments about the media was negative with the following typical: 
R(1):  I guess  I  regard  the media as um …as…ah…pretty  fallible…which  is always 
um…sort of inflammatory, it’s always like ‘oh my God’… 
 
C(1): I do get the feeling I should just stop reading the paper to be honest [laughs], 
because you just don’t know how much of it is drivel… 
 
G(3):  I  only  watch  TV,  maybe  one  programme  a  week,  possibly,  but  the  news  I 
haven’t watched for a couple of years 
C(3): it is very negative,  
[agreement] 
J(3): fluffy dogs always win out  
L(3): the quality of the news here is terrible, that what really…soft 
 
M(2): I don’t find the media very intelligent on the whole 
 
These and other comments confirmed that the media was not well regarded, and instead of 
clarifying issues, added to the uncertainty:  
Rs(1):  I’ve noticed that too, that the reporter will  include  lots of different facts but 
put  their  interpretation on  it but  then  include  in  the  facts  for you  to put another 
interpretation on it*?* 
 
P(3): a  lot of these articles are discussing those points of view, you know, arguing 
whether it’s likely to happen or not. But you know, just to throw out something like 
that doesn’t...it’s meaningless 
 
Ways the media reported H5N1 
 
Once a story had been ‘broken’ by the media, the way in which it was reported in the 
media was discussed at length: 
B(2): every other thing you pick up in the media these days is ‘wahhh’ {sings a high 
note} drama about something 
 
E(2): you know,  I do seem to think the way  it was reported,  it sort of gave you no 
hope 
 
Descriptive phrases such as ‘beating/ratcheting/bombarded/hyping it up’ were used by the 
participants, and there were accusations of sensationalism and the use of emotive 
language: 
L(4): it’s the way the media grabs it, sensationalises it and presents it, cause we find 
that with the press about lots of things 
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J(3):  I mean the media drops things…as soon as they’re not sensational – boom – 
onto the next thing 
 
D(2): this was on the radio, there was exactly that, using emotive language and… 
J(3): yeah, the sensational headlines do the sell the papers 
 
Implicit in some of these conversations was that the media held a kind of power, and were 
able to change or influence what people thought about, or paid attention to: 
R(1):when  they  were  beating  up  um…patriotic  sentiments,  really  manipulating 
public opinion 
 
B(4): but unless we saw it in the media that was the only time it became real 
 
B(2):  because  you  don’t  hear  about  it  anymore  you  don’t  tend  to  think  about  it 
anymore 
 
Perhaps this comment explains why some people think the media can influence: ‘the public 
take whatever they are presented with, they accept  it uncritically and they don’t  look  into 
things’(C:1), but J(3) cautions: ‘you take it verbatim that it’s true…but you should check it 
out’. By stating these views, the participants were positioning themselves as not engaging in 
this type of behaviour, and as critical and discriminating. Through their discussions, they 
wanted to stress that they had substantial knowledge of how the media operated, 
especially as some of the participants declared that they did or had worked within the 
media field: 
Rs(1): Yep, yes, I’ve sent things off myself to the media…that have not been checked 
and  printed  verbatim…I’m  like...well,  hey,  I  could  just  write  up  anything…and 
you’re going to print it? Cool, thanks! 
 
B(2): what  I  find  interesting about this, as a person who used to be a  journalist,  is 
that knowing that all of these paths can be chopped off anytime at the bottom, but 
the one at the bottom, which could’ve easily been whipped off, but the one at the 
bottom stayed there  
 
R(1):  I’ve known  from personal experience how  they distort and get  things wrong 
and how they’re biased 
 
J(3): well  if  you  think  about  reporting.  I mean  coming  from  the media  [laughs],  I 
have  in my week, have to deal with 20 different  issues…I don’t know about any of 
them,  I’m  just  a  journalist  so  I  have  to  rely  on  the  people  I  talk  to…you  know, 
and…work out and hope  they know what  they’re  talking about and often  I don’t 
have  time  to go and  talk  to 4 different people  to  find out  if  it all marries up and 
they’re  all  about  the  same  therefore  it  must  be  kinda  true,  because  you’ve  got 
deadlines and you don’t have time and you do the best you can and  it  is about…I 
mean for me…but and it’s also the pressure… 
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What the participants wanted from the media 
 
In order to make sense of the criticism that the media was not doing a very good job, it was 
important to find out what the participants wanted from the media. For example, were 
there explicit ways that the participants wanted the media to behave, or ways of 
communicating that were preferable to others? Certainly, the criticisms underscored ways 
of communicating that the participants did not like which implies that there must be 
approaches that the participants prefer. The remainder of this section addresses this 
sizeable sub-theme: 
C(3):  cause  I  find often  that  reporters don’t…they don’t always understand what 
they  read,  then  they  can’t  impart  the  information  exactly  and  even,  like  even 
reasonable reporters, you often find they’ve got the wrong end of the stick, they’ve 
not understood this point, they’ve not understood that point 
 
A(3): overview that um...like a journalists not trained in all these branches of science 
that you need to be 
 
J(3):  yeah,  they  should  be  trained  to  analyse,  I  mean  I'm  not,  I’m  not  but  you 
know…to analyse or to…you know, not just take things at face value 
 
This observation about the lack of expertise shown by reporters when communicating 
information, showed that these participants acknowledged the complicated interrelation 
between the scientific community and journalistic reporting which sometimes manifested in 
a lack of expertise, poor understanding of the issue and limited ability to ‘impart the 
information’. Implicit in these comments is that there may be a way of demonstrating 
understanding and expertise, of communicating well and of not ‘getting the wrong end of 
the stick’. The following excerpts illustrate that the participants had very definite views on 
what they did not like about the media reporting, and through the following negations, a 
series of preferences can be identified. These are in bold: 
R(1):  there  was  no  facts  linking  this  scenario  to  a  real  threat  so…  I  thought, 
whatever’s going on, you know there’s no basis for it 
 
V(1): and they’re very chatty and they…you don’t learn very much 
 
C(4): alot of times they get things wrong because they don’t investigate very well 
 
C(1):...finding  out  details,  facts,  and  then  giving  that  information  to  the  public 
rather than just responding in an overreaction or under reaction 
 
R(1):  they  have  people  who  don’t  seem  to  be  able  to  get  behind  the  surface  of 
things, you know, even in their…um…investigative pieces, in their features? They’re 
very superficial in what they say about things 
 
M(4):… how they distort and get things wrong and how they’re biased 
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P(3):  it wasn’t given  there  to provide  information  it was  there  to  scare  you,  into 
thinking you should do something 
 
Rs(1): the papers, but they would rarely follow it up 
 
A(3): they’re not actually there to get it absolutely right 
 
To paraphrase the above comments into a coherent ‘wish list’, the participants wanted to 
see the following from media reporting: facts, background and basis for speculation, good 
investigative ‘behind the scenes’ journalism and a follow-up of stories relating to previous 
articles, details, clear, correct and unbiased information, and as-near-as-possible verifiable 
evidence. In terms of the reporting of avian influenza, this ‘wish’-list’ raises an important 
question: can the intricacies and scientific concepts of the H5N1 virus be easily understood 
in terms of ‘clear and correct facts and details’? Does this mean that a certain level of 
scientific literacy, as described by Ziman (1991) and Friedman et al. (1986) is a prerequisite 
for understanding about risk?  
 
I would assess the scientific literacy of the focus group participants as high;105 most of them 
had a tertiary qualification and several worked within health disciplines, yet clearly they 
had frustrations around understanding the risk issue of avian influenza and found, by their 
standards, the media to be a poor communicator. By recognising that the public is ‘not a 
single homogenous entity but rather a complex structure of segments defined mainly by 
interests, and knowledges’ (Miller 1986:57), does the media need to report risks in ways 
that acknowledge these diversities? This could mean that within a story about a health risk 
for example, information for a range of scientific knowledges is provided.  
 
Some participants seemed to suggest that media risk-reporting is more about 
sensationalising text in order to sell newspapers, suggesting that verifiable scientific 
content is of secondary importance to more commercial priorities. Whilst the participants 
may indeed have this view, lack of scientific content is more likely to be a constraint of 
economics, where papers simply cannot afford to have journalists who are specialists in 
just one field. The participants verbalised that, when reading about potential health risks, 
they wanted concrete and certain substantiated facts. However, framing a potential risk in 
a way that eliminates uncertainty is paradoxical; as Anderson (2006) points out ‘the 
concept of risk deals with speculation about what might happen a long way into the future 
and is in conflict with news schedules that emphasize the here and now (p.118). 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 See characterisation of focus groups – Appendix VIII 
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Specific suggestions 
 
Apart from the specifics of information, some of the participants suggested some practical 
ways to report risk in relation to ‘doing’ something about the reported risk. Once again the 
particular suggestions are in bold: 
B(2):  if  you personalise  it,  you make  it  immediate,  you make  it  current,  and  you 
provide those, those things, those practical things that people need to do. 
  
P(3):  if  you make  it about a person  that you  love,  if  you make  it a person, ahm, 
that’s a different thing to 50 million people could die 
 
E(2): but  if someone said,  ‘OK  it might affect us and here’s five things you can do 
that…you  know, would help’  and  they’re not  like major  things  that  are going  to 
really disrupt your life,..then…. that would be... 
 
Rs(1):  if  you  had  access  to  information  of  constructive  things  you  could  do  that 
might help, that would be more interesting than hearing this scaremongering where 
you think ‘well, if it’s going to hit, it’s going to kill us all… 
 
G(3): we...if  it was a  real threat, they would have ads on saying  ‘buy Panadol –  it 
could  save  your  life  from  the  bird  flu’...where  were  those  ads  giving  us  that 
information? 
 
These kinds of constructive comments illustrates the level of engagement evident in 
thinking about how avian influenza had been reported in the media. It suggests two 
priorities as to how the media communicate health risks; the media should directly link risk 
information to personal circumstances, and offer symptom information and self-protection 
advice. Obviously, the suggestions also show that the participants would like more from the 
media by way of less sensationalism, how the risk relates to everyday life and how 
imminent the risk might be.  
 
Several of the recommendations fall into what I see as a ‘need for control’ theme, 
something that risk communication theorists have identified as crucial. Covello et al. (1989) 
state that ‘controllability’ is important to the public in evaluating risk; not only do the 
public have the right to know about potential risks to which they may be exposed, but that 
they need to feel that they can ‘participate in decisions that affect their lives’ (p.6). 
Sandman (1993) also acknowledges controllability as key, and argues that this need for 
participation along with the perception that they have no control over the amount of their 
participation is why members of the public react with ‘outrage’: largely ignoring the hazard 
and concentrating on the emotional reaction towards that risk.  
 
Sandman asserts that in trying to manage or communicate risk events, the government and 
other interested agencies say two things to the public: that they have the authority and 
expertise to manage the risk, and that (because of this) the public should not worry. 
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However, these messages ‘disempower and reassure’ simultaneously, and ‘the reassuring 
message gets lost in the outrage provoked by the disempowerment’ (p.39). The way to 
solve this disempowerment would be to share the control, which, in the avian influenza 
context, would mean (amongst other things), giving the public ways to actively keep 
themselves safe and avoid infection. Comments from the participants confirm this: ‘ads on 
saying  ‘buy Panadol’,  ‘information of constructive  things you could do’,  ‘here’s  five  things 
you can do’. As many of the comments from the participants have demonstrated, there is a 
real emotional component to their discussions, which is puzzling at first glance: why should 
something that is communicated by various organisations in order to warn, help and 
prevent harm, be responded to antagonistically by those the warnings are intended to 
protect? Perhaps the controllability element of risk communication answers this question.  
 
The following chapter returns to the core questions and aims of this thesis and, through 
theorising and interpreting the analysis of both the newspaper articles and focus group 
data, seeks to address them. It will also highlight issues and questions that emerged in 
response to the analysis and discuss implications for the discipline of risk communication 
with suggestions for further research. 
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7. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Discussion 
 
The discourse of risk begins where our trust in our security ends and ceases to be 
relevant when the potential catastrophe occurs. The concept of risk thus 
characterises a peculiar, intermediate state between security and destruction, 
where the perception of threatening risks determines thought and action [italics in 
original] (Beck 1999:135). 
 
Risk is a concept, a potential danger, an invisible uncertainty which can be made visible 
through the media. Moreover, as a result of risks ‘becoming real’ (van Loon 1999), 
evaluations and decisions are necessary. In relation to the communication of the health risk 
of avian influenza, the understanding, perception and mediation of risk has served as the 
orientation for this thesis, and has directed its theoretical, methodological and analysis 
decisions. This thesis was written due to a perceived gap in the empirical literature on the 
question of the relationship between what the media is producing in terms of health risk 
communication, and how the public are interpreting this risk information. If a pandemic 
occurs, public health authorities ‘will be dependent on the willingness and ability of the 
public to adhere to recommendations formulated to protect both the individual and the 
wider community’ (de Zwart,  Veldhuijzen, Elam, Aro, Abraham, Bishop, Richardus and 
Brug 2007:290). Knowledge about public perceptions about the risk of avian influenza is 
limited (Lau, Yang and Kim 2003; de Zwart et al. 2007; Anderson 2006), but officials need 
to be confident that the public will respond to their health warnings in a timely manner. 
A motivating concern for the conceptualisation of this thesis was how the media 
communicated the health threat of avian influenza and how the lay public of New Zealand 
perceived that threat as mediated by newspaper reporting. The core research questions 
were twofold: are there ways of reporting that help or hinder this process, and are there 
cultural and social implications to reporting that impact upon the public’s understandings 
and behaviours? This thesis used a mixed-method methodology to explore these questions, 
which allowed for a comprehensive approach to analysing and interpreting about both the 
quantitative and qualitative data. A constructionist epistemology underpinned the 
theoretical concepts that encompassed discourse, textual and thematic analyses, (and did 
not include assumptions or hypothesises), which allowed for a rich reading of the data. 
Early risk and risk communication theorists have chronicled approaches and 
problems with communicating risk, and have identified problematic gaps between different 
‘actors’: risk generators and audiences (Palmlund 1992), scientists and journalists 
(Dunwoody, 1992), the ‘knowledge-rich’ and ‘knowledge-deficit’ (Ziman 1991), journalists 
and scientists (Friedman et al. 1986), and media and the ‘lay public’ (McCombs and Shaw 
1972;  Kasperson 1988; Lewenstein  2003). Beck (1999) raised questions of objectivity and 
subjectivity, rationality and irrationality, and it could be argued that Peter Sandman (1993) 
answered these questions in his interpretation of risk as the combination of ‘hazard’ and 
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‘outrage’. He claimed that a ‘disconnect’ exists between how experts and the community 
estimate risk: the experts focus on the hazard but ignore the outrage,106 yet the public do 
the opposite, focussing on the outrage at the expense of understanding the hazard. 
Certainly, this ‘outrage’ was demonstrated in many of the responses from the focus group 
participants, and Sandman’s theory partly explains these responses. Nonetheless, the 
media’s role in amplifying or attenuating risk messages cannot be ignored; therefore, one 
of the implications for further research that this thesis raises is: how much of a role does 
the media play?  
In his article ‘Mass Media and Environmental Risk: Seven Principles’,107 Sandman 
asserted that journalists are in the news business, not the education or health business. 
However, when the media writes articles about a potential health risk such as avian 
influenza, using scientists or doctors as primary sources and providing information intended 
to help readers protect themselves from infection, journalists are undoubtedly in the 
‘business’ of both health and education. More importantly, past risk communication 
literature claims that in framing risk events in certain ways, the media play a crucial role in 
how the public perceive such threats.  
The New Zealand media framed the potential pandemic of H5N1 virus similarly to 
the U.S. media: episodic framing108 was the dominant frame that the New Zealand media 
used to report the avian influenza with most major indexes of sensationalism represented 
more than in the U.S. media. Thematic framing109 of avian influenza stories was shown to 
be used infrequently, appearing in less than a third of all stories. Iyengar’s (1991) theories 
of framing and attribution have certainly been useful in understanding how the New 
Zealand media represented the potential health risk of H5N1, and as the findings show the 
focus group participants seemed to respond to the effects of newspaper framing, criticising 
the media for its ‘hyping-up’ of the H5N1 issue, and wanting much more in the way of 
concrete facts and helpful details. There were similarities between what the participants 
wanted from health risk reporting and what defines a thematic frame. The participants 
criticised the media for the lack of this type of information ‘...finding out details, facts, and 
then giving that information to the public rather than just responding in an overreaction or 
under reaction,110 and stated that they would pay more attention if the media gave them 
specific advice on what they could do to mitigate the influenza’s worst effects.  
Parallels can also be drawn between the templates that the media used to report 
avian influenza stories and the themes that were evidenced in the focus group discussions: 
                                                 
106 ‘Outrage’ ‐ the nontechnical component of risk which includes notions of voluntariness, control, 
responsiveness, and feelings of trust and dread 
107 www.piercelaw.edu/risk/vol5/summer/sandman  
108 Episodic framing includes concepts of sensationalism, emotionally ‘loaded’ language, contextualisation and 
references to past pandemics. 
109 Thematic framing demonstrates more generalised reporting with contextual and scientific information as well 
as symptoms and protection advice. 
110 Participant (C) in focus group 1. 
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for example those of ‘othering’. The discourse of the ‘deviant other’ was evident in both 
the newspaper reporting and focus group discussion, with the media implying that Asian 
countries were to blame for not containing the H5N1 virus: ‘It’s not really surprising in 
countries like Indonesia that there are possibly unrecognised pockets of infection still 
bubbling away’.111  Whether the participants were reproducing attitudes voiced by the 
media or reflecting more deeply held cultural mores, some viewed people from other 
countries as problematic, and dispensable : ‘I was going to say if they were all Chinese you 
wouldn’t bat an eyelid’.112 Both the media and the participants also ‘othered’ those within 
the New Zealand society who did not act in ways that were deemed acceptable, but they 
did it in different ways; the media constructed the notion of ‘the good citizen’ by reporting 
in praiseworthy terms ordinary New Zealanders who were stockpiling and preparing ‘I feel 
that with three young children it is my responsibility to make sure their welfare is taken care 
of…I’m going to store water in airtight containers and I will get masks next.113 The 
participants, however, ridiculed those who were stockpiling, positioning themselves in the 
(sensible) majority, and as rational citizens who were not ‘you know… fruit loops’, did not 
act neurotically, overreact or run around as if ‘the sky is falling, the sky is falling’. 
Constructing the avian influenza in terms of ‘protagonists and antagonists’ (Eichelberger 
2007:1293) has implications for how communities respond to, and contain infectious 
outbreaks. The media, as conduits of health risk information, need to be cognisant of 
blaming populations or individuals for disease outbreaks or contagion control.  
Conclusions about the effect of one upon the other cannot be drawn too sharply 
and I suggest that public perception of risk needs to be situated within considerations of 
community and culture. As Mary Douglas (1992) points out: ‘there is no way of proceeding 
with analysing risk perception without typifying kinds of communities according to the 
support their members give to authority, commitment, boundaries, and structure ‘(p.47). 
Additionally, Scott (2000) explains ‘othering’ in reference to Douglas’s cultural theory of 
risk: ‘at the level of collectivity there will be scapegoating and blame of already vulnerable 
individuals and groups’ [italics added] (p.40). Focus group examples of ‘othering’ highlights 
the difficulties of attributing risk construction and perception, which suggest that taking a 
media effects approach is too simplistic. Whilst the media brought the issue of avian 
influenza to the public’s attention, suggesting that, for a while at least, this topic should 
be more salient than other issues, its role can be seen as more a mediator of risk 
information, leaving the public to negotiate this risk in the context of the many 
considerations raised in this thesis; within the imperatives of public health and 
governmentality to name but two.  
                                                 
111 The Press, 02 August, 2006 
112 Participant (C) in focus group 4 
113 The Press, 29 October 2005 
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Lupton and Tulloch (2003) state that negotiating risk is made all the more difficult 
because the public are reliant on experts’ knowledges ‘to warn and inform about risk’ 
(p.3), and the newspaper analysis showed that the media not only relied upon expert 
sources for information about H5N1 but also privileged some voices, whose expertise was 
uncontested, over others. The focus groups participants, however, were not passive in their 
evaluation of ‘expert’ information; there was debate about trust, authority and 
motivations, which showed that they were not bound by the media’s approach.  
When considering protection and manageability issues around avian influenza, the 
focus group participants talked at length about New Zealand’s geographic proximity to 
reported incidents of avian influenza. There was a consensus that New Zealand would be 
‘the last place to get it’ and that government protective measures such as border control 
and existing pandemic preparedness meant that any threat from the H5N1 virus was low. 
This confidence also meant that individuals did not personally take preparing, in terms of 
stockpiling food or having emergency kits ready, seriously. It could be assumed that the 
higher sensationalism demonstrated in the media articles might have penetrated the 
public’s apathy, but as shown by the participants’ response to this ‘hyping-up’ of the avian 
influenzastories, this approach did not work. Analysis of the focus group data showed that 
the participants reacted strongly to elements of sensationalism in the reporting of avian 
influenza, which resulted in criticism of the media, and a disregard for the risk messages. 
As a result of what the participants perceived as over-hyping and scaremongering, they 
declared that they had grown tired of persistent warnings that did not eventuate. 
 This effect has been referred to by researchers as ‘warning fatigue’ or ‘cry wolf’ 
syndrome, which Sandman claims is weak114 because he argues that people intuitively know 
that it is better to endure false alarms than to not have been warned at all. This statement 
may be applicable for industrial or environmental crises, but I suggest, not with regard to 
health risks such as global pandemics. SARS and the 1968 Hong Kong influenza epidemic, for 
example, were at the time worrying, but did not kill people in the numbers predicted; my 
reading of the focus group data suggest that the effects of warning fatigue may well be 
cumulative and more damaging than Sandman implies. The strength of participants’ 
feelings about over-warning and over-predicting indicate that future health risk warnings, 
such as those about the present swine flu pandemic, may be largely disregarded and 
ignored. Combine the resultant apathy with the level of distrust also displayed by the 
participants,115 and ‘warning fatigue’, as a phenomenom, could be potentially more 
problematic than previously thought.  
A theme evident in the textual analysis of the newspaper articles was that of 
medical or scientific language and one word in particular, ‘mutate’, appeared in many of 
the H5N1 articles, and had a noticeable effect in the focus group discussions. ‘Mutate’ 
appeared to change the tone of the discussions, initiated in-depth debate about the 
                                                 
114 ‘The dangers of excessive warnings … and of over‐reassurance’ ( Sandman, 2008). 
115 See chapter 6 sub‐theme of ‘credibility’.  
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seriousness of the health risk and showed, in this instance, that its use had a strong agenda-
setting effect: influencing not only how the threat was explained, but constructing avian 
influenza as something more dangerous because of this medical uncertainty. It could be 
assumed that these scientific terms were used to explain the seriousness of the threat 
however, as the participants discussions showed, they added to, rather than alleviated the 
uncertainty. The participants were almost all tertiary educated and were ‘scientifically 
literate’ with at least seven working in either public health or the fields of human sciences. 
One would expect that understanding of the medical and scientific implications of the avian 
influenza pandemic would have resulted in a higher than normal uptake of advice amongst 
the participants; for example, stocking up on emergency supplies and antivirals. This was 
not the case however, with just one of 25 of the participants actively preparing as the 
health authorities had recommended. What does this mean for risk communication theorists 
who posit that without better scientific literacy, risk communication will continue to be 
ineffective? My research shows that despite having a high ‘scientific literacy’, the 
participants had difficulty assessing the magnitude and seriousness of the threat of H5N1. 
Experts and organisations were not only used by the media as primary sources of 
information, but were important indicators for the participants in assessing personal risk in 
relation to avian influenza. Whilst the media reporting did not question the credibility of 
these authorities, the participants debated motivations and integrity, revealing that trust 
and credibility were important factors in their assessment of health risk messages. This 
finding aligns with risk communication literature (Covello et al. 1989; Sandman 2003; 
Lakoff and Johnston 1981; Brown 2003), and according to the focus group participants, 
integrity needed to be evident across all risk communication stakeholders: the health 
authorities, governmental organisations, local councils and the media. Despite debating the 
reasons for these organisations’ risk messages, ‘I think they have to over react...but if they 
under react, they will subsequently be blamed,116 organisations’ pandemic and preparedness 
plans, as reported in the media, served as a reassurance mechanism for the participants, 
and they had good knowledge of the major authorities involved: civil defence, health 
departments and local city councils. This feeling of confidence that the health threat was 
‘in hand’ revealed a contradiction: although organisations were urging the public to 
prepare, the participants did not feel the urgency to follow the advice of these 
organisations, that is, to take individual responsibility for protection and containment: ‘I 
very much grew up with that Social Welfare mentality, you know…that if things went 
wrong...that the government would look after you’.117 This highlights another facet of the 
problematic relationship between risk messages and risk reception, and suggests that 
further research is needed to enable organisations to design risk communication campaigns, 
that will confidently achieve their stated objectives. 
                                                 
116 Participant (P), focus group 3 
117 Participant (B), focus group 2 
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Implications 
 
In their case-study of media reporting of avian influenza over a six-year period in the 
United States, Dudo et al. (2007), concluded that assessment of avian influenza coverage 
outside of the United States was needed, and Anderson (2006) has noted that there have 
been ‘few comparative studies of media reporting across countries (p.126). It is hoped that 
this thesis, whilst not exhaustive, is a substantive and comprehensive attempt to address 
these concerns. Whilst this thesis compares New Zealand media reporting of avian influenza 
with results from the US media, neither country experienced an avian influenza outbreak 
inside their borders. Further research relating to media reporting of health risk may 
determine how the media’s reporting changes as a result of an actual outbreak: does it 
become more factual, less sensational? Will more overt mechanisms of social control 
(implementation of health quarantine measures for example) be contested or complied 
with, and will positioning of the ‘deviant other’ or the ‘good citizen’ become more obvious? 
More importantly, in what ways do these factors affect the public perception of personal 
risk? 
During the process of writing this thesis, and in discussing the topic of avian 
influenza, with not only the focus group participants, but also colleagues and peers at 
Canterbury University118 and conferences, the spectre of a possible pandemic elicited 
strong emotional responses. These responses often included annoyance with the media and 
health organisations for reporting health warnings, even though these warnings were 
circulated in order to pre-empt major problems of contagion and disease control. It seemed 
as if, at some level there was disappointment that, as had happened before, the predicted 
outbreak had not come to pass. This scepticism was used as a rationale to justify belittling 
organisations who had warned and prepared, and individuals who had heeded those health 
risk warnings. These emotional reactions may be simply what Sandman (1993) has termed 
‘outrage’, but I think that they are more to do with how the public, in times of crisis, 
conceptualise and operationalise risk in relation to the notion of uncertainty. 
The reporting of avian influenza and the interpretations and perceptions of this 
reporting illustrates a paradigmatic case of how risk is managed in contemporary society. 
The focus group participants engaged with the notion of avian influenza as a potential 
health risk enthusiastically, and debated it in many ways including its possible severity and 
impact. There were a variety of views, and when talking about some topics, some strong 
opposing opinions were evident. There was however, one sub-theme about which there was 
absolute agreement: the media were not reporting health risk events in a way that 
communicated to the participants what they wanted to hear. As previously discussed in this 
thesis, analysis of focus group data suggest that ‘the public’ want health risk messages to 
be clear, concrete and factual, and many of their comments highlight two important 
notions: those of controllability and empowerment. Sandman (1993) points out that health 
                                                 
118 www.canterbury.ac.nz 
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risk officials often put out risk messages that simultaneously reassures ‘we have the risk 
under control’ and disempowers ‘you don’t need to worry’. This is problematic as the 
participants demonstrated that they wanted to take an active role during any health risk 
crisis which meant receiving and acting upon advice about constructive, practical, 
immediate and personally relevant things they could do.  
A desire for messages that communicate certainty about risk, which is by definition 
inherently uncertain, raises questions about the very nature of risk communication, 
whether effective risk communication is possible, or whether partial effectiveness is all 
that can be hoped for. In light of this expressed desire for certainty, I suggest that future 
risk communication research should not focus so much on how the media are reporting 
health risks, but rather on how the public conceptualise risk, construct it in times of crisis 
and evaluate their ability to control it. At the time of writing, as countries all over the 
world come to terms with the impact of another animal-to-human virus, the global H1N1 
pandemic, these implications for health risk communication merit further research.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Coding Schema for analysing newspaper articles 
 
 
Variables  Colour 
 
Pink 
Purple 
 
Sensational: 
? Loaded words 
? Loaded phrases 
? Worst‐case scenario 
 
Orange 
 
yellow 
underline 
yellow 
 
Risk Information: 
? Qualitative 
? Quantitative without a 
contextual denominator 
? Quantitative with a contextual 
denominator 
underline 
green 
 
green 
green 
 
Self‐Efficacy: 
? Symptom Information 
? Personal Protection information 
? Public Understanding of Science 
blue 
 
Circle with red 
 
Risk Comparison: 
? Other (SARS, Hong Kong flu) 
? 1918  Circle with red 
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Appendix II: Focus group data transcribing Conventions 
 
%%%% 
 
Indicates when something is said but the transcriber cannot 
understand it 
Italic 
 
The person emphasis this word 
BOLD 
 
The person speaks loudly 
‘   ’ 
 
The person is quoting either herself or someone else 
(2) 
 
Parentheses indicate a pause and how the number denotes how 
many seconds it was 
{   }   
 
A note from the transcriber explaining what is happening at that 
time in the group 
… 
 
Indicates a small pause 
[agreement] 
 
Denotes a murmuring assent, not necessarily words 
[  ] 
 
Within text denotes what someone has done. Example [laughs] 
[  ] 
 
On a separate line denotes something someone from the group 
as said, but cannot be ascribed to a particular person 
[overtalking ‐ 3]  
 
More than one member of the group is talking and the 
transcriber cannot discern who is saying what. Sometimes 
followed by a number, indicating how many seconds it lasted 
 
[laughter] 
 
Denotes that the group laughed 
*?*  
 
Denotes a rise in intonation , not necessarily a question 
. 
 
A full stop indicates a fall in intonation, but not necessarily the 
end of a sentence 
, 
 
A comma indicates a continuing intonation, not necessarily a 
clause boundary 
 
(Ochs & Capps, 2001, xi-xii)
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Appendix III: Cue article used for Focus Group Discussion. 
 
Bird flu could kill 150m, says UN  
330 words 
1 October 2005 
New Zealand Herald 
English 
(c) 2005 The New Zealand Herald  
The UN has appointed a co-ordinator to counter a human influenza pandemic  
A TOP United Nations public health expert warned yesterday that an international 
influenza epidemic could come at any time and claim millions of lives unless 
action is taken now to control an outbreak in Asia.  
The number of people killed “could be anything between 5 million and 150 
million,'' said Dr David Nabarro of the World Health Organisation.  
He was speaking after his appointment as the new UN co-ordinator to lead a 
global drive to counter a human flu pandemic.  
“We expect the next influenza pandemic to come at any time now, and it's likely 
to be caused by a mutant of the virus that is currently causing bird flu in Asia,'' 
he said.  
The WHO has confirmed another fatal human case of H5N1 avian influenza in 
Indonesia.  
The patient, a 27-year-old woman from Jakarta who had contact with diseased 
chickens, developed symptoms on September 17, went to hospital on September 
19 and died on September 26.  
The woman is the fourth laboratory-confirmed case of H5N1 infection in 
Indonesia, three of them fatal. The virus does not pass from person to person 
easily, but experts believe this could change if the virus mutates.  
Dr Nabarro said with the almost certainty of another influenza pandemic soon, 
and with experts saying there is a high likelihood of the H5N1 virus mutating, it 
would be “extremely wrong'' to ignore the serious possibility of a global outbreak.  
``The avian flu epidemic has to be controlled if we are to prevent a human 
influenza pandemic,'' Dr Nabarro said.  
He was appointed by UN chief Kofi Annan, as the agency moved to intensify its 
battle plan against avian flu.  
The 1918 influenza pandemic killed more than 40 million people, and there were 
subsequent pandemics in 1957 and 1968 which had lower death rates but caused 
great disruption, he said.  
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Appendix IV: Focus Group Questions/Prompts 
 
Opening questions/prompts 
 
♦ ‘Think back to the time when you were first aware of the spectre avian 
influenza or bird flu’…….. 
♦ What were your reactions to this? ……..“did anybody react differently to 
this” 
♦ what did you do? - ex: rush out an buy bottled water/get on the 
internet/nothing 
 
Main questions 
 
♦ What do you think about the way organisations were putting out the 
messages? (if group doesn’t respond, use examples as follows):were they ‘in 
control’, ‘out of control’, over-reacting, being sensible, credible 
♦ How do you think the health organisations have handled the communication 
of avian influenza issues? (if group doesn’t respond, use examples as 
follows): seem well prepared, public are well informed, too much info too 
soon 
♦ How do you respond to the idea the pandemic planning and implementation 
of any plan would be left to the ‘officials’ at either national or local 
government level? (if group doesn’t respond, use examples as follows): 
wanted to have more control than that / make your own pandemic plan  
♦ Do you think that the official organisations are doing enough about the 
threat of avian flu 
♦ What did you think about the information that you were getting about avian 
flu? Ex: necessary, hype, true, alarming, just another media story, too much 
♦ What do you think about the risk of avian influenza now - Ex: over it, tired 
of hearing about scary stuff, problem sorted 
 
Follow up questions 
 
♦ ‘somebody mentioned the word ‘worry’ (or concern or panic), what was 
worrying’, ‘the most worrying’……… 
♦ Where did you get most of your public health information? – Ex: tv, 
newspapers, talking with friends….. 
♦ Are there any other health risks that worry you - Ex: 245T, skin cancer, 
global warming, vaccinations 
♦ Do they think that avian influenza is as much or more of a threat than these 
other health risks 
♦ Have you changed what you do since first hearing about bird flu (in regards 
to future planning)? - Ex: would not normally stockpile canned goods but do 
now 
**Remember** 
♦ Silences are OK – don’t elaborate or try to fill in the gaps 
♦ Don’t be directive, open-ended questions with as few concepts as possible 
♦ Its ‘their’ voices I want on tape, not mine and use their words to direct 
discussion – restate what they have said - Ex: “does anybody have a 
response to that/ a different view” 
♦ Debate is great! 
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Appendix V: Focus group information sheet 
  
Health Risk Reporting: Avian Influenza Coverage in New Zealand 
Newspapers 2002‐2008 
 
This discussion group forms part of research by Brenda Mackie, gathered for a 
University of Canterbury Masters of Arts thesis in Sociology. The purpose is to 
explore opinions and perceptions of media reporting about health scares, using 
the avian influenza as a case study. 
[This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee] 
 
Dear Participant 
 
By meeting together to discuss the topic of the Avian Influenza, it is hoped that 
data will be generated that will contribute towards understanding the 
relationship between media representations and the way that the public of New 
Zealand interpret those representations. This research aims to explore and 
understand views on how the media have reported avian influenza, through 
analysing ideas, issues and themes that emerge out of the group discussions. 
Core to this research paper is to understand how this reporting has contributed 
to the construction of particular ways of thinking and talking about avian 
influenza . 
 
These discussions will probably last no more than 90 minutes, with other 
participants whom you may know informally through friendship networks. At any 
time prior to the analysis of the data, you will be able to withdraw, and data 
pertaining to your involvement will be destroyed.  
If you are interested in the outcome of this research, or want more 
information, please feel free to contact the researcher or her supervisor via the 
contact below: 
Brenda Mackie: bam33@student.canterbury  
Dr Victoria Grace (Supervisor): victoria.grace@canterbury.ac.nz 03 364 2692 
  
PLEASE NOTE: By signing the attached form, you are giving your consent 
for data gathered from group discussions to be used as part of this MA 
research and may be published in the form of papers for conferences and 
journals 
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Appendix VI: Consent Form 
 
 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology 
University of Canterbury 
 
Consent Form 
Health Risk Reporting: Avian Influenza Coverage in New Zealand 
Newspapers 2002-2008 
 
November 2008 
  
I understand that I am participating in a group discussion about avian influenza 
and I have read and understood the information sheet. On this basis, I agree to 
be a participant in the discussion group, and I consent to publication of the 
results of the data with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
I am aware that all information I provide is confidential and that at any time 
prior to the analysis of the data, I may withdraw from the project, including the 
withdrawal and deletion of information I have provided. I also understand that 
the group discussions will be recorded and that I can, on request, review the 
audiotape/transcript. 
I note that the project has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
 
NAME (please print):______________________________________ 
 
PHONE:   ____________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE:  ____________________________ 
 
Demographic Information 
 
AGE:           ? 20-29    ? 30-39    ? 40-49    ? 50-59 ? 60 & over  
GENDER:       Male/Female 
ETHNICITY:    ? New Zealand European ? Maori ? Pacific Islander  
              ? Chinese ? Indian ? Korean  
              ? Other (specify) ________________________ 
 
OCCUPATION:   _______________________________________ 
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION:  (number of)  Adults ____ Children ___ 
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Appendix VII: Overview of Public Health in New Zealand (1872 – present). 
 
History of Public Health in New Zealand 
 
An organised system of public health was first introduced in New Zealand by the 
passing of the Public Health Act (1872), and by 1876, each province had been 
allocated its own Local Board of Health. For the first fifteen years, the only thing 
public health was seen to be responsible for were quarantine matters, but with the 
first case of the world-wide pandemic of bubonic plague occurred in Auckland in 
June 1900, a Department of Public Health was established and a new Public Health 
Act (1900) was passed by Government. The department was staffed with full-time 
salaried Government officers who had expert knowledge in public health. 
 
After the First World War and the influenza pandemic of 1918, the role and 
function of the Department expanded rapidly, and in addition to 'maintaining a 
sanitary environment’, it oversaw many activities which were grouped together 
under the designation of “Social Medicine”. 
Under the Health Act (1920) the Department of Health became responsible for the 
supervision of hospitals, charitable institutions, private hospitals, and for the 
control of nurses and midwives. In 1921 the School Medical Service and the School 
Dental Service were transferred to the Health Department from the Education 
Department; the Department of Mental Hospitals was added in 1948. 
 
The enactment of the Social Security Act 1938 introduced a range of treatment 
benefits, and in 1946, the supervision of health hazards in factories and other 
places of work was added to its responsibilities.  
 
According to The Health Act of 1956, The Department of Health is required to: 
? promote and conserve health: 
? prevent, limit, and suppress infectious and other diseases 
? advise local authorities in matters relating to public health in so far as they 
are charged with the care of public health 
? promote or carry out researches and investigations concerning public health 
and the prevention or treatment of disease 
? publish reports, information, and advice concerning the public health 
? organise and control medical, dental, and nursing services.  
Other related acts which the Public Health Act covers are: the Tuberculosis Act 
(1948), the Food and Drugs Act (1947). 
 
As of May 2009, there is a bill before Parliament to update and amend the 50 year 
old Health Act: to expand health emergency provisions, take account of changes in 
international travel patterns, (and threats such as SARS and pandemic influenza), 
manage health border controls and introduction of new guideline provisions aimed 
at reducing risks of non-communicable disease. 
http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/indexmh/summary-public-health-bill [and] 
http://www.teara.govt.nz/1966/M/MedicalServices/PublicHealth/en  
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Appendix VIII: Characterisation of the focus groups 
 
 
The study consisted of four focus groups, numbering five to eight participants with 
25 New Zealand-European adults ranging in age from 30 to 69. The majority of 
them were women (n=20), and only two participants did not have a tertiary 
education, with several having advanced degrees. The duration of the focus group 
session lasted between 52 minutes and 1 hour 30 and all participants chose to stay 
and have supper. One group continued talking for a further hour.  
 
Each focus group had its own emphasis depending on how many of the participants 
knew each other or how much they discovered they had in common. This 
‘commonality’ really helped with the communication within the groups, and 
established an atmosphere of trust. In one group for example, two participants 
discovered that they knew each other because they were both lay ministers in the 
Methodist church. Others had papers that they had taken at the local university in 
common, and were able to chat about the content and the lecturers. 
  
Each group engaged with the focus group topic and the cue articles, albeit in 
different ways. One group reached a consensus within 5 minutes that the cue 
article was sensationalised ‘media-hype’, which lead to strong opinions but 
opinions that were not debated. This also may have lead to opinions that were 
stronger than if they had not been contested. I have wondered about why this was 
so, and have concluded a couple of reasons: the group consisted of six people, two 
in a relationship, two others who were starting relationship and two separate 
others. Without exception, the ‘couples’ did not disagree with each other – they 
agreed with each other’s statements, built upon their comments and one man in 
particular, seemed to take exception to any comments that contradicted his 
partners, vociferously questioning any such contrary statement. It made for a very 
united and strongly expressed group. In other groups where there were established 
couples, this ‘unity of voice’ did not happen. 
One other group had one person who was particularly opinionated, and voiced her 
opinion at every possible chance. I was initially worried about this, but the group 
negotiated around her, and it did not stop them from saying what they wanted to 
say – they just had to wait a bit longer!  
 
 
Despite some quirks of personality, I got some terrific data, and in hindsight, would 
change little about the make-up of the groups. If I ran focus groups again, I would 
definitely make sure that each participant knew at least one other person, I think 
this helped tremendously. I would possibly be aware of the ‘couple’ dynamic, and 
maybe would not necessarily avoid it, but make sure that my group either had 
couples whom I knew to be independent thinkers, or did not have too many in one 
group. 
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Appendix IX: New Zealand Ministry of Health ‘Get Ready for a flu pandemic’ 
postal campaign letter to households and brochure  
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Appendix X: New Zealand Ministry of Health ‘Get Ready for a flu pandemic’ 
postal campaign brochure  
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